Lyndon B. Johnson was the US President who pushed through the civil rights legislation of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act a year later, both of which gave black Americans new civic guarantees.

There were many dissenters, not only in the South. Some used a particular reading of the Bible to object to the newly-recognised civil rights. The new law was also socially, as well as politically, delicate.

But would we have taken President Johnson seriously, as a champion of civil rights, if his Democrat Party had permitted a free vote on such legislation? Would we not have scoffed if he timidly said that he respected that some may want to object on grounds of conscience? Or simply that, since it was such a delicate issue, he was not going to push a party line?

I find it surprising, therefore, that there has been so little comment on Labour leader Joseph Muscat's odd position on divorce: He declares it is a civil right, thereby classifying it together with very important rights like those that protect against discrimination because of race, gender, sexual orientation, etc.

However, Dr Muscat also declares that on divorce legislation he would permit a free vote by his party's MPs on grounds of conscience and because of the delicate nature of the issue.

In other words, in the same breath Dr Muscat is saying that divorce is a right we have by virtue of being Maltese citizens while permitting his MPs to vote against our right on grounds of a troubled conscience.

Would we find it acceptable if he made the same argument about another civil right, like gender equality? To say something is a civil right is precisely to say that you do not accept that it is a matter of conscience.

Dr Muscat has also mentioned the delicate nature of divorce as a reason for permitting a free vote. Yes, permitting divorce would have radical ramifications. But so does any radical reform in sectors like rent, health, social services and education. If Parliament had to debate radical health reform - say, the wholesale liberalisation (or nationalisation) of the health service - would that be a good reason for a free vote? On the contrary, we would think it laughable if it were permitted.

Matters of conscience usually arise with questions of life and death; for example, war, abortion, stem-cell research on embryos, euthanasia. Even here, in those Western countries where abortion (say) is considered a civil right, it is very difficult for a state-funded private hospital to opt out of providing information on abortion services or even abortion itself. Whatever the hospital may say about conscience, the state insists that there can be no opt-outs on civil rights, particularly if there are no other similar services on offer in the vicinity.

In other words, where civil rights are concerned, anyone who invokes conscience does so in the knowledge that they are defying authority; hardly with its permission.

Although it is not directly relevant to the argument, readers may want to know my own position on divorce. Since 1997, I have publicly argued it is not a matter of conscience but of good sense. In some circumstances, introducing divorce would be the prudent thing to do. In 2001, I outlined why I think it is already the prudent thing to do for couples with no children (or dependent children) and am open minded on the rest.

That means that on the question of whether divorce should be introduced I am already partly in agreement with Dr Muscat and might possibly be in full agreement when the crunch comes. But I still think that the way he is going about the issue has retrograde implications for our civic life.

First, far from trying to make Malta "more fully European", his tactics are taking us a step back by introducing what no mainland European country, or even Malta, accepts: the notion of "conscience opt-outs" on civil rights.

Second, by colluding in the depiction of divorce as a matter of conscience, he is undermining the foundations of a progressive society. Such a society debates issues and weighs consequences rationally.

Indeed, it is what the Church hierarchy, in this case, is actually asking for. The Archbishop has not asked Catholics to invoke the Gospel; he has asked that they take decisions that are logically coherent with how the known social facts might affect the common good.

By saying that the Church hierarchy's objections to divorce are purely a religious matter, despite the hierarchy's statements to the contrary, Dr Muscat is refusing truly to secularise the issue, while claiming the opposite.

Dr Muscat's tactics are perhaps guided by the need to maintain party discipline. Or else, while speaking in the name of principle, he is actually improvising as he goes along. Either way, the consequences for the guarantees of our civic life are retrograde.

ranierfsadni@europe.com