There’s been some sniffing – outrage, even – at Joseph Muscat’s statement that, following the referendum result, the media (presumably the English-language press that advocated a No vote) had some stocktaking to do. Well, should we sniff or should we take stock?

Both, although some of the stocktaking is not what Muscat has in mind.

There’s no doubt that it’s an odd thing for a politician to say in a democracy. Muscat said the media need to take stock the way politicians do after a vote – with humility. However, I cannot think of a single democratic politician who has ever said this to the free media.

Let’s remember, in Euro-America, media organisations endorse political parties, presidential candidates and positions on particular issues all the time. Precisely because they do it all the time, they’re on the losing side sometimes. But no politician ever draws the conclusion that, because the other side won, this or that media organisation should therefore take a good hard look at itself.

It should be obvious why. Politicians and media organisations don’t relate to the public in the same way. Politicians of parties of government – if they’re to be good at what they do – have to be in touch with the national mood. But the free media are beholden only to their market segment. The only media organisations obliged to provide mood muzak are State media and those in the pocket of corporate shareholders who need the grace and favour of politicians. In short, the docile media, who have little to do with being democracy’s watchdog. They cannot defend freedom because they are themselves in chains.

If by his comment Muscat means that the media should revise their opinion because they’re out of step with the majority, then he’s obviously mistaken.

But maybe he had something else in mind: that the media did not serve their own market segments well, given that the actual result probably came as a surprise to a large proportion of their readership.

In other words, Muscat was not criticising the media for their opinions but for their coverage.

Maybe he has a point. What I’ve heard so far is that the three newspapers arguing for a No vote served their readers well because they reflected their readership’s consensus. No doubt, that’s true.

But that would mean limiting the duty of the media to address one kind of fact: the fact of opinion. There are three other kinds of fact that the media, in its ensemble, should also address.

There are the facts of reportage – what actually takes place. There are explanatory facts – the facts that account for how things work – which often require some long-term perspective and expertise. And, then, there are the facts of experience – how things seem and feel, according to different points of view.

The coverage of these three kinds of fact was at best patchy but often just weak. As a result, the referendum outcome seemed to come out of nowhere to many people.

Let’s see how better coverage of each kind of fact would have helped give a better picture of what was actually going on. Let’s begin with the facts of experience.

The media do need to take stock of the referendum result – not to become more docile but to be better watchdogs

Hunters were almost always portrayed from the point of view of their critics (and, yes, there is a lot to criticise). The people that the hunters’ lobby was appealing to – those others that, according to the hunters’ disinformation, stood to be the next ‘victims’ of a referendum – were described as enthusiasts of various hobbies.

Interviews with ordinary hunters, however, would have shown that hunting is an important part of their self-definition. Many of the other people the hunters appealed to – fireworks enthusiasts, etc. – also define themselves by what is very misleadingly called their ‘hobby’.

Legally, it’s nonsense to describe them as ‘minorities’. But, culturally, the term does capture the sense of self-identification with the activity, as well as the senses of class animosity and solidarity involved.

Sympathetic interviews – aimed at faithfully capturing the hunters’ point of view, their love for what they do – would have done even the No vote an important service. It would have realised much more profoundly that the campaign pitted a camp of people who defined themselves by what was at stake (the Yes vote) against a camp for whom (apart from a core segment) the issue was not self-defining but just one among many.

That in itself would have indicated another major difference between the two camps. Mobilising the Yes vote needed only dog-whistles – key words and alarms that didn’t need the extensive media coverage. Mobilising the No vote, on the other, needed much more – certainly more than just getting people to agree with you.

Next, the facts of explanation. Many reporters contented themselves with shaking their heads at the lack of entertainment value in the campaign. Just because they couldn’t see the campaign, they assumed it didn’t really exist.

In fact, the Yes vote was playing from a standard playbook: how to sneak in from behind at the last moment. It has been played countless times in student council elections, where the hacks (with the ground operation) always beat the idealists (without one).

It’s simple to describe.

You keep the overt campaign dull, to keep the other side from mobilising. You blow the dog whistle for your own side and mobilise in the last lap.

In general, the press did not analyse the respective campaigns properly – as, say, the media in the UK are analysing the playbooks of the general election campaign. Moreover, they repeatedly missed how the link with the local council elections worked. The pundits generally assumed that local council elections would boost the turnout for the referendum, which is why, they said, Muscat would have preferred to avoid council elections. But, in fact, the real threat to Muscat was that the referendum would boost the local council vote – to his disadvantage.

In local council elections, Labour manages to mobilise more of its core vote – up to 15 per cent – than the PN does. But if the referendum brought out more Nationalists to vote on local councils, too, then, combined with mid-term blues, it would have delivered Muscat his first electoral bruise since becoming Labour leader.

So it was perfectly in keeping with Muscat’s preferences to give the Yes vote low-key support – to keep the No side switched off – while campaigning hard on local council elections, given that the Yes vote needed only a dog whistle or two (not because it’s stupid but because of the nature of the issue). This way, the referendum has boosted his vote on councils but, very likely, not the PN’s.

It’s not rocket science. It’s a playbook. But media explanations hardly differed from those of their own readers.

Finally, there are the facts of what actually took place.

How did reportage of facts fare?

I did read that the Yes campaign claimed that you could get many lawyers to argue that all hobbies were endangered. But I never came across a simple reporter’s question: who are these lawyers?

I came across reports of systemic Labour involvement in the campaign – but there rarely was a follow-up giving reports of names and actions.

It’s only such follow-up questions that actually deliver a story (if there is one) concretely, giving a true sense of its scale.

So, yes, Muscat is right.

The media do need to take stock of last Saturday’s spring hunting referendum result – not to become more docile but to be better watchdogs.

ranierfsadni@europe.com