We are glad about the recent publication of the document by the Peace and Justice Commission, one month after the murder of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia, even though we were surprised the commission realised our country is at a crossroads only in relation to this event.

We too condemn and were shocked by the murder, and send our condolences to her fami­ly. Yet, this was not the first apparently professional murder to happen this year.

Moreover, phenomena like the widening gap between haves and have nots, the risk of Malta becoming a centre for money laundering related to financial services being a main pillar of the economy, the morality of having iGaming as a mainstay of the economy, and a culture of rampant individualism and self-centeredness, which obviously affects all spheres of society, including politics – phenomena which seriously threaten peace and justice in our society – have been conspicuous for more than a decade.

We would like to react critically to the document, not as a negative exercise but by ana­lysing its limits and possibilities. This article hopefully offers further food for thought to the document’s interesting insights.

The document notes that “reactions to the murder ranged from impassioned calls for justice to complete almost callous indifference”. It claims this “highlights the polarisation that exists within our country, which remains deeply divided along the fault lines of party political allegiance”.

It then seems to link these diverse reactions to the murder to the partisan divide that undoubtedly exists. If the analysis were correct, it would apparently entail those who made “impassioned calls for justice” belonging to one side of this divide and those of “callous indifference” to the other.

If this is what is implied, the document sustains the partisan chasm it claims to condemn – labelling one side as moral and the other as callous – and makes a claim both fallacious and simplistic. Not merely were impassioned calls for justice made by individuals on all sides of the partisan barricade but the indifference was manifested by people who do not necessarily belong to the same side, and not simply for partisan reasons.

Some were indifferent because they em­body the individualist and self-centred ethos the dominant culture has promoted for ages (this might explain phenomena like the scant student participation at the university vigil). Others because they felt culturally and economically (i.e. in terms of social class) detached from the victim, and others because, regrettably, they are unable to practise the Christian commandment of forgiveness in relation to episodes where they were aggriev­ed by the late journalist.

Boiling down the variety of reactions to the murder to partisan fault-lines ends up sustaining the latter.

The document rightly claims, quoting Pope Benedict XVI, that peace “is founded on truth, justice, freedom and love”. It rightly claims “we must uphold truth in our lives”, noting there is disrespect for truth, and denouncing those who make truth subservient to partisan allegiances. All very true. Yet, the document seems unable to follow its very sensible injunction “to look beyond what is immediately apparent”. It fails to discuss other factors that may inhibit the search for truth, like class bias, euro-centricism and implicit racism, implicit sexism, phobia towards members of some religious group or towards religion or lack of belief in general, and failure to acknowledge the cultures and narratives of people by dismissing them as culturally or intellectually inferior. Genuine dialogue and search for truth requires one to be aware of all these.

Moreover, the document might have indicated that the search for truth cannot be reduced to the almost public lynching of this or that individual, is respectful of evidence and does not rush to conclusions, and cannot be immaculately carried out in respect to Peter but be sloppy and slapdash in relation to Paul. “Look[ing] beyond what is imme­diately apparent” should also induce one also to make honest, daring reflections that look beyond single individuals and consider the economic, political and cultural structures in place, which structures might be ultimately responsible for the phenomena that obtain in society, and hence have to be changed or abandoned if one wants change.

Regarding justice, the document rightly recognises that it involves more than making an individual or group of people pay for a serious crime; that a just society is just in spirit and not simply in its words, does not hide its misdeeds behind legalistic jargon, sees that the rights and obligations of all are respected, and assures true equality before the law. It fittingly notes that ultimately it is the most vulnerable members of society who suffer if all this is not in place. It also rightly denounces political patronage and personal connections, noting that for justice to obtain in society, government and State institutions must function properly, and that a culture that favours justice (rather than practices which are inimical to it) needs to be sustained and created.

The document sustains the partisan chasm it claims to condemn

The document limits itself to retributive justice. But peace in society cannot obtain without another type – social justice. A society where the management of the State is immaculate but based on economic and politi­cal structures that create poverty and social exclusion, and lead to marginalisation – perhaps justifying this in terms of race, gender, meritocracy or the supposedly low tastes and inferior intelligence of the have-littles – is a society that values neither justice nor peace. And, as the document rightly notes, while State and economic management is necessary to achieve this ideal, it is not sufficient to achieve justice in this regard. Social justice requires people who believe in it and sustain it, and who do not create a culture inimical to it through their choices, values, opinions and writings.

These considerations apply to the other pillar on which peace rests, love, which as the document rightly acknowledges, “is not just a vague feeling of empathy [but] implies a firm and concrete commitment to solidarity”, taking effective steps to ensure “the good of the other”. We would only add that in such exercise no group or set of people should be marginalised for their cultural tastes, political allegiance or the nature of the work they or their families are engaged in, and that for such exercise to be truly empowering one cannot adopt a paternalistic or elitist attitude towards any set of people.

Regarding freedom, the document rightly recognises that this “is not simply the ability to do and say what I like whenever I like, or that I live free from fear and want… It is also freedom for the purpose of seeking what is true and loving… working for justice and the common good… to engage actively in the secu­lar world…”. However, the document disappoints by limiting itself to the first type of freedom (the one qualified as “not simply the”). In concrete terms it refers only to the State that has a duty to “uphold the right of all, even those it does not agree with… to criti­cise and to engage socially and politically… and [to create] strong and independent institutions, equipped to guarantee the defence of individual liberty”.

The suggestion made in relation to freedom to air one’s views is dry and formal, apparently considering freedom an issue involving only the State on the one hand and the individual on the other � the classical liberal and fallacious picture of freedom. It ignores other factors at work, like control by certain interests (political parties, economic groups, certain powerful families) of the major media outlets, including those most effective at moulding public opinion. There might be a situation –perhaps it already exists – where formally the media is free but certain classes, groups or individuals who try to speak in politically effective ways are practically excluded from airing their concerns and views.

This is the antithesis of freedom. Trying to make up for this lack of freedom does not involve simply the creation of watchdogs but includes teaching people (starting in school) how to read the media. This begins with questions like: “Who is included or excluded in the article?”, “Who owns the media outlet and what are their interests?”; “What are the interests, ties and connections of the writer?” (Questions which even the Church should ask in relation to its media?) This would greatly enhance freedom, which as the document rightly notes “is not simply the ability to do and say what I like whenever I like”.

The rest of the document makes sensible claims with which we generally agree. It notes the need to acknowledge responsibility – on individual and collective levels – for the current state of society,  inviting readers to pray for capable and effective politicians, calling on the faithful to “engage in concrete action to bring change” and inviting the faithful to engage in political institutions, though it fallaciously indicates this as a special duty of Catholics, when in fact, it is a duty of all people of good will.

A final consideration. The document claims it is not “in the fight of ideas but only in action [that lies] freedom”. We agree that freedom is manifested in action. But action, not guided by discernment and dialectical engagement between ideas, reduces the human being to the level of other species. Indeed, could it be that one of the reasons for the state of our society is the lack of “fight of ideas” (a phenomenon which characterises not just our society but many others) in areas like politics? Is this absence reducing political engagement to an exercise in management and economic success regardless of the costs?

We thank the commission for the docu­ment and the opportunity to engage in this reflection.

The authors are: Fr Colin Apap, Andrew Camilleri, Bernard Cauchi, Ruth Cauchi, Michael Grech, Roger Mamo, Charles Miceli, Fr Mark Montebello.