In the wake of peaceful protests, a frail-looking Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of Algeria since 1999, announced that he would not stand as a candidate in the forthcoming elections.
The ruling party – the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) – seemed to take the side of the protestors. High-ranking officials claimed that they understood the reasons behind the widespread protests and the demands of the demonstrators. They urged Algerians to “stand united, alert and mobilised during this sensitive phase in the history of our country”.
The junior coalition partner – the Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND) – has also been critical and it claimed that the country had been run by “unconstitutional forces” for some years.
We can only speculate on whether their stance was taken out of conviction or convenience. What is certain is that the FLN and the RND join a list of political organisations, trade unions, student groups and other individuals who are demanding some form of change. Even the military seems to be deserting Bouteflika.
President Bouteflika’s announcement did little to appease the demonstrators. In effect, his proposed compromise seemed like a double-edged sword.
On the one hand, his announcement seemed to suggest that his grip on power was coming to an end. On the other hand, elections scheduled for April 2019 were postponed, and the President announced that he would lead the country through a period of transition until a new constitution can be drafted and voted on by the electorate.
The protestors interpreted this as an attempt by the President to curb the momentum on their demands and to extend his term of office while postponing elections.
The developments in Algeria cannot be ignored by regional players including the European Union and the Mediterranean member states. Algeria is Africa’s largest energy producer and is considered to be a bulwark against Islamist militancy. Algeria’s civil war during the 1990s raises the spectre of further bloodshed and instability in the southern shores of the Mediterranean.
Moreover, violence and instability could push more people to take the perilous journey across the Mediterranean, thus putting further pressure on existing stretched financial resources.
So far, the protests seem to be peaceful. Young people are at the forefront of the protests in a country plagued by high levels of youth unemployment estimated to stand at 29 per cent. However, the demonstrations remained leader-less and were primarily organised over social media platforms. This should raise some uncomfortable questions.
The experience of the ‘Arab Spring’ shows that other groups can soon hijack demands for greater democratic participation
Bouteflika is no great democrat. He exemplifies the post-colonial leader who, after having fought against the colonial power, opted for autocracy rather than democracy. In the struggle for freedom, such leaders could count on the support of two great anti-colonial powers; the United States and the Soviet Union.
Alas, many chose to model their government structures on the latter rather than the former.
A militant in the FLN since his teens, he was close to Colonel Houari Boumedienne who would later serve as chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Algeria and President of Algeria until his death in 1978. During the Boumedienne regime, Bouteflika served as Minister for Foreign Affairs. When Boumedienne died, Bouteflika fell out of favour.
A reversal of fortune came some decades later. After successfully fighting off the Islamist insurrection, the military establishment suggested that he run for president. Other candidates withdrew. He chose his former mentor Boumedienne as his model for government.
Some Islamists were given ministries, thereby allowing the apparatus of the State to keep some control over places of worship and their leaders. The Kabylie region – a potential source of conflict and one which demands more decentralisation – was kept under watch. Oil revenues allowed him to embark on wide-ranging housing programmes.
His regime was bogged down with corruption and cronyism. Frustration breeds contempt, particularly among the young who are often well-educated but unemployed or underemployed.
In 2013, Bouteflika suffered multiple strokes. He has been using a wheelchair since and public appearances are few and far between. Indeed, he was reportedly receiving treatment in Switzerland when the protests broke out. Speculation about his health is rife.
Indeed, the West has for too long avoided an uncomfortable question: “What will life be like after Bouteflika?”
Given the complete mismanagement and mishandling of the so-called “Arab Spring” – a misnomer if there was ever one – we need to begin making uncomfortable questions about the future of Algeria and its implications on the Mediterranean region and Europe.
The first question should concern the aftermath of Bouteflika’s departure. Will Islamists exploit any potential vacuum of power? Will the tensions which left more than 150,000 people dead over a decade in the 1990s resurface?
The second concerns the involvement of groups extraneous to Algeria; will movements based outside Algeria try to influence the situation within Algeria?
Such questions are not merely academic. The experience of the “Arab Spring” shows that other groups can soon hijack demands for greater democratic participation. The result was an unfolding humanitarian crisis and political instability.
The coming weeks will be crucial – not merely for the Algerian protestors who are rightly demanding what should be legitimately theirs, but also for Europe. During this delicate time, it can ill-afford another crisis on its doorstep.
André Debattista is an independent researcher in politics and international relations.
This is a Times of Malta print opinion piece