Just when you think there’s very little left in this country that can take you aback, the Prime Minister and the leader of the Opposition each name one person who they think should preside over the talks on constitutional reform. And not one of their interviewers, and no editorial, states the most pressing reason why neither of those names should even be considered.
Joseph Muscat is pushing (or playing at pushing) Franco Debono, the former PN one-term backbencher and current Law Commissioner. Simon Busuttil has indicated the President of the Republic as someone with the necessary national stature for the task (although it seems he’s open to other possibilities as long as they command authority and widespread national respect).
Everyone has assumed that Muscat has named Debono as a gambit – to provoke the PN into refusing to participate in the discussions and hence to get them to carry the blame for these not taking place. The assumption is probably correct but it also misdirects our attention.
Yes, the trustworthiness of the chair is obviously important and it’s unreasonable to expect the PN to trust Debono. What matters, in the end, is that the chair of the reform talks is trusted by both sides, and not whether the mistrust is justified.
But all this makes us focus on Debono’s conflict with the PN whereas the fundamental issue is his relationship with constitutional reform.
He has a major conflict of interest, just like Marie-Louise Coleiro Preca.
It is a conflict of interest that isindependent of their personal qualities and vices.
We do not need to debate whether Debono has the intelligence, temperance and circumspection needed to chair such a process – whether he’s the sharpest knife in the legal drawer, a machete prone to fly off its handle, or yet another of the bladeless knives without a handle that our country exalts.
His conflict of interest is undeniable and he himself publicises it. He frequently and triumphantly points to his many public, detailed, and endlessly reiterated proposals for constitutional reform.
Those proposals might possibly be interesting enough to discuss and explore at length. Arguably, they might make Debono an expert who should be extensively consulted in the reform discussions. But they automatically disqualify him as a chair of that process.
The chair needs to be impartial. The role cannot be filled by someone who has a pronounced, strong view on some of the most important decisions that need to be taken.
The role of the chair is to bring the many sides together – many because, while the major players are the two parties of government, the process should have the character of a national assembly and be open to other political parties, NGOs and even individuals.
The chair will sometimes need to push for compromises or else propose a creative alternative to the competing ones on offer. He certainly cannot be a known advocate for a particular proposal.
The trustworthiness of the chair is obviously important and it’s unreasonable to expect the PN to trust Franco Debono
As the current incumbent of the Presidency, Coleiro Preca also has a conflict of interest. Her role is to be the guardian of the Constitution as it is, which includes guarding against proposed reforms that would erode our current rights.
If the guardian herself oversees the reform, who will guard the guardian?
Besides, Coleiro Preca would probably have to preside over discussions related to the Presidency itself. How can that be right? For example, should the incumbent President preside over a discussion related to whether second presidential terms can be granted?
One could retort that any agreed constitutional changes would be brought into effect after Coleiro Preca’s term is up in 2019. No change would affect her personally. But that means the reforms come into effect in a new Parliament, with a new composition and no guarantee that the same majority in favour of the reforms would be in place.
In any case, why go through such contortions? We have several figures who have the necessary qualities for the role.
It’s worth understanding what these qualities are, lest other pointless names are mentioned. It’s also important to remember the obvious but frequently forgotten fact about the chairing of these talks: they require multifaceted knowledge and skills. Chairing these discussions should not be considered a prize. It’s a task calling for circumspection, creative negotiating skills, and expert knowledge.
Five necessary qualities need highlighting. One is national prestige because with that comes some power of moral suasion. Not necessarily the odour of sanctity but, at least, the musk of gravitas.
Second, the person needs to command the trust of the major parties involved in the discussion. Even if trusted by the parties involved in the discussion, the person should not arouse misgivings among a major sector of the population.
Third, there is knowledge of the law and of constitutional law and, fourth, knowledge of the Maltese State, its practical workings and dilemmas.
There is never a complete overlap between the spirit of a Constitution and the way the State actually works. Our present system, for example, is a parliamentary democracy on paper but, in practice, invests the prime minister with so many powers that he often acts like an executive president.
A chair who combines legal knowledge with experience of the Maltese State would be able to identify more readily proposals that could correct, or further upset, the balance of powers in practice.
Fifth, there is political intuition and judgement; that is, not just the ability to assess a proposal for its political implications for society, but also the abilityto judge what is possible in the political jousting that will feature in thetalks themselves.
These ideal qualities do not rule out anyone who hasn’t been a politician or who hasn’t occupied a high position within the State, although such experience is very helpful. People who have occupied important roles as advisors to governments would also have acquired such experience.
There are several personages who satisfy these criteria. Here’s a list, in alphabetical order, just off the top of my head.
David Attard is a legal expert of international renown, a scholar of Maltese law, and has been a legal advisor to every Maltese government for the last quarter of a century.
Giovanni Bonello is a former judge at the International Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and widely known for his commitment to constitutional rights (although, since he’s made a few views widely known, some might not consider him sufficiently impartial).
Louis Galea, the former minister, ends his term on the EU’s Court of Auditors around the middle of this year. As Speaker, he had already discreetly guided talks on constitutional reform between the then Nationalist government and Labour Opposition.
Former President Ugo Mifsud Bonnici won the respect of both sides of the House during his term as President, and has a scholarly knowledge of Malta’s political development and laws as well as extensive practical experience in the upper echelons of government and State.
No doubt, there are other names that can be discussed. I can think of others myself. So why waste time discussing names of people who should so obviously be disqualified?
ranierfsadni@europe.com