The judgment of the Civil Court, First Hall of March 28 in the names of Nigel Mallett v Dolmen Complex Limited (1270/2010GM) is a significant one for the way it touches the different facets of what can be described as ‘premises liability’. It is a judgment that sounds a warning to all those (be it shops, offices, or as in this case, hotels) receiving guests in their premises, and sheds light on their responsibility towards their patrons and invitees.
Every person has a duty to ensure a reasonable degree of security of a property for which he is responsible, particularly if third parties are to be invited or permitted into same. Premises liability is a legal concept that typically comes into play when an injury is caused by some type of hazard or unsafe condition in someone else’s property.
The premise is that an individual has a right to be safe in places wherein he is invited or wherein he is permitted. As with most personal injury cases, the litmus test is whether there was any negligence on the part of the person alleged to be responsible, that is, whether there had been a failure of one to take reasonable care in situations where one would typically expect one’s property to be visited by other persons.
The case at hand was what can be described as a typical ‘slip and fall’ incident. The plaintiff, an IT manager at the University of Malta, was helping in the organisation of a conference at the premises – a hotel run by defendant company. While going down the stairs, he slipped in a puddle of water leaking from a number of planters, and fell, injuring himself. He suffered a permanent disability, quantified at six per cent.
The court studied the version recounted by the number of witnesses who were present on the day, as well as those who were familiar with the hotel’s daily practices. After analysing the facts at hand, it transpired that indeed, on the day of the incident, there was water along the staircase leading to the restaurant, and no notice warning passers-by to exercise caution was placed anywhere in the vicinity. Having established the fact, the court then moved to study the legal aspects of the case, quoting authors and judgments which in the past had already delved into matters similar to the case at hand.
It stated that the hotelkeeper’s duty to provide a safe environment is akin to a consideration for the payment received. Indeed, this obligation is one of a contractual nature, and therefore, the hotelkeeper’s responsibility is not a mere product of the accident itself but is born out of a pre-existent contractual relationship dictated by the very nature of the hotelkeeper-guest juridical rapport.
The difference may not mean much to most, but in reality, it has significant legal implications, particularly in respect of the question of what proof must be submitted for a case for damages to be successful. In cases where damages arise out of a contractual relationship (ex contractu), it would be sufficient for the claimant to prove the existence of an obligation towards him, while in a claim arising purely from the incident causing harm and no other pre-existent contractual relationship (ex delicto vel quasi), one would need to demonstrate the causal link between the harm and the person responsible for it.
Every person has a duty to ensure a reasonable degree of security of a property for which he is responsible, particularly if third parties are to be invited or permitted into same
The court stated that the plaintiff had managed to prove that there was a pre-existent contractual relationship and consequent infringement.
Surely enough, the fact that the plaintiff slipped and fell on the water and got injured while in the hotel premises was sufficient for the purpose of the case, more so when considering that defendant company had not managed to prove otherwise, or to convince the court that it was not responsible for the occurrence.
To the court, it mattered not that the plants in the staircase were watered by another company; for the contractual relationship between the hotelkeeper and the guest remained unaltered.
The court also referred to one of the respondent company’s pleas, in which it had pleaded to be exonerated from responsibility since it had always engaged competent people and exercised the necessary diligence in respect of the people so employed. In doing this, the respondent company had effectively raised the qualifications of the doctrine of culpa in eligendo as a defence, a principle of tort law that imposes strict liability on employers for any tort committed by their employees.
This defence presupposes that the “employer’s” liability is only to those cases where it is proven that the employed had engaged incompetent persons or persons which he ought to have known were not competent. Defendant company’s logic was that it did not engage incompetent persons, and that therefore, it could not be held liable.
The court disagreed. It cautiously noted that this defence could not be availed of in cases where damages ensued out of breach of contract. As this was the case, such defence could not be successful.
Having extinguished all that was needed to be said in respect of the responsibility of the incident, the court then moved to quantify the damages suffered, and condemned the respondent company to pay the plaintiff the sum of €11,160.48.
Carlos Bugeja is senior associate at Azzopardi, Borg & Abela Advocates.