History in ruins: Cottonera takes the full brunt of Italian and German bombing. The Victory monument in Vittoriosa standing defiantly in front of the ruins of the medieval clock tower. Right: The church of the Annunciation (Il-Lunzjata) in Vittoriosa was destroyed during the German raids of 1941.Top-secret correspondence that I recently discovered in World War II despatches reveal an abysmal laissez-faire attitude, uncertainty and crass ineptitude in Britain’s assessment of Malta’s strategic importance in the central Mediterranean basin at a time when the clouds of war were sending ominous signs of immediate Fascist aggression. These startling documents cast a new light on Britain’s real intentions in defending Malta. The fact is that in the pre-war years the British War Command in London had written Malta off as indefensible.
There are grave doubts as how serious Britain’s intentions were in defending Malta at a time when war was imminent. The Royal Air Force, and to some extent also the British Army High Command, considered Malta as indefensible. In fact, there were also strong rumours that France was offering Bizerta, and Britain was offering Malta to Italian dictator Benito Mussolini as a sacrifice on the altar of appeasement. However, these rumours were never substantiated; no secure proof of this has ever been unearthed.
“As early as 1938,” states Oliver Warner in his biography of Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, Admiral Andrew Cunningham, “the Air Ministry’s view was that in time of war, with Italian airfields barely 60 miles away in Sicily, it was improbable that the island could be defended. The War Office was inclined to agree, and no argument that Backhouse [Admiral Roger Backhouse, First Sea Lord] brought forward would change them.”
This state of uncertainty among the war lords was very evident when Italy declared war against Britain and France on June 10, 1940. Malta’s state of readiness was almost non-existent, its anti-aircraft defences were very poorly equipped and air defence was not even considered. In spite of the expansive storage facilities around Grand Harbour and other localities, no attempt was made to stock up essential foods and fuel supplies for emergencies.
This dismal situation was subsequently but belatedly severely criticised by Messrs Drummond and Wall, who were dispatched to Malta by the War Office to supervise evacuation plans, rock-shelter construction and food supplies. In their confidential report dated May 14, 1942, on the critical situation, they stated: “The situation was made more difficult by the insufficient preparations for most of the emergencies (namely shelters, food, defence and inadequate evacuation plan). The government was therefore beset by considerable problems, all of which had to be tackled de novo and by a relatively small administrative staff.”
The monument to Vittoriosa war victims on the site where 33 people lost their lives on January 16, 1941.In the mid-1930s, Italy’s ambition for territorial expansion was manifestly shown with its invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) which was followed up on Good Friday of 1939 with the capture of Albania.
On the local front, pro-Fascist propaganda in Maltese circles intensified. In the Cottonera area, and I vividly recall these rumours, it was alleged that the diocesan clergy included a very active nucleus of irredentisti with their propaganda in favour of Malta’s territorial integration with nearby Italy. Sir Hannibal Scicluna, entrusted with the safety of ecclesiastical art treasures before the outbreak of war, was faced with this naive remark from one of the high-ranking canons: “Gli aerei italiani lanceranno soltanto fiori e ciocolatini.” (Italian planes will only drop flowers and chocolates).
Paradoxically, Cottonera was to bear the full brunt of Italian and German bombing, devastating churches, historical buildings and hundreds of houses. I have bitter childhood memories of the frightening explosions, devastation, starvation, squalor and misery in the primitive tunnels in the Vittoriosa fortifications. These tribulations were preceded by the gas scare, the wailing of sirens, the black-outs and the premonition of the impending apocalypse that blighted my boyhood days.
When Italy declared war against Britain on June 10, 1940, Malta’s state of readiness was almost non-existent, its anti-aircraft defences very poorly equipped and air defence not even considered
In September 1935, the British government sent to Malta two highly-placed experts, Mr G. Kirwan, an official in the Air Raid Precaution (ARP) department of the Home Office, and Major A.T. Sumner, Assistant Superintendent Chemical Defence Research Department in the War Office. Their brief was to advise the Malta government on the steps to be taken in the case of an enemy attack.
In their comprehensive secret report they warned that a heavy air attack might be expected at any moment from Italian bombers based in Sicily, and they anticipated a considerable number of casualties from the collapse of debris, particularly in the crowded Three Cities. Furthermore, they highlighted the effect of gas if used against Malta. After the harrowing experience of the Spanish Civil War in 1936-1938, more attention was directed towards the provision of shelters against high explosives. Previously, shelter policy was focused on the danger of a gas attack rather than high explosives.
In the prevailing circumstances, when the effects of aerial bombing with high explosives during the Spanish Civil War became known, the gas scare was forgotten. This actually meant that all precautions that had been taken and the intensive training given during the previous three years were all in vain, and all the Passive Defence budget was used up.
In January 1938, the Governor of Malta, Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, sent the following secret despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, enquiring about the possibility of financial assistance for the construction of air raid shelters in Passive Defence Measures:
“The extent of the measures required is directly attributed to the fact that Malta is a fortress which, in certain circumstances, would certainly invite and would be extremely exposed to savage bombing. The principle of assistance towards Passive Defence measures from central funds has already been recognised in UK... and I would ask if the principle approval might be obtained for not less generous treatment for Malta.”
It became quite obvious that Britain was dragging its feet in this regard, in spite of persistent pressure from the Council of Government about the urgency of the situation. One of the most vociferous members was Mr A . Montana, from the Constitutional Party, who is reported as saying on August 1, 1939: “Gas masks are of little use and will not save the people from being blown sky high by high explosives, nor will they prevent panic. What has been done in Gibraltar could have been done here.”
In a secret dispatch in reply to a request for Britain’s assistance sent four months previously by the Governor of Malta, the Secretary of State reminded the Governor of the decision in 1939 with regard to Passive Defence expenditure in Malta namely: “On the termination of the special emergency which led to heavy expenditure on Passive Defence between 1935 and 1937 (the gas scare) the cost of further measures must be borne by the Malta government.”
However, in December 1939, Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners were commissioned by the British government to prepare a scheme for air-raid shelters in the Valletta, Floriana and Sliema districts as well as for those villages in the immediate vicinity of the aerodromes. This report was completed in February but only forwarded to the Malta government in April 1940 after a secret telegram had been sent to the Crown Agents in London.
In his reply by secret dispatch, the Secretary of State gave the following reason for the delay in answering the Governor’s telegram: “Because the general policy in regard to the execution of long-term schemes for defence in the Mediterranean was being reviewed by the Defence Authorities in this country.”
The despatch ended with the following firm refusal to provide rock-cut shelters: “It has, however, now been decided that these schemes, including the scheme for the construction of air-raid shelters in Malta, should proceed but that their progress should be in such a way as to ensure that the labour and material should not have to be found at the expense of the war effort of this country.”
Unfortunately, this parsimonious attitude had to be redeemed by severe losses of ships and sailors as well as the untold dangers, starvation and misery of the Maltese in defence of their country.