The Tunisian revolution has focused our attention on the Arab world and the possibility of unrest – especially after last week’s riots in Egypt – spreading to this volatile region.
Change has traditionally come at a very slow pace in Arab countries where authoritarian rulers tend to hang on to power for decades and where dynastic successions sometimes take place.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the overthrow of Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali has sent shockwaves throughout the region.
What are the chances of similar revolutions engulfing other Arab states? And will such revolutions lead to secular democracies – as hopefully is the case with Tunisia – or will they be hijacked by Islamist forces?
Out of the Arab League’s 22 members, only three can be considered to have democratic credentials: Iraq, the Palestinian territories and Lebanon.
However, Iraq is still plagued by sectarian violence and instability and is hardly a democratic model for the Arab world; the Palestinian territories still have large chunks of land occupied by Israel and secular democracy is threatened by Hamas; and Lebanon has its own particular problems due to its diverse sectarian make-up, but is nevertheless the most democratic country in the Arab world.
Generally speaking, the shape of democracy in the Arab world is poor, with the level of authoritarianism varying from state to state. At one end of the spectrum are countries such as Libya and Syria, which have not introduced any political reforms over the years and on the other end are countries such as Morocco, Jordan, Algeria and Kuwait, which have implemented a degree of political reform but which still have some way to go. The other Arab countries lie somewhere in between.
It is likely that the revolution in Tunisia will have more of an effect – in the short-to-medium term – on the countries of the Maghreb, Egypt, and perhaps Jordan and Syria, rather than the Gulf states, since most non-Gulf Arab countries share a similar economic situation.
While it is true that a lack of political freedom – also one of the causes of the Tunisian revolution – is also evident in the Gulf States, the pressure for democracy in this region is nowhere as strong as it is in other Arab countries.
This is because the region’s wealth – due to its vast oil and gas reserves – has given the people of the Gulf a high standard of living and a pretty good deal. One also has to take into consideration the region’s unique history and social structure.
In wake of the downfall of Ben Ali’s regime, there have been demonstrations in Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Mauritania, Sudan and Yemen – which although a Gulf country is the poorest country in the Middle East with an unemployment rate of 35 per cent and dwindling oil reserves.
Clearly, some people in the Arab world have taken heart from the dramatic events in Tunisia, and while each country has its particular set of circumstances, there is no doubt that Ben Ali’s overthrow marks a turning point in Arab history.
The main focus now is Egypt, which has been rocked by protests and which plays such an important role in the Arab world. With a population of 84 million, a revolution in Egypt would change the face of the Middle East and have vast regional repercussions.
An important ally of the US and the EU, Egypt has all the ingredients for a popular revolution: 43 per cent of Egyptians live on or below the poverty line (despite getting $2 billion in annual aid from the US, although €1.3 billion is in military aid), unemployment is high, President Hosni Mubarak rules under emergency laws, corruption is said to be rife, elections are rigged, many opposition candidates are prevented from participating in elections and the government’s human rights record is poor.
The main opposition movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, which consists of both Islamists and moderates, is banned, and this has only served to make it more popular.
While Egypt’s middle class is proportionately smaller than Tunisia’s and the average Egyptian is not as IT literate as the average Tunisian – social networking greatly contributed to the unrest in Tunis – the situation in Egypt nonetheless remains extremely volatile.
The immediate victim of this situation is likely to be the suspected president-in-waiting, Gamal Mubarak, the son of President Mubarak, whose succession to the presidency in September would almost certainly trigger further unrest.
Egypt, however, needs to do more than just do away with a dynastic succession. It must bring about genuine political reform, including the introduction of fair and free elections – before the situation gets out of hand. Both Washington – which has huge clout in Egypt – and the EU must play their part in bringing about this change.
The road to democracy in the Arab world will not be easy. Many autocrats will not go down without a fight, and some of the opposition movements in these countries are Islamist which lack democratic credentials.
However, the West must not make the mistake of indefinitely backing secular autocracies as the only way to prevent an Islamist takeover. Secular democracies in the Islamic world are possible, as countries like Turkey and Indonesia have shown, and hopefully Tunisia will prove.
This is what the West should be encouraging, despite the very huge challenges ahead.