October 2015 marks the 80th anniversary of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia). Italian irredentists and fascists claimed that Malta was geographically part of the Italian kingdom. Therefore, the British military authorities saw this aggression as a possible threat to Malta.

During this time the British started taking the first precautions against a possible Italian invasion of the Maltese islands. During invasion of Abyssinia the Italian used gas warfare, which they believed and expected to be a feature of any future European war.

Due to this chemical warfare, the British feared the Italians might use poison gas against the Maltese civilian population. Precautions started being taken against possible poison gas attack. Thankfully, it never happened.

After its unification, Italy began realising its colonial ambitions, as other countries had. After conquering Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, Italy turned its attention to the last independent African country, Ethiopia (Abyssinia).

The first Italian invasion became known as the First Italo-Abyssinian War (1895-1896). However, on March 1, 1896, the Italians were defeated by the Ethiopians at the Battle of Adwa. As a result of this battle, the Italians entered into negotiations with Abyssinia, which resulted in the Treaty of Addis Ababa. Ending the war, the treaty saw Italy recognise Abyssinia as an independent State and clarified the border with Eritrea.

In 1930 the Italians built a fort at Wal Wal, well inside the Abyssinian border. During the following years the Italians sent more forces in the area. On November 22, 1934, an Ethiopian force arrived at the fort at Wal Wal and demanded the fort’s surrender.

On January 3, 1935, Ethiopia appealed to the League of Nations for arbitration of the dispute arising from the Wal Wal incident. French Minister of Foreign Affairs Pierre Laval and British Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare went to Rome and met Benito Mussolini. Agreements made at the meeting cemented Italian authority in Tunisia and granted Italy lands previously in French Somalia.

After its unification, Italy began realising its colonial ambitions, as other countries had. After conquering Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, Italy turned its attention to the last independent African country, Ethiopia (Abyssinia)

The hope for peace did not last long. On January 25, 1935, the Ethiopian army killed five Italian soldiers near the fort at Wal Wal. Mussolini’s response was to mobilise two divisions and preparations began to send a large military force to the area. After the arbitration of the League of Nations, Italy agreed to a neutral area along the border but continued to send more forces to the area.

On January 7, 1935, a meeting between Laval and Mussolini led to the Franco–Italian Agreement. This treaty gave Italy parts of French Somaliland, redefined the official status of Italians in French-held Tunisia, and essentially gave the Italians a free hand in dealing with Ethiopia.

On February 10, 1935, Mussolini mobilised the two divisions. On February 23, he began to send large numbers of troops to Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. On March 13, Italy and Ethiopia agreed on a neutral zone in the Ogaden.

On March 28, 1935, General Emilio De Bono was appointed commander-in-chief of all Italian armed forces in East Africa. In addition, he was the commander-in-chief of the forces invading from Eritrea, the northern front.

De Bono had under his direct command a force of nine divisions in three army corps: The Italian I Corps, the Italian II Corps, and the Eritrean Corps. General Rodolfo Graziani was De Bono’s subordinate. He was the commander-in-chief of forces invading from Italian Somaliland, the southern front.

Between May 20 and 21, the League of Nations held a special session to discuss the crisis in Ethiopia, and discussions continued throughout the summer at the League of Nations seeking to pacify Mussolini.

In June, Britain sent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Anthony Eden to try and broker a deal with Mussolini that would prevent war. Mussolini though, was not in any mood to back down as yet.

An arms embargo was placed on both Italy and Ethiopia.

From June 23 to 24, the UK tried to quell the crisis, sending Eden to try to broker a peace agreement. The attempt was unsuccessful.

On June 25, Italian and Ethiopian officials met in The Hague to discuss arbitration.

On July 25, Britain imposed an embargo on arms sales to both Italy and Ethiopia.

On July 26, the league confirmed that no fifth member of the arbitration panel had been selected. On August 3, the League limited the arbitration talks to matters other than the sovereignty of Wal Wal.

On August 12, Ethiopia pleaded for the arms embargo to be lifted. On August 16, France and Britain offered Italy large concessions in Ethiopia to try to avert war, but Italy rejected the offers. On August 22, Britain reaffirmed its commitment to the arms embargo. On September 4, the League of Nations decided that neither side were to blame for the incident at Wal Wal, and on September 10, Pierre Laval, Anthony Eden and Sir Samuel Hoare agreed to reduce the sanctions against Italy.

