I am not keen in engaging in a debate with Jeremy Cassar Torregiani (The Sunday Times, July 1) about whether the National Bank of Malta was solvent or not in 1973.

What I will, however, still insist upon is tangible (documented) proof that, according to the Central Bank of Malta’s Bank Inspection Unit’s reports, they deemed the National Bank to be in an acceptable, continuous and continued, state of absolute liquidity, i.e. in addition to its alleged solvency.

None of the data produced by Mr Cassar Torregiani makes a contribution towards this element.

I have written and spoken often enough to prove that those were historically bad times for the entire banking sector in Malta, that the National Bank was in the throes of an ongoing run from its depositors (i.e. not a one-day liquidity shortfall), that “lender of last resort” as some sort of unchanging and unquestionable rigid-law-to-be-always-followed, or concept, was already being internationally revisited, that top management at the National Bank was not exactly scientific or qualified or modern as compared with other institutions on the island, and that, despite all this, the National Bank’s shareholders were not given a fair chance of redressing the situation and, as Mr Cassar Torregiani himself said on television, “putting their house in order”.

What, as a banking historian, I am here simply stating is that – as so often happens when politicians involve themselves – far too many things in this issue have ended up being (intentionally or otherwise) hidden from those who came later.

Will the still pending court cases serve to shed more to light? Or will more be further buried into posterity if – as many rightly hope – some out-of-court settlement is reached between the current litigant parties?