Certain myths and legends seem to possess an uncanny quality of assuming pseudo-historical stature. Perpetuating such myths only makes the work of serious historians an upward struggle.
One such myth certainly belongs to Mussolini’s involvement in the acquisition of Junkers Ju 87 dive-bombers for the Regia Aeronautica as described by Charles Debono (The Sunday Times, September 26).
Both documented history and events around the story of Regia Aeronautica’s dive-bombers indicate quite the opposite. The beginning of the Ju 87’s Italian connection dates back to December 19, 1936, when fighter ace Adriano Mantelli, flying a Fiat CR 32 as fighter escort to a Condor Legion Junkers Ju 87, witnessed the complete destruction of a ‘Red’ (Communist) command centre at Bujalance during the Spanish Civil War. A direct hit was scored by the dive-bomber using a single bomb for the task.
On his return to Italy at the end of the war in Spain, Mantelli was instrumental in arranging an official ‘exchange’ visit for a Luftwaffe delegation to Guidonia in August 1939, which among other aircraft included three Junkers Ju 87s Stukas (short for Sturmkampfflugzeug). During their short stay, German and Italian pilots flew and evaluated both Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica aircraft. The Ju 87 dive-bomber was extensively and carefully tested and evaluated by Italian pilots, who reported most favourably on its qualities.
However the Stato Maggiore Aeronautica (SMA) continued to favour the design and development of indigenous aircraft, and notwithstanding that the Savoia Marchetti SM 85 had ‘failure’ written all over it as a dive-bomber, enough were built to equip the 96º Gruppo Bombardamento a Tuffo (GbaT) that was based in Sardinia.
As if the SM 85 wasn’t enough of a disappointment, development persisted with the equally disastrous SM 86. It was only on Italy’s declaration of war on June 10, 1940, that the SMA realised the impossibility of committing the 96º GbaT and its aircraft into combat. Procurement of a replacement became a matter of urgency.
Twelve days later, General Pricolo, through the proper Cabinet minister, formulated a request to the Reichluftministerium (RLM – German Ministry of Aviation) for the acquisition of 100 Ju 87s from Germany, complete with ammunition and anti-shipping armour. Since the Luftwaffe objected, declaring that no aircraft from German production lines could be spared for export, this request was flatly refused.
After this episode, it was through the personal intervention of Col. Giuseppe Teucci, Air Attaché at Italy’s embassy in Berlin, that personal negotiations with Hermann Göring, commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, secured approval for the acquisition of 50 Ju 87s on July 5, 1940 (eventually a total of 159 Ju 87s arrived in Italy after several negotiated requests). So much for Mussolini’s involvement in the matter!
It is also incorrect to say that the Italian pilots took a “crash course” due to the urgency with which the Ju 87s were needed in action. The Italian contingent consisted of highly skilled crews already trained in dive-bombing tactics, and their familiarisation with the Ju 87s at Graz was quick and uneventful.
On July 15, 1940, training began with the launching of dummy bombs, proceeding to live bombing with exercise ordnance five days later. The course required 20 live dive-bombing sorties per pilot, but this was reduced after evaluating the high rate of success achieved by the Italian pilots, who all qualified on the type at the end of August. Praise by German instructors for the skill of the Italian pilots is well documented.