The acoustic concrete mirror’s function was to track the sound of approaching aircraft. It was built at Magħtab and the mirrors’ line of shoot was towards Sicily, the direction whence the British expected the enemy to come

On September 25, Ethiopia again asked for neutral observers. However, three days later, Ethiopia began to mobilise its army.

As all this was happening, the British forces stationed in Malta were under the threat of Italian espionage and acts of sabotage. During the 1930s Italy intensified its espionage activity, and a number of arrests were made on the island, including that of a British subject. The official responsible for the island’s security affairs at the time was Defence Security Officer Major Bertram Ede. He formed part of Colonel Vernon Kell’s M15.

In 1933, Arnaldo Belardinelli, who was married to a Maltese woman and ran a textile factory, was arrested when he tried to transmit a report about the defences of Malta to the Italian Consul Ferrante in Tripoli. Durante was also the manager of the seaplane service between Sicily, Malta and Tripoli.

Belardinelli had bought a map of Malta, where he indicated all the fortresses in Malta and even tried several times to take photos of the Ħal Far airfield hangar, but he never succeeded.

Durante was also interested in how many and what type of guns there were in Malta. Belardinelli attempted to bribe Dockyard employees to obtain plan of the navy’s Asdic submarine detection equipment. On May 28, 1934, Durante and Belardinelli went to Ħal Far, Kalafrana and Għar Ħasan to spy, and they succeeded to obtain sensitive information from soldiers stationed in the area. In May 1936, two Maltese were arrested and confessed that they had received instructions and payment from Ferrante. The latter was expelled from Malta in July 1936.

During this period there were other cases of Italian espionage in Malta. On September 30, 1935, deportations of Italian residents from Malta started. The first five were Commendatore Luigi Mazzone, who was Italian ex-vice consul, agent for the Italian news service ‘Stefani’ and the principal Italian shipping agent in Malta, and his two sons Giovanni and Luigi Mazzone; Cavaliere Cardenio Botto, ex-secretary of the Fascist Club, Valletta, ex-assistant director at the Royal Opera House, and bandmaster of La Valette Band Club, and Cavaliere Leonardo Fusco, assistant manager at Banco di Roma, Valletta. Four of them left Malta on board RMS Knight of Malta, bound for Syracuse. Mazzone was at the time in Sicily, and he was not permitted to return to Malta.

During spring 1935, the Italian navy, the Regia Marina, took preventive measures in case of the outbreak of a war against Britain. At the beginning of spring 1935, the First Lord of the Admiralty declared that the HM Dockyard could be used by large warships of the Royal Navy. The large floating dock was the first objective of naval importance identified by the Regia Marina. It also identified other objectives such as the arsenal of the naval base, Tigné torpedo depot, Ricasoli Point torpedo depot, the three oil depots, the ammunition depot at Fort Mosta, the seaplane base at Kalafrana, Ħal Far airfield and the coastal fortifications, which had already been identified by the Regia Aeronautica.

In reaction to all that was happening outside Malta, the British planned to build an acoustic concrete mirror as part of Malta’s defences. Its function was to track the sound of approaching aircraft by means of microphones set up in the forecourt across the mirror’s line of focus. It was built at Magħtab and the mirrors’ line of shoot was towards Sicily, the direction whence the British expected the enemy to come, should Italy decide to attack Malta.

All the needed material was loaded on SS Fabian on July 31, 1935, and the vessel arrived in Malta on August 17. By the end of September 1935 the mirror was completed, and the training of personnel from the 16th Company began on November 6, 1935, under the supervision of Messrs Ferguson and Handford from the Air Defence Experimental Establishment, Biggin Hill.

Trails on the mirror ended on November 6, after which two 24-hour tests were carried out between December 2-3 and 5-6, 1935. However, by June 1939 the mirror was abandoned when it was replaced by radar station AMES241, which began operating in April 1939.

(To be continued)

Charles Debono is curator of the National War Museum at Fort St Elmo.