On Monday, an Egyptian court sent three al-Jazeera journalists to jail with sentences ranging from seven to 10 years. The following day, Egypt’s newly-elected President, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, rejected a White House appeal for the release of the journalists and other political prisoners. Where is Egypt heading?
Many have criticised John Kerry, the US Secretary of State, for having promised to unfreeze suspended US aid to Egypt only a day before the court sentence. The appeals to withdraw that aid again, however, seem oblivious to the story behind the suspension.
Last year, the US was reluctant to freeze aid. The interim Egyptian government – then, as now, under the army’s control – did not seem to care too much. Indeed, on the national stage, the army enjoyed being seen as brushing off the greatimperial power.
Meanwhile, the US government underlined that the freezing did not represent a suspension of US-Egyptian cooperation. Israel criticised the move as a strategic error.
A look at the nature of the aid explains everything. Egypt remains the second-largest recipient of US aid (second only to Israel) but of it only $250 million is in development assistance while $1.3 billion is military aid. Much of the latter is tied to buying US equipment and consultancy services; it flows right back to the US.
The cuts did not threaten the Egyptian establishment’s future.
As for Israel, its concern was that any weakening of US commitment to Egypt’s army might lead to a weakening of the latter’s commitment to its anti-Gaza policies.
Meanwhile, last year Egypt was the beneficiary of petro-dollars from the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia. Egypt’s government was feeling optimistic enough that it could turn its back (against the advice of the Ministry of Finance) on an agreement with the IMF for a crucial loan.
Even that thumbnail sketch is enough to see why the balance of power is not the simple one expected of a donor-recipient relationship. The US needs a stable, cooperative Egypt more than ever now that Baghdad is tottering. The crackdown on al-Jazeera is also a move against Qatar’s influence that Saudi Arabia will appreciate.
Where does this leave the al-Jazeera journalists? The White House has already described their sentences as “politically motivated”, punishment merely for not conforming to the official story in their reports, a flouting of “the most basic standards of media freedom” and “a blow to democratic progress in Egypt”.
It is all of that – while being only part of a larger picture. Although the official line among the regime-supporting media is that the defendants (and some students who were tried alongside them) are not real journalists, the message to Egypt’s ‘real journalists’ has been received clearly enough: they could be next. One well-known columnist has declared that it is no longer possible to publish free opinion. The number of political dissidents, jailed in the name of national security, continues to rise.
For the US and Europe to address this situation, however, requires an appraisal of three double-edged factors.
First, it’s unrealistic to expect Sisi to pardon the journalists without letting the normal court appeal process to go through.
While Egypt is not a model of separation of powers, and while its lower courts are politicised, overt political interference in the judicial process is still something that is resented. Besides, this particular case features al-Jazeera, which is genuinely resented in many quarters of Egypt; its coverage of the 2011 protests against Hosni Mubarak was considered suspect even in some anti-Mubarak quarters.
Second, while that analysis might seem to be passive and fatalistic before a new President who is sweeping away all opposition in the name of national security, it’s not.
In Egypt, an appeal to national security is not enough either to legitimise a leader or to stabilise his regime. Mubarak tried it twice, in two separate decades, and on each occasion concluded that he needed more to survive. If he doesn’t know it already, Sisi will eventually discover this also.
The al-Jazeera case is just a symptom of a much deeper, more dangerous malaise
True, he emerges from an election in which he obtained 95 per cent of the vote. But that figure disguises both his present popularity and his likely future one.
The electoral turnout was very low. Officially, it was 45 per cent but some estimates make it as low as 25 per cent. And it was low despite all the official ‘encouragement a vote over several days; a public holiday; free transport; a stiff fine for non-voters.
Such considerations do not take away from the legitimacy of Sisi’s election. But the weak electoral mandate will overshadow any reforms he will need to make to address Egypt’s fundamental economic problems.
They include an official unemployment figure of over 13 per cent (the real rate is considered rather higher). In a country where 60 per cent of the general population is under 30, young people represent almost 70 per cent of the unemployed, according to one report.
If that were not enough, there are fundamental subsidies to restructure – if an IMF loan is to be obtained. It is said that now even Saudi Arabia, an important supporter, is nudging Egypt towards accepting that loan.
There was hope, last year, even among some of the country’s liberals, that what was needed was a strongman who could pull the country behind him as difficult but necessary decisions were made. In this year’s electoral campaign, however, Sisi showed little understanding of the country’s economic problems. The little he said suggests that his instincts lie with cuts to public services, the brunt of them to be borne by youth, higher taxes on overseas workers and reliance on private charity.
Sisi is not, therefore, a man with a social vision who can rely on his popularity to sustain his initiatives and make him independent of the army out of whichhe emerged.
Finally, there is the military establishment. Sixty years ago, the leaders which emerged out of the army to rule Egypt were middle-ranking colonels of peasant background, with some idea of the social reforms they wanted to redraw the balance of class power in the country.
Today, it is the top generals who have their hands on the levers of government. They have numerous economic privileges and are unable to countenance any reforms that would make the military’s operations more transparent, let alone taxable.
The military seems unable to stomach the reforms that would legitimise its considerable power. Meanwhile, the only possible counterweight – a charismatic popular President – may have his own legitimacy problems soon.
The situation is inherently unstable. Whether another boiling point will be reached soon or whether it will take several years (as it did, say, in Poland in the 1980s), is difficult to say. But come it will.
The last three years have taught us that Egypt’s military leaders cannot see a way out of a dilemma: they cannot maintain popularity and legitimacy without dispersing some of their powers but, the moment they do that, they would be in danger of sawing off the branch on which their other privileges rest.
The al-Jazeera case is, therefore, just a symptom of a much deeper, more dangerous malaise. The dilemma for the US is whether it can address this malaise without curtailing some of its own powers in the region.
ranierfsadni@europe.com