A senior English judge, Lord Bingham, once said that "a habit of reticence makes for good judges". Judge Lino Farrugia Sacco would have done well to bear that maxim in mind before making comments to the press last week.

Instead, he chose to break his silence over his decision to ignore - and though he denies it, defy - the code of ethics for the judiciary in Malta. This states that its members "cannot hold any position... voluntary or honorary, and neither can they carry our any activity which... may compromise their position, duties or functions."

After being re-elected president of the Malta Olympic Committee, Judge Farrugia Sacco quoted a judgment - without sourcing it, though it certainly did not concern the code of ethics - which, he said, says that if a judge feels his conscience is clear, he does not need to feel uncomfortable or threatened about his independence.

The independence of the judiciary is a sacrosanct principle that has been adopted in Malta and other countries. But we need to be clear about what the term means. According to the Guide to Judicial Conduct for English judges - updated as recently as March this year - judicial independence is "a cornerstone of our system of government in a democratic society and a safeguard of the freedom and rights of the citizen under the rule of law". It is not, as "is sometimes mistakenly perceived", a "privilege enjoyed by judges".

Though Judge Farrugia Sacco disagrees, it is clear that independence and a code of ethics are not in conflict. On the contrary, they are complementary. The guide has been universally accepted by the English judiciary - who are hardly known for ceding their independence - and one could not imagine one of them declining to abide by its provisions.

Moreover, Judge of ethics Farrugia Sacco's argument that the code does not apply to him because it was issued after he was appointed, is without foundation - not just in principle, but also in practice, since conditions that might have been acceptable 20 years ago may not be suitable today. As England's former Lord Chief Justice points out in an introductory note to the guide, "the responsibilities and the public's perception of the standards to which judges should adhere are continuously evolving".

Judge Farrugia Sacco also said that he did not have to comply with the code because nowhere in the world did these "restrictions" exist. Even if that were the case, it does not mean that the Maltese cannot be different - as they are in legislation when it comes to divorce and abortion - especially if there are good grounds for doing so. Recent cases involving the bribery of judges, and the sporting connections that accompanied them, are reason enough.

However, Judge Farrugia Sacco is also failing to take note of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, which were universally approved not by any State, but by a round table meeting of Chief Justices at The Hague in 2002.

A key provision states: "A judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny and comment, and must therefore accept restrictions on his or her activities - even activities that would not elicit adverse notice if carried out by other members of the community or even of the profession."

This is precisely the purpose the code of conduct for Maltese judges serves. And if Judge Farrugia Sacco and others do not wish it to apply to them, they should cease to sit on the bench in judgment of others.