Mr Justice Lino Farrugia Sacco’s claims have been dismissed. Photo: Matthew Mirabelli

A judge’s rights were not violated when the judiciary watchdog stood by what it had already decided although a fresh impeachment motion had been moved, the Constitutional Court ruled yesterday.

Madam Justice Lorraine Schembri Orland dismissed Mr Justice Lino Farrugia Sacco’s claims that his rights had been breached when the stand taken by the Commission for the Administration of Justice on an impeachment motion moved by Prime Minister Joseph Muscat was identical to that adopted when former prime minister Lawrence Gonzi had presented a similar motion.

The commission had ruled in both instances that there was prima facie evidence of misbehaviour by the judge when he had remained in office as president of the Malta Olympic Committee despite its calls for him to leave.

Dr Gonzi had moved his impeachment in 2012 after The Sunday Times of London ran an article on alleged irregularities in the sale of Olympic Games tickets in which Mr Justice Farrugia Sacco had been mentioned together with another official of the Malta Olympic Committee.

In both instances there was prima facie evidence of misbehaviour by the judge

The judiciary watchdog had said that although the judge was not involved in the matter, his presence on the MOC had undermined the public’s respect in the judiciary.

The Speaker of the House, Anġlu Farrugia, ruled late in January that Dr Gonzi’s motion was “dead” because it had been moved during a previous legislature by a person who was no longer an MP. Furthermore, the motion had never made it to Parliament’s agenda.

Motions’ substance ‘identical’

Subsequently, Dr Muscat moved a fresh motion and this, according to law, was forwarded to the commission for investigation. The commission reached the same conclusion.

Besides arguing that he did not have a fair trial before the commission because he was not allowed to produce witnesses, Mr Justice Farrugia Sacco also argued that he was not officially notified of the fresh impeachment motion. In her 96-page judgment, Madam Justice Schembri Orland said that the court’s role was not that of passing judgment on the merits of the case filed by the commission against the judge.

The court’s role was that of establishing whether the judge’s fundamental human right to a fair hearing as protected by both the Constitution and the European Convention of Human Rights had been violated.

The fact that the commission did not investigate the facts as laid out in the second motion did not, in itself, in the light of the particular circumstances of this case, constitute a violation of the right to a fair hearing.

It would have been different had the judge not been allowed to present his case before the commission when the first motion was being investigated.

Mr Justice Farrugia Sacco had submitted that once there was a second motion against him, then the commission had to recommence its investigations. He also argued that the commission had to be composed of different members to those who had investigated the first motion.

There was no doubt that the second motion did not call for the investigation of any different facts

These submissions were dismissed by Madam Justice Schembri Orland. There was no doubt, she said, that the second motion did not call for the investigation of any facts that were different to the first. In fact, when moving his motion, Dr Muscat had referred to the first.

The commission had submitted that the judge’s complaint of violation of his human rights was premature because the proceedings against him had not been concluded.

The case would have to be heard and decided upon by the House of Representatives. The proceedings before the commission were of a preliminary, prima facie and investigative nature and the watchdog could not remove a judge from office.

Mr Justice Farrugia Sacco had complained that he had not been given any hearing, let alone a fair one, on the second motion.

Madam Justice Schembri Orland however declared that, as the substance of the two motions was identical, it could only conclude that the judge was expecting to be heard twice on the same motion. He was also expecting a rehearing of his case by a differently-composed commission.

The court dismissed the judge’s claim that the commission had been given carte blanche to do as it pleased. That was not the case as the workings of the commission were subject to judicial review.

When referring to the ruling delivered by the Speaker on the first motion, the Constitutional Court noted that Dr Farrugia had declared that the motion was “dead” At no time had he ruled that the first motion was null.

The commission’s report on the first motion remained valid because it referred to the facts it had investigated. Once that motion had not been declared null, then the commission had no need to investigate the facts anew, Madam Justice Schembri Orland concluded.