The First Hall of the Civil Court, presided over by Madame Justice Lorraine Schembri Orland, on July 16, 2015, in the case ‘Carmel sive Charles Mifsud and his wife Josephine Mifsud v Godwin Micallef and his wife Doris Micallef’, held, among other things, that the ordinary courts had jurisdiction to decide a case relating to the eviction of a tenant after the termination of the lease. Not every case, therefore, arising after the end of the lease was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rent Regulation Board.
Charles and Josephine Mifsud purchased from Gasan Properties a number of properties including a flat at Ta’ Xbiex which was subject to an existing lease with Godwin Micallef as tenant, regulated by a lease agreement dated November 19, 1987. The lease was for 15 years as from December 1, 1987 up to November 30, 2002.
According to the lease agreement, it was agreed that, in case Micallef wished to renew the lease at the end of the lease, he had to request a renewal from the owner in writing, at least six months before the lease expired.
It resulted that Micallef did not notify his intention to renew the lease, yet he continued to occupy the apartment.
Mifsud claimed that Micallef had no valid title and, faced with this situation, he filed legal proceedings against Godwin and Doris Micallef requesting the court:
• to declare that in terms of the lease agreement, Micallef had to request its renewal at least six months before its termination;
• to declare that Micallef had not notified his intention to renew the lease within the time period but continued occupying the property;
• to declare that as a result he occupied the flat without valid title; and
• to order his eviction within a short time period.
Micallef, in reply, disputed the jurisdiction of the local courts. According to Act X of 2009 article 1525 of the Civil Code, the Rent Regulation Board (RRB) had exclusive competence to decide disputes in relation to rents of urban property. Without prejudice, he maintained that he did not occupy the property without valid title, and that he had a valid title of lease. Rent was paid regularly and subsequently deposited in court.
Issues that go beyond the provisions of the rent regulation laws must remain the competence of the ordinary courts
The court noted that the period of lease had expired and Micallef as tenant did not opt to renew the lease according to the lease agreement.
It said the competence of the ordinary courts depended on the claims of the plaintiff, as this set the parameter of what the court had to decide upon. See: Frankie Refalo noe v Jason Azzopardi et (App. October 7, 1997).
Article 1525(1) of the Civil Code provides:
“A contract of letting and hiring, whether of things or of work and labour, may be made either verbally or in writing, provided that a contract of letting and hiring of urban property and of a residence and of a commercial tenement entered into after January 1, 2010 shall be in writing.”
Article 16(4) of Chapter 69 states:
“Without prejudice to any other law, the Board shall also decide all matters affecting the leases of urban property including residential as well as commercial property in terms of the Civil Code, including cases relating to the occupation of urban property where such leases have expired.”
In ‘Antonia Frendo et v Christopher Agius et’, dated July 10, 2014, it was held that these amendments appeared to give exclusive jurisdiction to the RRB on all disputes relating to leases, including cases relating to the occupation of a property after the end of a lease: ‘Massik Masitiria v Stivala Properties Ltd et (PA)’ dated July 2, 2013; and ‘Enrietta Bonnici et v Gordon Borg (App. Ing)’ dated December 4, 2013.
In the latter judgments, the court examined whether the ordinary courts were competent in cases connected to leases. It held that, although the competence of the RRB was widened by the 2009 amendments, it remained a special tribunal with powers to be used within the limits of the law. Issues that go beyond the provisions of the rent regulation laws must remain the competence of the ordinary courts.
In ‘Camilleri v International Trading Co. Ltd’, dated October 31, 2011 (PA), the court said that it appeared clearly that the legislation intended that the disputes regarding leases fell within the competence of the RRB. It was of the opinion that the 2009 amendments empowered the RRB to decide all cases arising from a contract of lease.
In ‘Christopher Gatt v David Doneo (PA)’ dated March 28, 2011, the court dismissed the plea of incompetence rationae materia, once the case was not simply in relation to rights and obligations under a contract of lease, and concerned the validity of the lease.
In ‘Enrietta Bonnici et v Gordon Borg’ dated December 4, 2013, the court examined article 16(4) Chapter 69 and said that article 16(4) conferred jurisdiction to the RRB to decide all cases connected to leases even those after 1995.
It was held that the law did not distinguish between leases which were in vigore and those which had expired. The purpose of the 2009 amendments was to widen the jurisdiction of the RRB, to decide cases even at the renewal stage. However, it was not clear that the RRB had jurisdiction over cases where the lease had already expired.
The court, in this latter case, concluded that after the termination of the lease the jurisdiction of the RRB was limited to compensation for occupation without title after the end of lease and not also to cases where the occupier was ab initio without title. Not every case, therefore, arising after the end of the lease was within the jurisdiction of the RRB.
This interpretation was confirmed in ‘George Falzon et v Raymond Buttigieg et’, dated March 28, 2014. In similar cases the ordinary courts affirmed its competence.
In ‘Strickland Ltd v Maria Frendo (PA)’ dated March 24, 2015, the court said that the plaintiff sued as owner and not as lessor, in order to evict the occupier on grounds of occupation without valid title. It did not result that plaintiff requested eviction owing to some breach of rights and obligations.
The court maintained that, in this case, Mifsud did not request the dissolution of the lease. Micallef submitted that the lease was still in existence, though this still had to be determined and, if it later resulted that he occupied the property with a valid title of lease, Mifsud would have to sue before the RRB.
This principle was also affirmed by the Court of Appeal in ‘Falzon v Buttigieg’ where it was held that the competence of a tribunal depended on the claims of an applicant. If the court were to accept that Micallef had a title of lease, Mifsud would have to refer the case to the RRB, if he wished to take possession of the property but on the basis of a different “cause” as the court would have established that there existed a relationship of tenant and lessor between the parties.
For these reasons, on July 16, 2015, the First Hall of the Civil Court declared that it was competent to decide the case rationae materiae.
The pleas of Micallef that it lacked jurisdiction were dismissed.
The court ordered the case to be continued.
Dr Karl Grech Orr is a partner at Ganado Advocates.