At the height of their advance into parts of the Middle East, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, observers questioned whether other states funded Isis. Their rise seemed unstoppable. Many wanted to make sense of a phenomenon which appeared to threaten the world as they knew it.
At one point Isis controlled an area roughly the size of Britain and a population of approximately 12 million. Today, it controls only three per cent of the territory it once held in Iraq and Syria.
In its wake it left complete devastation – mass graves, destroyed buildings, broken communities, displaced people and stolen property. There is still a reluctance to treat the massacre and displacement of whole Christian populations as genocide. Some facts remain unclear. The task now is to provide some transitional justice.
In a Pulitzer-worthy investigation, Rukmini Callimachi and her team from The New York Times provide a fascinating glimpse into the administrative workings of Isis. As they travelled through previously occupied areas, they spoke to some people who lived through this harrowing experience.
While deploring their methods, the terrorist group were surprisingly praised for the services they provided. One local said: “It was much cleaner under Isis.” In another town, residents told the journalists that Isis conscripted electrical engineers to repair an overloaded power grid.
When the Iraqi Army reclaimed the town, they disconnected the circuit breakers, and the power outages resumed.
After liberating these areas, the Iraqi government realised that it needed to step up if it wanted to win back the loyalty of the citizens. As one shopkeeper admitted, “Although they [Isis] were not recognised as a state or a country, they acted like one.”
The New York Times team unearthed approximately 15,000 files discarded by Isis which provide an interesting analysis of their governing methods.
In one of their first acts after occupying a territory, Isis summoned all public officials and instructed them to resume their jobs immediately. Those who failed to obey faced punishment. Callimachi reports: “Soon municipal employees were back fixing potholes, painting crosswalks, repairing power lines and overseeing payroll.”
Brutality and bureaucracy were the two arms of government. Their cruelty is well documented, but the bureaucratic aspect is only now beginning to emerge. It points to a reality which has often been ignored: Isis is mostly self-funded.
Vile and brutal regimes always seem to have their cheerleaders – long after they are gone
Isis did not reinvent the wheel; they shaped their polity over what existed beforehand. They had a diversified revenue stream which went beyond the sale of illegal oil. Indeed, the economy was so diversified that airstrikes did not cripple it:
“Ledgers, receipt books and monthly budgets describe how the militants monetised every inch of territory they conquered, taxing every bushel of wheat, every litre of sheep’s milk and every watermelon sold at markets they controlled. From agriculture alone, they reaped hundreds of millions of dollars.”
Callimachi shows that tax revenue “far outstripped income from oil sales”.
Some aspects of daily life were radically different; female employees were fired, employees from minorities vanished, and their property confiscated. Legal offices were shut, and new rules were introduced.
They also introduced new bureaucratic structures to regulate ‘morality’: “Citizens were thrown into jail for a litany of obscure crimes, including eyebrow plucking, inappropriate haircuts, raising pigeons, playing dominoes, playing cards, playing music and smoking the hookah.”
Isis also made sure it could provide for its foreign recruits. Each recruit constituted a propaganda victory. One French recruit boasted that she was given a fully-furnished apartment and paid no rent or utility bills.
Callimachi’s team provide a unique glimpse into the administrative workings of Islamic State. This journalistic piece can also offer points for reflection on issues affecting governance, international politics and brutal dictatorships.
One factor which never ceases to surprise me is that vile and brutal regimes always seem to have their cheerleaders – long after they are gone and long after their cruel misdeeds are uncovered.
Despite the awfulness of the Fascist regime in Italy, some assert that “at least the trains ran on time”. Many who experienced communist repression can still look nostalgically to a time when “there was food, housing and jobs”. People who make these statements do not necessarily condone the ghastly excesses of these regimes, but they look back with nostalgia over the apparent materialistic benefits they reaped.
The failure of our time lies in our inability – the inability of the current political class and the political culture it fosters – to articulate cohesively the centrality of other concerns which are essential to material well-being but which are not materialistic.
When ‘freedom’ becomes a cliché linked to ‘prosperity’, and when the latter fails to materialise, some will question whether the former was just a scam. It isn’t; however, some political principles have no definite aim because they are an end in itself.
The rule of law, stable institutions, religious freedom, justice, accountability and transparency, seem to have no direct material outcomes. However, without them, material and personal well-being is jeopardised. Authoritarian and despotic leaders are slowly finding ways of framing and articulating such principles as superfluous propaganda.
Another vital lesson to be learnt is that, unlike the liberating US forces in 2003, Isis did not dismantle the administrative mechanisms in place. Instead, it sought to modify this to suit its needs.
The continuity in the provision of public services seems to have gone relatively smoothly as different warring factions took control over this area.
This provides a smoother and less harrowing regime transition thereby avoiding very dangerous vacuums of power. It is, after all, within such a vacuum that Isis initially thrived.
Significantly, this new information points to the necessity of better intelligence-gathering services. Such reports serve as a springboard for the international community. If this is faulty, the response will undoubtedly be inadequate.
André DeBattista is an independent researcher in politics and international relations.
andre.deb@gmail.com