At precisely 5am on October 3, 1935, General Emilio De Bono, Commander-in-Chief of Italian armed forces in East Africa, crossed the Mareb River and advanced into Ethiopia from Eritrea without a declaration of war. Ethiopia immediately declared war on Italy, thus beginning the Second Italo-Abyssinian War.

Abyssinians prepared for an Italian attack.

On October 7, the League of Nations declared Italy to be the aggressor and started the slow process of imposing sanctions on Italy. They did not prohibit the provision of several vital materials, such as oil, and the sanctions were not carried out by all members of the League. The US, exasperated by the League’s failure to act, actually increased its exports to Italy, and the UK and France did not take any serious action against Italy, such as blocking Italian access to the Suez Canal.

The Mediterranean Fleet that had left Malta went to Alexandria, Egypt. But several ships continued to be stationed or visit Malta. It was reported that on October 13, warships of the First Destroyer Flotilla under the command of Captain H.F. Raillie-Grohman, remained in Malta.

HMS Douglas, the submarine repair and depot ship HMS Cyclops, and submarines under the command of Captain G. D’Oyly Hughes were in Malta. It was reported on November 24, HMS London, HMS Devonshire and HMS Shropshire visited Malta to use the drydocking facilities, and that HMS Delhi, HMS Durban, HMS Sussex and HMS Exeter also docked in Malta.

On December 1, the First Destroyer Flotilla remained in Malta. It was composed of HMS Keppel and W class destroyers. On December 15, HMS Courageous, the flagship of Rear-Admiral Sir Alexander Ramsay, arrived at Malta and paid a brief visit for docking purposes.

Seven more deportations were made on the October 9 and 10: Nicola Parodi, manager of Banco di Roma; Riccardo Naselli, manager of the Ala Littoria, who was in charge of the arrangements for the arrival and departure of Italian seaplanes in Malta at Marsaxlokk Bay; commercial agents Attilio Pagliacci and Salvatore Marsala, and Nicola Revello, Emilio Chilo and Mario Tamborino. Several of the deportees were accompanied by their families and dependents, including some Italian servants. They were transported to Syracuse on the RMS Knight of Malta.

Meanwhile, a report dated October 14 entitled ‘Malta: civil air raid precautions’ was published by G.D. Kirwan of the Air Raid Precautions Department, Home Office, and Major A.T. Sumner, Chemical Defence Research Department, War Office. According to the report, the Air Ministry had advised them about a possible attack by Italy on Malta with between 30 to 60 tons of bombs a day.

The use of sulphur mustard played an important role in shifting the momentum of fighting in favour of the Italian forces and in demoralising the Ethiopian forces

The report continued that the lower figure represented an attack if older types of aircraft were employed, and the higher figure if larger aircraft were brought in use. It said that it was expected that the attacks would be of a continuous nature, from 100 to 150 aircraft mostly based on Sicily, but some operating perhaps from Libya, and might be augmented and possibly interspersed by massed attacks by 300 to 400 or perhaps even more aircraft.

The Air Officer Commanding Malta believed that the Italian air strategy favoured continuous attacks by night and massed attacks by day, the latter including a proportion of bombs fused to burst a considerable time after being dropped. The experts considered that the first attack on the island would be concentrated on certain air force and military objectives, not including the HM Dockyard, which had no immediate military importance.

Italy’s two-pronged invasion of Abyssinia, 1935-36.

Putting aside the question of whether it would be Italian policy to avoid bombing the civil population of Malta, the report focused on a potential 30 ton-a-day scale attack on Valletta and the area surrounding the two harbours. It considered that the civil population outside this area would be subjected only to sporadic, perhaps accidental attack.

It was assumed that the area of Valletta within which the potential scale of attack is 30 tons a day would roughly be the area within the line of St Julian’s, Ħamrun, Paola and Żabbar. The following locations were also considered as possible targets of the enemy: Fort Tigné, Manoel Island Destroyer Depot, Fort St Elmo, Command Headquarters at the Auberge de Castille, Fort Ricasoli, Naval Wireless Station, Naval Dockyard and Corradino Naval Oil Tanks.

The experts said that the distinctive methods of building construction in Malta seems likely to have an important bearing of the effect of air raids, as compared with conditions in England. They argued that in England, great emphasis had to be made on measured attacks as they had to deal with conflagrations due to incendiary bombs or high explosives.

An Italian Caproni CA101 bomber flying over Ethiopia.

