Ever since Vladimir Putin came to power a decade ago, the Kremlin regime has relied on two pillars: the security forces and energy exports. By suppressing internal rivals and absorbing their assets, the regime created a dual monopoly.
Redistributing some of the profits from high energy prices enabled the regime to improve living standards and make itself popular with ordinary Russians. And resolving internal problems through a disproportionate use of force reassured even the regime's security obsessed ex-KGB men.
Until recently, this combination of carrots and sticks functioned effectively. The virtual absence of popular protest in Russia during the Mr Putin years seems amazing. But make no mistake: Mr Putin's popularity ratings relied not on his vigor, humor, or mystique, but on salaries and credits that Russians had never enjoyed before. And, as long as oil prices were growing faster than Russian salaries, those in power could still grab a big slice of the profits.
Now that happy union between the Kremlin and ordinary Russians is ending. Few Russian policymakers, much less the Russian public, expected oil and gas prices to collapse as they have. We do not know what will happen next. If prices rebound, Mr Putin and his people will glorify themselves for their wisdom. But if prices remain stagnant at current levels, Putin's system is doomed to failure. It is no coincidence that George W. Bush's and Mr Putin's disastrous presidencies were cotemporaneous. By driving up energy prices, Mr Bush was Mr Putin's greatest ally, with Mr Putin returning the favour by refocusing Russia from its multiple problems to "terrorism." Both sought to undo the work of their successful predecessors, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin. Both led their countries into traps with which their successors must deal. When Mr Bush said that he liked what he saw in Mr Putin's eyes, he meant it. But their successors are as different as the procedures that brought them to power.
Since Soviet times, the Kremlin has traditionally been wary about Democratic administrations in the United States. John F. Kennedy refused to tolerate the Soviet military presence in Cuba. Jimmy Carter boycotted the Moscow Olympics. Mr Clinton led the successful operation against Slobodan Milosevic's Serbia, the Kremlin's best friend in Europe. And Mr Obama's triumph heralded the fall in oil prices.
With energy revenues screeching to a halt, Mr Putin's regime will lose popularity. Central myths about Mr Putin the healer of the nation and the supplier of giveaway budgets are collapsing.
And Mr Putin cannot avoid responsibility. If the Kremlin claimed credit for the oil- and gas-fired prosperity of the past six years - prosperity due solely to economic exuberance elsewhere in the world - the Kremlin should be accountable for the current devastation.
© Project Syndicate, 2009. www.project-syndicate.org