A few weeks ago, in the German Parliament, on a national day of mourning for the victims of war, President Emmanuel Macron made an impassioned case for a “European army” and a tougher foreign policy to prevent the European Union becoming a “plaything” of the United States, Russia and China.
He said that a strong and assertive Europe was the only way to prevent a return to the great-power conflicts of the 20th century. He called on Angela Merkel to support reforms to turn Europe into a big player on the international stage, arguing that the EU was not fit to confront the security threats of the 21st century.
Only a week before, in the European Parliament, Merkel had appeared to back calls for a European army. She said in a dig seen as critical of President Donald Trump: “The times in which we could rely implicitly on others are over. If we want to survive as a community, we will have to take hold of our own destiny more firmly.” But she has also since qualified this proposal by emphasising that the European army was a “long-term ambition”, an aspiration since underlined by her Defence Minister.
The proposal to create a European army – possibly separate, in some eyes, from Nato – is the latest fault line in deteriorating relations between Europe and the US. And President Trump has been predictably scathing about it. He has repeatedly called for European allies to contribute a greater share of the costs of Nato, with the majority of countries, including Germany, falling short of the two per cent of GDP they are supposed to fork out.
All talk of European defence arrangements are militarily flimsy. No European countries have the military weight now, or in the foreseeable future, to replace American military clout, either through huge movements of heavy armour and other conventional forces to defend Europe or, more importantly, in nuclear terms, notwithstanding France’s and Britain’s contributions. Without the US, the balance of terror tips overwhelmingly in favour of Russia.
The European army as a project is militarily absurd. Armies do not exist in a vacuum. They need communications, intelligence and logistics, together with air and maritime support and command and control. On all of these, Europe is heavily – often utterly – dependent on US capabilities. For anything more than the lightest peacekeeping duties, an autonomous European army is a fantasy.
Armies need political masters. Who is going to send this European fighting force into battle? The European Commission president? The president of the European Council of Ministers?
All talk of European defence arrangements are militarily flimsy
It is hard to see countries such as Germany, where the Bundestag micromanages all military deployments, agreeing to put its soldiers under the command of European bureaucrats. Political agreement over when and where it would be used would be very difficult to achieve.
No European leader – not even, I suspect, President Macron for all his lobbying for the idea – has any realistic belief of creating a supranational European army. The German Defence Minister clarified only recently that Berlin, like other EU capitals, does not plan on ever giving up national authority over troop deployments.
Far from enhancing the defences of EU democracies, such a move could weaken and split the North Atlantic alliance just at the time when Europe needs solidarity. The most plausible basis for European defence cooperation is the strengthening, or reinvention, of the European pillar of Nato as the US withdraws or becomes a less reliable partner.
The question marks over the US commitment to European security are greater than at any time since the Berlin airlift 70 years ago. As Brexit looms and American engagement ebbs, the old dividing lines around Nato and the EU are blurring fast. An Anglo-French expeditionary force aims to be operational by 2020. President Macron has also launched a nine-country European Intervention Initiative, which is independent of both Nato and the EU.
The advantages of the new security arrangements between France and Britain – set up outside EU structures – are speed and flexibility. Instead of the lumbering 29-country Nato bureaucracy (which is vulnerable to vetoes and delays), the new coalitions are of countries that share similar perceptions of the threat and trust each other to contribute speedily and effectively in dealing with it.
Few would disagree that closer European defence cooperation has become imperative. A poll in 2015 showed that Germans would not support Nato military intervention even to protect an ally from Russian aggression. Since then, trust in US leadership has evaporated further. European policymakers agree they need to take security more seriously and spend more on defence. But in most countries they struggle to do it, even under a Nato label.
The promised autonomy of a European army may be illusory but the practical gains, it is argued by those who advocate it, could be real. European defence cooperation can add value by integrating European defence markets and coordinating multi-national procurement projects. This would be a realistic ambition, leading to a larger number of better equipped, more flexible forces, greater specialisation and hard-headed equipment procurement and the removal of bureaucratic and physical obstacles to the speedy movement of troops and equipment. These capabilities would be of use to Nato.
Nato, not the EU, is the cornerstone of Europe’s collective defence and, crucially, retains the US as the leading member. Talk of the formation of a European army overlooks many of the practicalities needed to make it succeed. Effective combined operations require not only an understanding of capabilities and competences but also commitment. Moreover, talk of “decision-making autonomy from Nato” is counterproductive and undermines Nato.
For decades, hawkish supporters of the Atlantic alliance have resisted any independent European defence initiatives, seeing them as a plot to undermine Nato. But the question that any discussion of a European army raises is the most fundamental of all: What is Nato for?
The answer is still to counter Russian threats. This is why President Vladimir Putin is committed to the dissolution of Nato and why it is vital to ensure that talk of the formation of a European army must only be considered as the political precursor to a stronger European pillar of Nato.
This is a Times of Malta print opinion piece