A few months ago, rebel fighters in Libya often went to the battlefront unarmed. They waited for one of their companions to be killed so that they could pick up his weapon, which was often enough older than the fighter himself. Since the weapon drops in western Libya, that has changed.

The arms are now modern and in better supply. Many foreign military advisers are embedded within the rebel forces. But this alone is not going to be enough to bring about Muammar Gaddafi’s defeat. Some European military observers are talking of a war that will be decided by which side will rot and collapse first: the regime or the Nato alliance, increasingly fraught with tension over the expense of the war and the terms of fidelity to the UN mandate.

Talk about a waiting game might seem odd just when the momentum appears to be firmly on the rebels’ side. The official international recognition of the Transitional National Council is proceeding. The rebels are tempering their courage with military discipline. The economy in Tripoli is under great strain.

However, there are reasons to be cautious. This uprising has shown how strengths, in one phase of the struggle, can be transformed into weakness.

Phase one, the initial rebellion in the east, showed how two of the long-standing strengths of the Gaddafi regime could suddenly change its fortunes. Oil-wealth had previously meant that the state had huge revenues that did not depend on national labour productivity. It was not vulnerable to workers’ strikes and it had deep pockets to reach into when consumption needed heavy subsidies.

Meanwhile, the practice of posting supporters in their home territory meant that the state was represented by people able to read the local mood sharply. This made the Jamahiriya more responsive to popular needs than foreign observers often made allowance for.

The initial uprising in February showed how these strengths could become reversed. The brigade initially sent to quell the protests was, from the commander down, made up largely of men from the area. They were close enough to the people that, when the orders from Tripoli were too brutal than they could stomach (it was the instructions to bomb Benghazi from the air that appears to have marked the limit), it was a small step to go over to the other side.

As for oil wealth, the very same feature that made the state independent of its people and complex organisation – one just needs a few oil rigs and ports – was its Achilles heel: the source of wealth was relatively easy to capture.

Phase two was that part of the following conflict before Nato became involved.

At first, many rebels and their supporters believed the speed of their conquests showed that the regime was going to collapse in a matter of days. In fact, however, they were misunderstanding the nature of their strength and how quickly it could turn into weakness.

Libya is both one of the largest countries in Africa, in terms of sheer size, as well as one of the smallest, in terms of population. This means that many towns and settlements have huge empty spaces between them. In military terms, it would mean that the capture of one town signifies rapid capture of a long stretch of territory. Equally, it means that retreat from a lost stronghold becomes a panicked flight for the nearest cover, sometimes 100 kilometres away.

The rebel fighters, often dismissive of their fellow professional soldiers’ caution, allowed themselves to be overstretched and were close to being on their knees when Nato intervened.

Phase three saw another initial advantage of the rebels become weakness.

Nato’s intervention virtually eliminated Col Gaddafi’s air force. This meant that in several towns rebels could gain the upper hand as the state forces were overstretched.

However, the rebel towns’ isolation, which permitted initial success, also prevented the rebels from unifying nationally. The vast country’s communications were under central control and could even be turned off at the flick of a switch.

We are presently in phase four, where it appears that the rebels may finally begin to unify their various forces and edge towards Tripoli.

However, their military ascendancy may play a part in exposing their civic weakness.

In terms of conflicts elsewhere, the Libyan uprising has proceeded at great speed. In Libyan terms, however, the fighting has been protracted. In a country without much in terms of routine political infrastructure, the fighting may have strengthened the political credentials of the military leaders and undermined civilian leadership.

In Benghazi, for example, it would appear that the initial volunteer culture of the city has almost evaporated. Crime has soared (as it has in certain other eastern towns) and corruption is said to be rife. In western Libya, the Los Angeles Times has reported, rebels have sometimes expelled an entire town’s inhabitants to Tripoli.

Both Col Gaddafi and the Transitional National Council must have their eye on the battle clock. For Col Gaddafi, the race is about hoping that he can outlast the international coalition’s resolve. For the Council, the race is to win the war before the civic revolution it promises is lost, before, that is, the country is so changed and brutalised by conflict that the power and authority of the commanders will persist into the peace.

ranierfsadni@europe.com