Last Monday there was the meeting of the Euro Group (comprising the countries that are members of the eurozone) which discussed the current problems with Greece. In truth, there was already the expectation that no solution would be reached by the end of the meeting. However, a solution is required in the next two weeks.

This solution has to be found in a context which is, to say the least, confusing and tense. Greece is no longer seen as a trusted interlocutor by several members of the Euro Group and so it is very difficult to envisage what will happen next.

Mixed messages have been a prevalent feature over the last weeks, even though there has been the feeling that what we experienced was the lull before the storm. The president of the European Commission, Jean Claude Juncker, has asserted more than once that Greece will not default on its commitments and so will stay in the eurozone, in spite of the fact that there is not yet clarity on the reforms that Greece is planning to implement.

On the other hand, he also asserted that the Greek government must commit itself to a credible and sustainable fiscal policy. At some point he even stated publicly that financial experts based in London are waiting to crush the euro if Greece leaves the eurozone. So would the eurozone survive a Greek exit from the eurozone?

The crux of the issue is the reforms that Greece should implement to remain solvent. The Greek government, led by Alexis Tsipras, has made a number of electoral pledges, which it now wants to honour. However, to honour them it has to renege on the commitment given by the previous government to its creditors that it will implement a policy of fiscal consolidation.

It is still not known (probably because there is no solution) as to how the Greek government can maintain its commitments on both fronts – that is balancing the electoral pledges with fiscal consolidation.

Because there is uncertainty as to whether Greece will default or not, there is also uncertainty as to what would be the impact of a Greek default. In this regard there are two opposing views and both have their backers. One view is that if Greece defaults and exits the euro, initially there would be chaos and panic in the international financial markets, European banks would need to be bailed out once more and the euro will get a hammering.

Following action by the European Central Bank, the markets would stabilise and the situation would become manageable once more.

The second view is that no one really knows what could happen if Greece defaults. The issue is not so much Greece, whose economy represents just two per cent of the eurozone. Nor is it the European banks, whose exposure to Greek debt has been rolled back significantly. It is rather how the ECB will react and how financial markets will react in respect of the sovereign debt of Italy and Spain, which is much larger and to which several banks are still exposed.

Is this so-called view, that no one really knows what could happen, an indication that EU governments are underestimating the impact of a Greek default?

It may well be that one should fear less the impact of a Greek exit from the euro and fear more a Syriza contagion, which could then really put the eurozone in turmoil

The Spring Economic Forecasts published by the EU earlier this month do not help in reducing this uncertainty. It is claimed that although the Greek economy grew for the first time last year since 2007, and that the conditions to support growth are in place, political uncertainty is holding back the recovery. One really wonders whether the tough words used by the Greek Finance Minister and other ministers are just meant for the media or carry real substance.

Some British media reported that the Greek Cabinet has resolved to defy the creditors and to bring matters to a head. Prime Minister Tsipras and the leading figures of his Syriza-led government agreed to defend their “red lines” on pensions and collective bargaining and prepare for battle whatever the consequences. They feel that the strategy they adopted in the last weeks to find a compromise appears to have reached a dead end.

Thus there are many who are accepting that Greece will exit the euro, willingly or unwillingly. However, the view is that one does not know what could happen next. The problem is not whether any one of two or more possible scenarios will realise itself, but rather that there is really no scenario to expect.

It may well be that one should fear less the impact of a Greek exit from the euro and fear more a Syriza contagion, which could then really put the eurozone in turmoil.