In 1976, the Labour government won re-election with a stronger majority than in 1971. It was flush with an economic revival after a series of controversial nationalisations of key industries.
By 1981, its 6,000 vote majority had evaporated; although the MLP stayed in power for five more years, having secured a majority of seats (no corrective mechanism was in place then).
In 1992, the Nationalist government won re-election with a stronger majority than in 1987. It was riding a wave of economic liberalisation. By 1996, its 13,000 vote majority had disappeared and the PN lost the election.
In 2003, the Nationalist government won re-election with a reduced majority compared to 1998. By 2008, this 8,000 vote advantage had shrivelled to 1,580. It was enough to secure re-election, true, but with the flimsiest of margins.
The 2008 election was the only election in Malta’s parliamentary history – which will be 100 years old in 2021 – to have returned the same political party to power for a third successive term. But only just.
Indeed, the result was quite unexpected, and bucked the trend of Labour Party victories in local council elections in the immediately preceding years.
It is as if there are some very serious challenges facing political parties in power in Malta once they hit the end of theirsecond term.
Now, let’s fast forward to the present. In 2017, the Labour government won re-election with a stronger majority than 2013. It is riding a wave of economic growth and business optimism (albeit with concerns about labour shortages).
But what could happen to its 35,000 vote majority by 2022?
Comparisons are odious, but history may have important lessons for us, and especially for the Muscat government as it works its way through its second term.
Let me offer a few points to ponder.
The final, ultimate card up the Prime Minister’s sleeve is to engineer his own succession
First, governments with uninterrupted years in office enjoy ‘the power of incumbency’: the net advantage that results from being in a position to closely manage the apparatus of the State, including filling key positions with sympathetic members.
And yet, after so much time, this asset can boomerang: various citizens start having second thoughts about where this is going.
Fresh and creative ideas in policy-making may decrease; and the momentum to simply ‘steady as she goes’ may take over.
‘State capture’ by elites is one price of familiarity bred over years of repeated communication and interaction with politicians. A general feeling of being snug and comfortable as things are may start to irk members of the public.
Second, governments with uninterrupted years in office may also develop aggrandised notions of their power of political survival; with this sense of unassailability, they may go about specific policy ‘crusades’, even though they know that they will meet significant opposition.
The MLP government of 1976-81 managed to alienate farmers, bakers, civil servants, bank employees, doctors and various other interest groups, all of which registered bouts of industrial action.
The PN government of 1992-96 had decided to introduce value added tax (VAT) in ways that hurt many small businesses; in so doing, it incurred the wrath of the Association of General Retailers and Traders (GRTU). The PN government of 2003-08 had banned spring hunting and committed itself to the privatisation of the Malta Shipyards.
Thirdly, a general desire for change and new faces (irrespective of new policies) may come to pass. Aware of this, a party in Opposition, apart from holding government to account, needs to make itself attractive to potential new voters, offering them assurances of being able to function credibly as an alternative government pledging exciting policy initiatives.
Meanwhile, wary of the dangers of being associated with the status quo, an incumbent prime minister can seek to apply some corrective measures by reshuffling his cabinet. But to do so, he must not be beholden to long-serving ministers who may, for the sake of their own political survival, try and mastermind their own indispensability within the Cabinet.
The final, ultimate card up the prime minister’s sleeve is to engineer his own succession. This is a delicate task.
New leaders come with their own personality, charisma and baggage. Will these jive with the electorate? They need to thrive on the goodwill of the party and its former leader in office; but would they convince the sceptics that they are not merely “their master’s voice”?
godfrey.baldacchino@um.edu.mt
Godfrey Baldacchino is a professor of sociology at the University of Malta.