The very first provision of the Constitution proclaims Malta to be “a democratic republic”. Other provisions in the Constitution enshrine the principle of democracy such as when they refer to popular suffrage during general elections, the role of the Opposition, involvement of citizens in constitutional amendments, and the safeguarding of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Other ordinary laws develop this principle such as the Referenda Act, laws regulating local council elections and European Union Parliament elections, and the Criminal Code which, through the jury system, introduces a democratic element in the judiciary. Government backbenchers have a similar task though to a lesser degree.

But how democratic is our Republic? The measuring rod of a vibrant democracy is not only popular suffrage but the extent to which the Opposition is allowed to function properly. For in a representative democracy, few and far between are those instances where citizens are called upon to express their opinion. The burden is entirely upon the Opposition to shoulder the task of controlling government to the limited extent that it can.

Our constitutional electoral system is ingrained against the Opposition where the result in general elections has consistently been that the winner takes all. Our direct system of democracy is already a feeble one but would be worse should the Opposition end up in disarray.

Currently the Nationalist opposition has suffered two consecutive traumatising losses in the 2013 and 2017 general elections.

The state of Malta functions – with the entire blessing of both the Nationalist and the Labour parties – in a way that the winner takes all and the loser is not even allowed to collect the crumbles falling from the table of power. All this is done in the interest of governability.

First, as the winner is always the sole party in government, there is no other political party sharing power within a coalition capable of offering checks and balances to the mighty winning party. This means that once a party is elected to power, Opposition supporters invariably end up under both PN and PL administrations humiliated through transfers, isolation at the workplace, denial of deserved promotions or even non-renewal of appointments.

Second, the composition of all State offices bar a few exceptions – are decided by the prime minister. He decides who is appointed president, chief justice and speaker. He appoints ministers and parliamentary secretaries and decides when to dismiss them. He appoints the Cabinet secretary, head of the civil service, permanent secretaries, directors general and directors of government departments and agencies.

Once a party is elected to power, Opposition supporters invariably end up under both PN and PL administrations humiliated

He is involved in the appointment of judges and magistrates. He appoints chairmen and members of several public bodies.

Third, it might well be that constitutionally and legally the appointment might vest in the president or a minister. But the president is constitutionally bound to act on the prime minister’s advice. Failure to do so entails misbehaviour. She can therefore be removed by a resolution of the House approved by simple majority without her even participating in the removal process or being allowed to state her case for, after all, she might have so acted to protect and defend the Constitution.

No fair trial is afforded to the president on removal from office proceedings in the House.

Where the appointment is vested in a minister, he either consults the prime minister before making the appointment or Cabinet, the latter being chaired by the prime minister whose arguments are extremely persuasive.

Fourth, both political parties represented in Parliament appear to have been extremely satisfied with this status quo allowing what they cherish to materialise – governability. A stable government is given more priority than democracy, respect for human rights and other values such as good governance.

Fifth, not only is the prime minister an elected ‘dictator’ and not only is Malta governed by a majority dictatorship, but Parliament tends to be a rubber stamp in government’s hands.

To ensure that backbenchers do not rebel against the front bench, prime minister Lawrence Gonzi created the office of parliamentary assistant.

Joseph Muscat, thrilled by this enticing endeavour, developed it further by allowing government backbenchers to be brought to the front bench by appointing them to several chairmanships of statutory bodies. This not only meant that these backbenchers incremented their parliamentary honorarium through the back door with a second salary plus perks, but it also ensured that they now became active front benchers with a personal interest to ensure that government does not fall as they personally would gain to lose the extra financial income earned through such a clear constitutional conflict of interest.

Sixth, to make matters worse, the smaller parties have really no say in the governance of Malta. It is a misnomer to call them a political party for they are nothing more and nothing less than a pressure group. No person in his senses votes for these smaller parties because he knows that the so-called ‘proportional’ system is not that proportional after all for the first to be eliminated in any election are these small parties.

A total 16.6 per cent of all votes in an electoral district are lost and smaller parties are not allowed to poll together all their district-based votes nationwide in order to be able to elect an MP.

A vote to the smaller parties may serve well as a protest vote against big parties. The voter knows beforehand that his vote will never lead the small party to the House but more probably to oblivion. Past history of independent Malta is replete with such examples and only Alternattiva Demokratika is (at least to date) an exception to this rule since they continue to exist without having savoured parliamentary membership.

The Democratic Party was by far wiser than the smaller parties because they formed a coalition with a bigger party and made it to the House with two MPs at their very first attempt. Now, lest I be misunderstood, I am not stating that smaller parties should be wound up as this would constitute a severe blow to an already frail democracy. What I am stating is that the Constitution and the electoral law do not look favourably at smaller parties.

The same applies to the scheme of election broadcasts approved by the PL-PN duopoly in the Broadcasting Authority where small parties and independent candidates are only allowed token amounts of broadcasting time just simply to put their conscience at rest that the smaller parties and independent candidates are allocated an insignificant amount of airtime.

Smaller parties do not own any broadcasting media of their own. The PL-PN duopoly in the Broadcasting Authority believe in the legal fiction that the radio and television stations owned by the PL-PN balance out each other and that the whole set-up of that authority raises serious constitutional questions of independence and impartiality, more so when the authority exercises a quasi-judicial function.

The balance always tilts in favour of the two big parties and out of those two parties, the one in government reigns supreme.

Kevin Aquilina is the Dean of the Faculty of Laws at the University of Malta.

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