Revisiting the Constitution to amend it should start at the very important aspect of the separation of powers. The three organs of the State are the legislative, the executive and the judiciary, or lawmakers, the Government and judges. It is a given that the separation of these three bodies best safeguards democracy.

To date we have had the British system for a model, recognised as the next best thing for democracy, after the Greek. But as with all other things, adaptation is of the essence. Besides, matters have evolved since its long-standing tradition. Over the last 200 years or so it has been fine-tuned to bring the separation of powers nearer completion or to completion. Lest the tools of yesterday in today’s hands become tomorrow’s failure.

Our lawmakers are all elected members to Parliament. The latter consist of the President and a House of Representatives.

Government consists of a Cabinet of ministers. Our model requires that it be made up of members of Parliament. This means that practically a quarter of all the members of our Parliament play out a double role: that of lawmakers and of executives. Within the proper concept of the separation of powers that is not a paragon of compatibility.

The judiciary seem to be separ-ate. Judges are appointed by the executive. Parliament may remove them. Otherwise the judiciary proceed independently of the rise and fall of governments. But with lawmakers and executives partaking so much of each other, it cannot be said that removal may not be swayed by the latter. Experience bears this out.

Nor may the Commission for the Administration of Justice be immune from executive interference. When proceedings for the impeachment of a judge suddenly grind to a halt following a change of party in government, something is not well.

The long arm of the executive arches heavily over the other two organs, overtly or otherwise. For this reason, possibly, contempor-ary models of the British system distinctly separate the three organs. Like the judiciary, the executive proceed independently of Parliament and vice-versa. In our system that separation has not materialised as yet. Bringing it about requires some change.

It entails that the Cabinet be composed of ministers who are not lawmakers. This is not wholly new. To date there have been unelected members in Cabinet, let us call them without portfolio, practically and unofficially.

That leaves us with the position of the Prime Minister. The question is whether he should be in the House and in Cabinet. Or whether he should be President and Prime Minister rolled into one. There is precedent for both. In this context he will be the only one as lawmaker and executive.

One implication of separation is that the legislative will not be terminated prematurely. Members will not feel the need to move resolutions of no confidence in themselves. The Cabinet, too, will be able serve its term.

The changes cater for greater stability. They also ensure transparency and better checks and balances, eschew conflicts of interest, and cut down on partisanship, hangers-on and populist indulgence.

That will not preclude redress in the event of conduct unbecoming. In that case it is the person affected that is possibly removed, without provoking the fall of government and end of Parliament in one fell swoop. That would apply to the Prime Minister being replaced by a member of the majority party in the House. Invariably a change of party ushers in a change of government but not necessarily the other way around. But because the separ-ation of powers here is what it is, that lack of differentiation tends to embroil a party as well, and the differentiation proper is lost.

With regard to judges, the executive will keep nominating them. But they are to be appointed upon scrutiny and confirmation by Parliament.

The long arm of the executive arches heavily over the other two organs, overtly or otherwise

As to removal, in some jurisdictions impeachment by Parliament has been replaced by removal by an independent body. We have a commission which advises the House on impeachment. Given its track record, Parliament would do well to keep that power to itself.

Much has been said about judicial accountability. The question is why appointment to the Bench is not of a definite duration, renewable automatically, unless Parliament votes not to renew. This will not affect independence and impartiality, and will stem a number of sins in the name of serenity.

As to the presidency, the Head of State is the three organs in unison. Questions arise as to whether it is to be electable. It may be, but that may dent that unity if executive powers are attached. The question is whether it is a presence, or more, and in what manner and context. In its constitutional role the Head of State was famously said to advise, to encourage and to warn. That may take various forms.

Importantly, the President is to be removed by a two-thirds majority, following proven misbehaviour, as obtains with judges. Surely, he too is to exercise his functions without fear or favour from all quarters. As we have had time to realise only of late.

Victor Zammit is a lawyer.