Some political anoraks are warming to the idea of having non-elected ministers. In a recently published book about the Maltese legal system, Prime Minister Joseph Muscat is quoted as saying that he favours the idea of being able to appoint ministers who are not Members of Parliament. Naturally, this would require a constitutional amendment and some increased form of scrutiny and accountability for these non-elected ministers.
The idea is not a new one and the system of appointments is permissible in some foreign jurisdictions. In Britain, for example, former prime minister Gordon Brown had appointed non-elected politicians to ministerial posts. These ministers were known as ‘Goats’ following Brown’s declaration that he wanted a “government of all the talents”.
In theory, the idea is attractive. Having a non-elected minister would mean that the minister is not directly beholden to the electorate. He would not need to curry favour with every voter with imagined grievances and there would be less patronage. Not being dependent on voters would also free the minister from the time-consuming perpetual campaigning and having to attend countless coffee-mornings and ‘Taħt it-tinda’ events.
Moreover, he would be less tempted to favour his particular constituency and not the common good. Then there is the fact that the prime minister could avail himself of the expertise, experience and competence of those people who have not been elected to parliament. Getting elected does not necessarily mean that one acquires the expertise required to manage and direct important matters of State.
So on the face of it, there are advantages to having some non-elected technocratic ministers. How it works out in practice is another matter.
There is too little scrutiny of ministerial output in the inter-election period
Having ministers who are not directly elected by citizens would weaken the link between voters and their representatives. At present there is a vestigial and weak form of control on ministerial activity by the electorate. Simply put – if the minister is utterly inept or is caught out in some scandal, the electorate may choose not to re-elect him. If ministers are appointed instead of elected, voters will lose this form of control or scrutiny too.
There already is too little scrutiny of ministerial output in the inter-election period – removing this ultimate manner of accountability would make matters even worse.
Then there’s the fact that such a system would concentrate even more power in the hands of the Prime Minister, who may source non-elected ministers from quarters who are close to him – a regiment of Yes men and women.
Although the Prime Minister already has the prerogative of appointing ministers at present, he cannot really ignore parliamentarians who are elected with massive electoral support. If the law were amended, the Prime Minister would be able to appoint anybody, lack of electoral support notwithstanding.
There would be friction with other ministers who would have achieved office on the basis of their electoral support. The experiences of other countries have shown how fraught relationships between elected and non-elected ministers have effectively brought the sector to a halt. The resignation of Estelle Morris –the former British Education Secretary – was brought about mainly because of her strained relationship with Lord Andrew Adonis – a non-elected politician. Morris said she was frustrated at having to deal with “the Andrew Adonises of this world” while being education secretary. “Sometimes they were just plain wrong,” she said. “It was my job, not their job. I was elected, they were not elected.”
Before rushing headlong into introducing reforms in this manner, we should consider other country’s experiences and whether they have been totally beneficial.
As Winston Churchill once said: “Democracy is the worst form of government. Except for all others.” That holds true for a government made up of unelected technocrats.
cl.bon@nextgen.net.mt