Ever since the cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran began to escalate, almost two weeks ago, a spate of commentary by seasoned observers has followed to show just why Saudi Arabia may be overreaching. Others have simultaneously suggested that the conflict is deepening the sectarian divide within Islam – as though this follows logically. But does it?
The escalation followed the beheading, by the Saudi authorities, of a Shia spiritual leader who had been a critic of the monarchy. It coincided with the execution of just under 50 Sunni radicals but it was the single Shia that drew all the attention (which may have been exactly what Riyadh wanted).
In Iran the execution was followed with two attacks on Saudi diplomatic missions, attacks that could hardly have happened without the sanction of the Iranian regime. Saudi Arabia could have responded with restraint, at that point, but chose to cut off all diplomatic, trade and air ties.
Since then, it has been trying to get other Sunni Arab states to join its campaign against Iran. But if you think that Saudi Arabia has succeeded – having seen the news report that the League of Arab States also condemned Iran – think again. There’s some smaller print.
In the first place, three unnamed Arab League members did not vote for the condemnation, although that did not prevent the motion from being passed. Second, few countries joined Saudi Arabia in cutting diplomatic ties completely (as distinct from downgrading them).
They are Bahrain, Djibouti and Somalia – small members that are keen on Saudi support.
In the light of what else the Arab League members could have done to support Saudi Arabia, what actually has been done is distinctly underwhelming. A strong condemnation is what you issue when you don’t intend to do much else.
In addition, fellow Gulf countries Qatar and Oman have not announced that they will be reviewing their respective security agreements with Iran.
If you’re wondering how their regimes can have security arrangements with a country that is supposed to be the regional foe of Sunni Arabs, then you can probably see why the idea of this incident, in itself, deepening the sectarian divide might be exaggerated. The Sunni-Shia divide is real but it does not shape geopolitics by itself. Reasons of state feature prominently too.
Just as the US might be a supporter of Saudi Arabia against Iran, but working against Saudi Arabia in Syria, so too does Iran conduct business with Sunni regimes and organisations. Iran supports Hamas – a radical Sunni Islamist organisation that one would expect to be more prejudiced against the Shia – while Daesh attacks Hamas for that very reason.
A strong condemnation is what you issue when you don’t intend to do much else
All this context indicates that Saudi Arabia is finding it difficult to put together a real coalition to defend its interests. Even the so-called Islamic military alliance against Daesh, announced by Saudi Arabia, excludes not only Iran (obviously) but also Iraq, Lebanon and Algeria. And we still have to see that military alliance engage in real fighting.
The difficulty in finding reliable allies exacerbates a moment of critical weakness in the kingdom’s history.
The first weakness is structural. The country depends on petroleum for 90 per cent of its revenues. But oil prices have fallen to under $35 a barrel (down from double digits in 2014) and may fall further.
Nor does this seem to be a blip. The veteran economics commentator, Anatole Kaletsky, has argued that the energy market has undergone a decisive shift thanks to the development of fracking.
Previously, if Opec wanted oil prices to go up, all it had to do was reduce production and reap profits from the ensuing scarcity. Now, however, the moment oil costs more than $50 a barrel, shale oil extraction becomes profitable. In other words, if Opec cuts its own production, it would simply be handing market share over to US companies.
On this argument, $50 should mark the ceiling of oil prices in the future. However, even if the price does hit that ceiling, it spells the end of the current dispensation – autocracy in return for generous subsidies to Saudi citizens. If prices were fixed at $50 for five years, Saudi Arabia will run out of cash.
The second weakness is of leadership. The current king, Salman bin Abdullah, is said to be suffering from dementia.
The deputy crown prince, Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud, the Defence Minister, is said to be the real power behind the throne.
However, complaints have been seeping out – from within the royal family to the German intelligence services – that he is a reckless, arrogant gambler, reversing decades of cautious Saudi foreign policy in favour of a more belligerent one.
What is more, he seems intent on dealing with the looming cash crisis by undertaking a sweeping liberalisation of the economy over a five-year period. Not even Margaret Thatcher managed that. And the kingdom is used to changing things at a glacial pace.
Nor will there be accompanying political liberalisation. On the contrary, the regime is becoming more repressive, with any dissent being treated as treachery. The number of executions has risen sharply.
International observers have mainly restricted themselves to pointing out how difficult it will be for the economic reforms themselves to succeed, given the shock that the massive subsidy cuts will deliver.
But there are massive risks even if they do succeed, in conventional economic terms. Both Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi were removed at periods when the respective economies were registering improved performance.
But the economic figures themselves can actually incite political resentment if the profits from growth are not seen to be distributed equitably but rather flowing into the pockets of the kleptocrats at the top.
Four years passed between the breakout of the Arab Spring and the fulfilment of theSaudi monarchy’s promise (under a different king) to permit women to vote and stand in municipal elections. The next four years just might turn out to be more eventful.
ranierfsadni@europe.com