In Malta these risks were very much reduced, and perhaps negligible, owing to the buildings being built of stone with hardly any use of wood. The two experts said the Italians were believed to be making use of bombs of between 50 and 100 kilos in weight, as well as heavier bombs. Some of the latter are armour-piercing bombs, but it was assumed that most of their bombs will be of the general purposes type with nose fuses.

The report continued that the possible use of gas by hostile aircraft in an attack on military targets in Malta received serious consideration. It was anticipated that mustard gas would be selected because it would be particularly efficient given the meteorological conditions experienced on the island. The Italians were known to possess gas. It said that if mustard gas was used it would probably have the appearance of a brown oily liquid and would leave a stain on any stonework or other light-coloured object.

The report indicated that the gas might be released from aircraft either in the form of fine or gross spray, or in bombs, according to the object the enemy had in view. Fine spray could be released at an altitude of 10,000 feet or above, but under such circumstances it would take 20 minutes to reach the ground and in this time would travel several miles from the point of emission. The gross spray would be released at considerably lower altitudes and would cause heavy contamination of a much smaller area. It added that a bomb was a particularly efficient weapon for delivering mustard gas because, owing to the possibility of a light case, the weight ratio of contents to total bomb is high, and a heavy local contamination could be effected from high altitude.

On November 18, the League of Nations condemned Italy’s aggression on Abyssinia and imposed economic sanctions. On the same day, the British military authorities decided to hold military exercises in Malta. According to a local newspaper the exercises looked very much like a test of mobilisation, including all regular troops and mobile corps in Malta.

Suppliment of the Times of Malta showing a map of Abyssinia.

It reported: “The exercises, however, even to the layman, did undoubtedly prove how very efficiently we are prepared for any emergency... Hundreds of private buses were called up, and were driven to the various headquarters of the regiments participating in the manoeuvres, where they were loaded with troops, and arms and ammunition, which were carried to their various posts all along the coastline, while various contingents marched to their posts on foot.

It was expected that the attacks would be of a continuous nature, from 100 to 150 aircraft, and might be augmented and possibly interspersed by massed attacks by 300 to 400 or perhaps even more aircraft

“The Royal Engineers were busy installing a telephone system that ran all around the coastline of Malta, while quick-fires and machine-guns were placed in position behind the barbed wire on rocks and sandy beaches. Apart from motor transport, stolid mules and horses from the farmhouses were requisitioned and well-paid for their hire.”

Pietro Badoglio replaced De Bono in November 1935, and under his methodical direction the campaign was carried out with a mixture of brutality and efficiency. On December 22, Italian aircraft for the first time dropped tear gas grenades and asphyxiating gas over the Takkaze Valley in northeastern Ethiopia. Italy controlled the air and initially dropped sulphur mustard air bombs but later shifted to the use of aerial spray tanks. Sulphur mustard air bombs reportedly caused most of the chemical weapon casualties.

The Times of Malta of October 4, 1935, announcing the Italian invasion of Abyssinia.

The use of sulphur mustard played an important role in shifting the momentum of fighting in favour of the Italian forces and in demoralising the Ethiopian forces. Its use resulted in many long-lasting, painful injuries and in a significant number of deaths. More chemical weapons were used on Ethiopia during the same month, on Amba Ala on December 26 and on Borena on December 31.

In December 1935, British Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare and French Prime Minister Pierre Laval proposed the secret Hoare-Laval Plan, which would have ended the war but allowed Italy to control large areas of Ethiopia. Mussolini agreed to the plan, but when the plan was leaked to the media it caused an outcry in Britain and France.

Hoare and Laval were accused of betraying the Abyssinians, and both resigned. Their plan was dropped, but the perception spread that Britain and France were not serious about the principles of the League. The war continued, and Mussolini turned to Nazi Germany to create an alliance.

Before the outbreak of the Italo-Abyssinian war, on February 9, 1934, a treaty had been signed by Greece, Turkey, Romania and Yugoslavia in Athens, known as the Balkan Entente. Its aim was to maintain the geopolitical status quo in the region following World War I.

The signatories agreed to suspend all disputed territorial claims against each other and their immediate neighbours following the aftermath of the war and a rise in various regional ethnic minority tensions. It was reported that in late December 1935, Turkey and the Balkan Entente were ready to cooperate with Britain in case of a conflict occurring in the Mediterranean.

Next year we will see how the British continued to fear of possible Italian gas attack, invasion or the outbreak of a war in the Mediterranean and the outcome of the Abyssinian war.

(Concluded)

Charles Debono is curator of the National War Museum at Fort St Elmo.