One of the areas in our constitutional set-up that needs a thorough revisit is the perceived lack of a clear demarcation between the executive and the legislative branches of the Maltese state. Or so, I would have thought.

Malta’s experience with Labour government MPs being appointed chairmen of State-owned entities is not a very happy one

Apparently, the Prime Minister thinks otherwise. He is on the verge of proposing changes in the Standing Orders of the House of Representatives and in legislation so that MPs could participate in the decision-making process with appointments as chairpersons of government entities and authorities.

It does seem that this is the “natural consequence” of his having promised a role to each MP on the government side. There is no doubt that backbenchers on the Government side tend to become restless if they find that all they have to do is to attend Parliament, intervene by making speeches or asking questions… and vote for their side, whether their opinion on the issue that is being voted upon had been sought or not.

When the Prime Minister’s predecessor faced a somewhat similar problem during the previous legislature, he sought to appoint all backbench MPs as parliamentary assistants – an undefined role that eventually turned out to be a practically meaningless appointment that simply served to be the proverbial ‘sop to Cerberus’.

Under the Mintoff-led Labour administrations, it was not unusual for MPs to be given appointments that were directly or indirectly connected with the executive. For a long time, both government-owned commercial banks had sitting government MPs serving as chairmen.

Having the entire banking sector owned by the state was bad enough. Having Government MPs directly involved in the supposedly commercial decisions of these banks made matters worse, of course.

Malta’s experience with Labour government MPs being appointed chairmen of State-owned entities is not a very happy one and the Prime Minister would do well to be wary of this step. It all boils down to the confusion there seems to be in the minds of many as regards the distinction that there should be between the executive and the legislative branches of the state – a confusion that unfortunately appears to be across the whole political spectrum.

Nobody contests the general election to become a minister and elected members are all equal – except for the person that is deemed to enjoy the trust of the majority of members, who is appointed Prime Minister by the President. This first among equals then proceeds to choose the Cabinet that is constitutionally the executive. In Malta, the Prime Minister’s choice is a limited one: only MPs can become Cabinet members.

While the Prime Minister and the Cabinet members double as both part of the executive and members of the legislature, it would be wrong if all the MPs on the government side become part of the machinery that runs the executive. That would tend to undermine the legislative function and the supremacy of Parliament with the government using it simply to rubber-stamp its decisions.

In his first speech as Leader of the Opposition, Simon Busuttil insisted that the PN in Opposition is prepared to cooperate with the Government but that it cannot be part of the executive. He also referred to the defunct Opposition Nominee Act passed during Eddie Fenech Adami’s 1992-96 administration. This gave the opposition the right to nominate a person that enjoys its trust on the boards of several parastatal bodies.

Alfred Sant, then Leader of the Opposition, refused to use the powers it gave him and nominate anyone on these boards. When he became Prime Minister in 1996, the PN in opposition initially insisted on using this right to nominate members but then Sant took steps to abrogate that law.

The idea was to ascertain that the opposition would have more trust that everything going on in the relevant board meetings was above suspicion. The Opposition Nominees Act gave the opposition the right to nominate on parastatal boards a person who wasn’t an MP nor a representative of the opposition. Sant’s objections notwithstanding, it was not tantamount to the opposition being given some participatory role in the decisions taken by the executive.

The solution to the restlessness of government backbenchers that would also give a more participatory role to opposition MPs is to have more select committees monitoring what is happening in the important sectors where government seems to have an uncontrolled free rein. This has already happened limitedly in some sectors but more can be developed on these lines. In this way, MPs can give a more substantial input to our democratic process without undermining the checks and balances between the legislative and the executive functions of the state.

Having all government MPs directly or indirectly involved in the executive tends to lead to a situation where these checks and balances – difficult as they already are – evaporate into thin air.

Is it worth taking this road for the sake of a vague promise made to those MPs who were left out of the biggest Cabinet this country has ever seen? Is this what Joseph Muscat wants?

micfal@maltanet.net