I t is still uncertain as what will happen to Greece. Will it stay in the eurozone or not? Will it remain a member of the European Union or not? Will it manage to renegotiate some of the conditions tied to the bailout provided to it by EU member states, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund some years ago?

The statements made by some political leaders are such that one may think that there is the will to find a solution. However, the no-nonsense German Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schauble, has made it quite clear that Greece has to live up to its obligations.

My last contribution on this subject was that Greece had lived on to fight another day. It was actually offered a lifeline, in that the incoming Greek government was given the opportunity to provide detailed plans of reforms it was going to implement instead of the ones which the previous government had agreed to. The reactions to the new Greek proposals ranged from cold to lukewarm and it is uncertain what will happen next.

What governments need to be careful about is the significant extent of human suffering that a Greek exit from the euro would cause

One needs to add to this uncertainty the claim made by Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras about World War II reparation payments and his demand to link this claim to the present discussions on the extension of a loan agreement. This lack of diplomatic ability (last seen in Europe in the first half of the 1980s) was compounded by a Greek minister who threatened to swamp Germany with Islamist refugees.

All this would seem to indicate that there is a loss of trust between Greece and Europe. These statements are not just rhetoric for the crowds, but a real conviction that, irrespective of carefully worded statements by politicians, the room for a compromise does not seem to exist anymore.

It is unlikely that the creditor countries will make any further concessions beyond those made last month, because they do not want their voters to continue paying for Greece’s inertia. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the Greek government will live up to the commitments made a month ago; even if this was just a commitment to submit detailed plans on what reforms it was willing to commit to.

Therefore, a Greek exit from the eurozone appears to be more likely to happen than it ever has been. The issue is that one does not really know when it will actually happen. There seems to be a lull these days, apart from the noise made by the Greek government.

This may be interpreted to mean that, in fact, the eurozone countries (excluding Greece) and the European Central Bank are preparing for this exit and want to be ready for it when it actually happens.

Many analysts say that the Greek exit from the eurozone would bring havoc once more to the financial markets for a number of reasons. First, the EU will make an enemy out of Greece and could tilt the political equilibrium that has been found in Europe. Second, it will show that the claim that there is no turning back once one joins the eurozone is just a myth. Third, analysts fear that international financial markets will not take a Greek exit very nicely. Fourth, it could jeopardise the fragile economic recovery.

Whether these analysts will eventually be proven right remains to be see. After all, Greece may never exit the eurozone and solutions will be found to resolve the Greek debt issue. On the other hand, when one looks at the larger picture, Greece does play a relatively small role in the eurozone economy and, as such, the impact of a Grexit on the euro may eventually be negligible.

What governments need to be careful about is the significant extent of human suffering that a Greek exit from the euro would cause. Greece does not have the productive capacity to cope with it and it may be left isolated because the Greek government would have lost all credibility.

However, if an agreement is found, how will it be interpreted? As a victory for Greece or a victory for Germany? Either way voters will not like it. If it is interpreted as a Greek victory, voters across Europe will claim that those who break the rules end up getting away with it. If it is interpreted as a loss for Greece, voters will claim that Brussels has once more imposed its will on a member state. Either way it will cause disgruntlement among voters, placing governments in a lose-lose situation.

So is the lull we have today a lull before a storm? It may seem so, unless the European politicians become statesmen and turn this negative outlook into a positive one.