The last 10 days have been punctuated by three news items concerning Libya. First, there was the attack on the Corinthia hotel in Tripoli, which left several dead but could have been a lot worse.

Next came reports of escalating Maltese rumours that our armed forces were on a high alert against the possibility of an IS attack on Malta – perhaps by ship.

Finally, even as the international news media reported ‘IS encroachment’ in Libya, the Tripoli-based government and its supporters denied it’s really taking place while Ali Tarhuni, a prominent member of the Tobruk alliance, had earlier warned Europe of jihadists operating in coastal cities to the west of Tripoli.

So, what’s really going on? Has IS really penetrated Libya or hasn’t it? Who’s lying? What kind of threat is there to Malta?

The short answers are that both IS and al-Qaeda are to be found in Libya but no one’s lying. As for an immediate security threat to Malta, a categorical answer can only be given by someone with access to intelligence information but, going by the publicly-available information, Malta is likely to lie low on the strategic priorities of both IS and al-Qaeda.

To understand those answers, it’s necessary to tackle five other questions.

First: is there anarchy in Libya? Hereit is important to distinguish between three spheres (even though they’re interconnected law and order, economy and society.

Neither the internationally-recognised Tobruk-based government nor its rival based in Tripoli have a monopoly on that essential requirement of the State: the use of force and violence. The police and army are ineffective. There are hundreds of militias.

Especially in the cities, there are frequent violent incidents – including targeted assassinations and terror attacks – leaving several people dead.

Political violence includes systematic fighting taking place in certain pockets of the country. To it must be added criminal violence since some militias are better described as criminal organisations.

However, some of the militias are gendarmeries, substituting the police and army, rather than exploiting their absence.

The preponderance of personal reports I’ve had is that there is law and order in large parts of the country (though not necessarily on the road to get there). Some key areas are not even directly involved in the political fighting.

But it’s a local order, not under State control. It is, to borrow a phrase, ordered anarchy. There is personal security but it’s not guaranteed by the State (or either of the rival governments).

This situation has persisted for such a long time because the breakdown of law and order has not been accompanied by a social breakdown. And petroleum revenues and surpluses have ensured that salaries and social benefits continue to be paid.

Which leads to the second question: how tenable is this situation?

A double crunch is approaching. In the short term, there is a financial crunch. Oil production is down because of the political instability. Oil prices are down on the international markets. The breakdown of the State has enabled large-scale theft of resources – such as organised theft of imported fuel, heavily subsidised for Libyan consumers, only a fraction of which reaches the intended destination.

The hitherto steady payment of salaries, subsidies and benefits will soon come to an end unless political stability is restored. If State payments dry up, then economic and social breakdown will follow that of the State.

In the longer term, other damage needs to be calculated. For example, the breakdown of the State has had an impact on education – from the distribution of textbooks in some parts of the country to the issuance of graduation certificates (essential for higher studies to be continued).

Targeting Malta would cost IS much in scale and effort

Third: is there the political will to fix the situation? Both major sides contain elements that have no interest in compromise. But both also contain elements that have the interests of a united, stable Libya at heart.

To get a politically-lasting solution, however, Libyan politicians will need to address two key questions faced by countries rebuilding themselves after war and regime collapse.

Peace often comes at some expense to justice. It’s one thing to take action against major wrongs and crimes but if every wrong is pursued, the settlement will remain elusive. The road must remain open to people who served under the former regime, as long as they did nothing heinous, to be reincorporated into society and even public life.

We still have to see how ready for compromise Tripoli and Tobruk are. But they are aware that time is running out and that further delay will only help a common enemy: the jihadists.

So, fourth: how entrenched are IS and al-Qaeda in Libya? Jihadist groups have committed atrocities and assassinations in both eastern and western Libya, both cities and the interior. A caliphate has been declared in the eastern city of Derna. I have it on good authority that, in part of the western coast, known al-Qaeda associates are operating, while there is a jihadist camp in an identified part of the interior.

So, how can anyone deny that IS has entrenched itself in Libya and not be lying? It’s a matter of flexible identities and numbers.

How long is a piece of string? What counts as jihadist encroachment or significant presence? Are they formally IS or al-Qaeda – or simply an associate group?

Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya also had jihadist camps and jihadist resistance, which the dictator, with the free command of all his arsenal, never eliminated although he did render the jihadists ineffective. Libya’s geography makes complete elimination nearly impossible.

The breakdown of the State has, it’s true, enabled jihadists to penetrate the western part of the country, conduct operations in cities and set up at least one camp in the interior. But I’ve met no one who guestimates the numbers at more than a few hundred in the entire country (although none of my sources has access to intelligence information).

In addition, the numbers in a given place are likely to fluctuate. Many of the fighters are non-Libyan, from other parts of the Arab world. It is suspected that some may have been flown in to conduct assassinations (to be unrecognised when they approach a target with face uncovered).

Finally, to say, for example, that al-Qaeda is operating from a coastal city may mean no more than that a handful of known associates are operating there with impunity and not that they actually control the place.

On the basis of such information, Libya is nowhere near being under jihadist control, nor are significant parts of it.

The real danger is that a critical tipping point may be fast approaching: the cash crunch if a sustainable, unity government is not formed soon.

Fifth, and last, given all this: what kind of direct jihadist threat is there to Malta?

To repeat, only someone with access to intelligence information can answer this question categorically. But it would be a departure from the established strategies of both IS and al-Qaeda to target us for sustained attacks, let alone a takeover.

Al-Qaeda is interested in tempting the US and its major allies into overreacting and, thus, overstretching. It is therefore very likely to be more interested in targets with high shock value: a major capital rather than Malta.

IS likes to establish governance over a territory and it favours territories that enable economies of scale and effort. So it will keep focusing on Libya and any cross-border operations will focus on its declared targets of Tunisia and Egypt.

Surprise is part of military strategy but targeting Malta would cost IS much in scale and effort, for little discernible advantage at this point.

ranierfsadni@europe.com

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