When the Soviet Union collapsed 26 years ago, there were hopes that Russia would emerge as a democratic nation. President Putin, who has now served twice, as both president and prime minister, has frustrated those hopes. Longing to restore Russia’s superpower image and obscure its creaking economy and venal government, he has been ploughing resources into the armed forces as he flexes his military muscle in Ukraine and Syria.
Despite the sorry state of Russia’s economy, which is shrinking by four per cent a year as living standards in the country continue to sink (weighed down by a fall in oil prices and an international sanctions regime imposed after Putin’s annexation of the Crimea in 2014), the Russian defence budget accounts for 4.5 per cent of GDP. A recent military analysis has revealed that the Russian armed forces have “a significant capability edge”.
By contrast, Nato which has kept the peace in Europe for almost 70 years and is the West’s only effective defensive shield against Russia, has seen most alliance countries running their forces down. The majority of its members have failed to reach the two per cent of GDP target set by the alliance. The three most important European members – Britain, France and Germany – are just about achieving their two per cent targets.
Across Europe, manpower has been slashed, weapons procurement programmes halted and systems dismantled without being replaced.
By falling short of the Nato commitment to dedicate two per cent of GDP to defence, European states are neglecting their basic duty of safeguarding the security of their citizens. Eastern Europe is under threat from Putin and the European continent adjoins a Middle East in turmoil.
Britain’s impending exit from the EU has prompted fresh calls by Angela Merkel, Francois Hollande and Matteo Renzi to begin the march towards a common European army. A common army should not compete with Nato, but a growing number of nations in Europe believe that they need to boost EU forces amid concerns that the US might step back from Europe.
Putin’s stubborn focus on military development began in 2008, following the Russian army’s incursion into Georgia which laid bare the deficiencies of its military technology. But following government expenditure of $720 billion on a new generation of military weapons, Putin was soon baring his teeth with a war in Ukraine.
Russia saw the conflict as a means of destabilising Europe and entrenching its influence in the former eastern bloc.
The Syrian civil war, which Putin promptly entered on the side of his friend Bashir al-Assad, gave him the chance to plant the seeds of Russian influence and financial control in an ever more volatile Middle East.
Although sanctions against Russia have contributed to frustrating Putin’s efforts to restore the old ideal of imperial splendour, Putin’s government is expert at sidestepping them. Nonetheless, no country can withstand a punitive sanctions regime indefinitely and western countries must continue to apply pressure. Meanwhile, Nato states must improve their defences. Putin cannot be allowed to punch a hole through the peace in Europe that Nato underpins.
Putin cannot be allowed to punch a hole through the peace in Europe that Nato underpins
Against that background, unfolding events should cause the West to ponder the possible consequences for Europe’s security of a number of unrelated, but worrying, events. First, in the US, Donald Trump, the Republican candidate who could become commander-in-chief in 2017, seems to believe that Putin is a formidable statesman with whom he can fruitfully do business.
If this were to come about, it would represent a spectacular misjudgement. The Russian president’s priorities are all too clear. These are to split Europe, to stake out an unchallenged and expanding sphere of influence, and to drive a wedge between the US and European members of Nato. Russian propaganda is remarkably successful at churning out material designed to sow doubt within the trans-Atlantic alliance.
The essential American interest abroad must lie in the effective deterrence of potential enemies. That can only be achieved by sending a coherent message of support to US allies and by projecting credible strength. It has been damaging for Trump to make Nato solidarity conditional in some way upon how much member states have put into the defence budget.
While it is important that all Nato members contribute at least two per cent of GDP, it makes the Article 5 Nato commitment – by which an attack on one nation constitutes an attack on all – far from solid, leading to an increasingly timid and fractured alliance.
Trump appears to believe that he can succeed in reshuffling the post-Cold War order. This is delusional. Dumping Ukraine would set a devastating precedent and lifting the sanctions applied for the annexation of Crimea would send a message that the violation of international borders will go unpunished by the US.
World leaders – with the exception of those that do not want the US to succeed – have been alarmed by the surreal prospect of an anti-American, pro-Putin president.
The second cause for concern is that, following the failed coup against President Erdogan and after a bilateral summit in St Petersburg earlier this month between the Russian and Turkish leaders, they appear to have reset their diplomatic relationship in a way which may not be entirely helpful to western security interests.
Working together, Turkey and Russia are capable of redrafting the terms of conflict in the Middle East, as well as disrupting the post-World War II order in Europe. That is why the meeting of these two autocrats is causing some consternation in the Western alliance.
However warmly he is embraced by Putin, Erdogan should not forget that he is a member of Nato and an intrinsic and vital part of a collective security system that has kept the peace in Europe for almost 70 years.
The lukewarm support for Erdogan by Nato and EU counties in the first hours after the thwarted coup by the generals, and the EU’s insistence on his watering down anti-terrorism laws before Turkish citizens are granted easier travel conditions in Europe, appear to have turned Erdogan against the West.
Putin is presenting himself as a natural partner of Ankara. His aim is to cause mischief in the Nato alliance.
Even the plan to fight together against Daesh seeks to aggravate divisions in the West since the military operations would involve Turkey sharing “real time” intelligence and communications between commanders – possibly also allowing Russian jets to operate out of Incirlik, an American-built base in Turkey which has about 50 US tactical nuclear warheads stored on site.
The EU needs substantial Turkish cooperation to stem the flow of migrants. Despite Erdogan’s extensive crackdown after the attempted coup, he remains a crucial ally. The West should give him more enthusiastic support and respect. But it must also make clear that he cannot create for himself a privileged membership in Nato – especially one that gives Putin a voice at the table.
Trump’s thinly veiled contempt for Nato chimes in with his admiration for Putin. If elected, his foreign policy could jeopardise the trans-Atlantic alliance. Erdogan – a key Nato ally – is cosying up to Putin, while Europe stands largely on the side lines wracked by an immigration crisis which it finds itself unable to overcome and in which it desperately needs Turkey’s help.
These are worrying times for the West’s defence alliance.