Since the Syrian uprising transformed itself into a civil war, I have several times been treated to a recitation of the famous Arabic verses that speak of Syria as the beating heart of the Arabs. Each time, my interlocutors – Jordanian, Libyan, Palestinian, even Kurds of Syria – declaimed the lines in classical Arabic, the image of “heart” long learned and understood by heart.
The future of Syria may not be ‘regime change’ but ‘regime disappearance’- Ranier Fsadni
The resonance of language is an intrinsic part of the image’s political and cultural resonance. The very name of Syria condenses a shared millennial history, the hopes of modern Arab nationalism as well as its failures and betrayal.
A European, trying to understand how a place can capture so many disparate, ambivalent meanings, would need to contemplate Rome and Athens, their past glory and present dust.
Even though it may be difficult for a European to apprehend the full symbolic significance of the human tragedy currently engulfing Syria, the conflict still offers several simple lessons about the region, if only we are ready to learn them.
On Tuesday, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation met in Mecca, at the invitation of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, to discuss a proposal to suspend Syria from the 57-member organisation, representing 1.5 billion Muslims worldwide, the vast majority of whom are not Arabs.
At the time of writing, the proposal to suspend Syria was reported to have the support of the majority of foreign ministers. However, Algeria had reservations while Iran, the Syrian regime’s closest ally among Muslim states, openly criticised the proposal. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called for the unity of Muslim states in defence of foreign aggression against Syria.
Almost 11 years after 9/11, Euro-American discussions about Islam are still dominated by the idea that the religion controls the state where Muslims are in the majority. To all those who are prepared to see, however, this summit suggests the direct opposite.
An organisation based on religious identity is actually dominated by states, their presidents and foreign ministers. Nationalist agendas and geo-strategic interest, not religion, are shaping the particular stand that each state is taking.
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are heavily financing Islamist fighters, some of them extremist. While the fighters themselves may be motivated by a theological vision, the financiers are more concerned to ward off Iran’s influence in the region as well as that of the United States, which, together with some European allies, have been advising, arming and training certain factions of the Syrian rebels for the last several months.
It is true that these different nationalist agendas correspond to a Sunni-Shiite sectarian divide within Islam. But this is only a partial and superficial truth. It would not explain the stance of Algeria, an almost entirely Sunni state. Thirty-six years ago, when Lebanon collapsed and the Syrian (Shiite) Alawite regime supported the Christian Maronite faction against fellow Muslims, no one had any difficulty understanding that national interests trumped religious identity. Why should it be different today?
Descriptions of the Syrian civil war as a popular uprising against a detested, vicious regime, dominated by the Alawite minority, have misrepresented the complexity of alliances on the ground.
The regime is indeed possibly the most vicious in the region, despite stiff competition. But it has still managed to attract support from several quarters: Christians and Kurds, middle and upper classes, as well as tribal groups that fear the alternative as worse.
Class, ethnicity and religious identity are all part of the mix of factors shaping allegiances. The results are not easily predictable, even by the protagonists themselves. In the Alawite heartland of Latakia, some Alawites have thrown in their lot with the rebels. Elsewhere, Sunnis support the regime.
One factor shaping allegiance has been the fact that the story of the civil war can be read in two ways. In Europe, we are familiar with reading the events as popular reaction to regime brutality. So do many Syrians. Others, however, attribute the escalation of killings to Western and Gulf sponsorship of fighting groups, some of them foreign.
In any case, this week, a news report suggested that the US, the UK and France were scrambling to foster direct links with rebel fighters as they came to acknowledge that the Syrian National Council is unable to lead a unified opposition.
Finally, we may need to recognise – as Syria experts like Joshua Landis are urging – that the future of Syria may not be “regime change” but “regime disappearance Syria as a failed state and, like Lebanon during its civil war, a swamp infested by numerous fighting groups who cannot obtain a decisive victory over any other.
On this scenario, the Assad regime does not disappear. It simply transforms itself into a faction with its own powerful militia and impregnable territory in the Alawite heartland. It does appear as though President Bashar al-Assad may be preparing for this eventuality. He is arming Kurds and Arab tribes, whose autonomy would make Syria ungovernable.
The long-term plan behind this scheme, where national unity is deliberately destroyed, would be to pave the way for an eventual return to politics once the fighting has exhausted itself. The same way that Lebanon’s criminal warlords have returned to positions of influence many years after international condemnation.
ranierfsadni@europe.com