The First Hall of the Civil Court, presided over by Madame Justice Lorraine Schembri Orland on July 10, 2014, in the case ‘Antonia Frendo and others v Christopher and Alison Agius’, held, among other things, that it could not be assumed that the Rent Regulation Board was exclusively competent to decide any issue relating to rent and occupation. Any dispute which was outside its specifically stated legal parameters fell within the competence of the ordinary courts. The competence of the board had to be interpreted restrictedly.
The facts in this case were as follows:
Antonia Frendo and her children were the owners of 12/2, St Helen Street, Birkirkara. The property had been leased to Christopher and Alison Agius in terms of a private agreement dated December 12, 2002. The period of the lease was for four years and was automatically renewed for further periods of four years.
According to article 1532 of the Civil Code: “(1) In the absence of an express agreement or of circumstances tending to show the intention of the contracting parties as to the duration of the lease, the following rules shall be observed:
(a) the letting of an urban tenement or of a movable shall be deemed to be made for the period in respect of which the rent has been calculated, that is, for one year, if the rent has been agreed upon at so much a year; for one month, if the rent has been agreed upon at so much a month; for one day, if the rent has been agreed upon at so much a day. Provided that if it is not made to appear that the rent has been agreed upon by the year, the month or the day, it shall be deemed to have been agreed upon according to usage.”
After the four years, on December 2006, the period of the lease had to be calculated in terms of article 1532 of the Civil Code and article 1568. The owners notified the Agius couple that the lease had terminated and that they occupied the premises without valid title.
They filed a lawsuit before the Rent Regulations Board. The board on December 5, 2013, declared that it was not competent rationae materiae to decide this case.
Faced with this situation, the owners proceeded to take legal action against the Agius couple, requesting the court to evict them from the premises within a short time limit. In reply, the couple contested the legal proceedings.
It was stated in defence, that:
• Frendo’s legal action was legally deficient in absence of a request to ask the court to rescind the lease and;
• That the ordinary courts lacked competence to hear this case.
As regards the merits, Agius claimed to have valid title at law.
Nullity of the legal action: the court considered whether Frendo’s legal action was null, in absence of a request to declare the lease rescinded. In ‘Bonnici v Zammit’ (PA), dated January 20, 1986, it was held that a writ had to be examined as a whole and should be rescinded only if the defendant would suffer serious prejudice. The court aimed to avoid a multiplicity of lawsuits and moved away from sanctioning rigid formalism “si attaccava con troppa severità e poco riguardo agli interessi dei contendenti e dell’ammistrazione della giustizia in generale” (Kollez Vol XXVI pl p424).
In ‘Moore noe v Falzon et’ (PA), dated December 15, 1995, it was stated that the law did not require any particular words of how a writ had to be drafted. It was sufficient if the claim was clear. Not every discrepancy brought about nullity. There had to exist good reason.
In ‘Vella v Cefai’ (CA), dated November 4, 1991, it was held that if a writ contained an error which infringed article 156 (1) (a) of Chapter 12, and a claim was not clear, the plea of nullity could be accepted, if the defect could not be corrected. The court should not lightly annul a legal action and insofar as possible it should save a judicial act. Nullity was an extreme sanction imposed by law.
A judicial act could only be rescinded for grave reasons, where the error could not be tolerated without some harm to some principles of procedural justice. The practice of the courts, in particular following the amendments of Act 24 of 1995 including article 175 of chapter 12, was to restrict exaggerated formalism: ‘Fino v Fabri v CA’, dated February 28, 1997.
The court felt that it was not necessary for Frendo to request a declaration that the occupation was unlawful and dismissed the plea of nullity. The court said that Frendo need not request the court to declare the rent to be invalid, in her action for eviction. This was implicit and could be assumed from Frendo’s claim. Besides, Christopher Agius suffered no prejudice in the circumstances.
The court had to establish whether Agius had title in order to decide whether he occupied the premises without title, re: ‘Joseph Gasan v Nicole Spiteri’ dated June 28, 1948.
The court noted that Christopher Agius in the proceedings before the Rent Regulation Board... also challenged the competence of the board. This was an abuse, pointed out the court. The fact that Agius pleaded that the board was not competent meant that he accepted the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts
Competence of the ordinary courts: The court noted that Christopher Agius in the proceedings before the Rent Regulation Board, involving the same parties and merits, also challenged the competence of the board. This was an abuse, pointed out the court. The fact that Christopher Agius pleaded that the board was not competent meant that he accepted the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.
Despite the decision of the board, this court was duty bound to consider this plea. In ‘Enriette Bonnici v Gordon Borg’ CA (INF), dated December 4, 2013, it was held that although the competence of the Rent Regulation Board was widened with the 2009 amendments, the board still remained the tribunal with special powers. Any dispute which was outside its specifically stated legal parameters fell within the competence of the ordinary courts. The competence of the board had to be interpreted restrictedly.
It could not be assumed that the board was exclusively competent to decide any issue relating to rent and occupation. In ‘Chris Gatt v Daniel Doneo’ (PA), dated March 28, 2011, it was held that article 1525 (1) of the Civil Code increased the competence of the board.
Re: ‘Joseph Bugeja et v Alfred Camilleri’, dated October 6, 2004, the competence of the board had to be determined in the light of the claims of plaintiff and the pleas of defendant.
In this case Frendo was requesting the eviction of the Agius couple from a dwelling home. While Frendo sought to apply the Civil Code provisions to calculate the lease period, Agius maintained having valid title. This claim of eviction was based on the validity or otherwise of clause 3 of the lease agreement which stated the period of lease (without a time limit). As this analysis was beyond the competence of the special board, the ordinary courts had jurisdiction to consider the dispute, concluded the court.
Reference was also made to ‘Enriette Bonnici v Gordon Borg’, dated June 26, 2012, on the effects of article 16 (4) of chapter 69, where the law intended the board to have competence after the termination of the lease, it did so expressly and unequivocally. The word ‘lease’ in article 16 (4) of chapter 12 had to be interpreted to mean a valid lease. The ordinary courts had jurisdiction when it was not clear that the Board had jurisdiction.
For these reasons, on July 10, 2014, the First Hall of the Civil Court gave judgment, where it declared that it was competent rationae materiae to decide this case.
Dr Karl Grech Orr is a partner at Ganado Advocates.