Neutrality is still valid

It is frequently asserted that we live in a society which upholds no dogma. Admittedly, in contrast to the past, today one cannot assume that everyone (or almost) on our little island believes in the ascension of the Virgin or the infallibility of the Pontiff. But, to my mind, what happened is that certain articles of beliefs ceased to be considered as items that cannot be questioned or doubted, only to be replaced by other dogmas.

The Constitution enjoins our country to promote peace and justice, not sitting on some fence

If one follows mainstream political discourse or media, it seems that beliefs like the wisdom of Malta’s joining the EU, the advisability of privatisation or government sub-contracting, and the inadvisability of increasing tax rates for those who are making it big, are articles of faith that are to be considered beyond debate or doubt.

An article of belief that mainstream discourse seems to be elevating to the status of dogma is the belief that Malta’s neutrality no longer makes sense, and hence that the Constitution should be amended either by dropping the neutrality clauses or by effectively neutralising these.

It is indeed frequently asserted that we have a moral duty to abandon or dilute neutrality. This claim is based on the idea that neutrality amounts to indifference, and in certain conflicts it is immoral to be indifferent between two belligerent parties.

This argument would be impeccable were it not for the fact that it trades on an equivocation between different meanings of the word “neutral”.

The Oxford English dictionary gives the following as dissimilar meanings which the term has: “taking neither side”, “not helping either of two belligerent States”. The first suggests indifference; failing to take sides regardless of the issue or of whether a major injustice or violation of rights is being committed. The second implies only that one does not take part in armed conflict. It does not entail not recognising the moral failings of one side or not doing anything to remedy an injustice.

A glance at the neutrality clauses suggests that it is the second meaning of neutrality that our Constitution upholds. The Constitution enjoins our country to promote peace and justice, not sitting on some fence. One issue where Malta played such role concerns the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Our Constitution did not hinder successive governments from diplomatically promoting a two-state solution that guarantees the rights of both parties, while recognising that one party is perpetually perpetuating an injustice against the other through illegal occupation.

But could not there be moral legitimacy for use of force at special times? There might be, in cases of grave injustices and if all diplomatic means are exhausted.

Yet, even the most consistent theory which justifies the use of force in specific cases, the just war theory, admits that, even if all conditions for the use of force hold, it is not necessarily the case that one is justified to use force (for instance, in case where there is no reasonable hope of success), or that everyone is duty bound to participate in a military venture.

Aquinas for instance, claims that clergymen are not bound to participate in justified military ventures in the same way lay people are.

A similar rationale could be envisaged for a country like Malta, a rationale that would see our nation play the role of a regional peacemaker (see Richard Rubenstein in Times of Malta, November 11, 2011). Joining a military block or participating in permanent military ventures undermines the possibility of Malta playing such a role.

If this does not suffice, the Constitution already stipulates that if circumstances require that assistance be given to some military venture under the aegis of the UN Security Council, this may be provided. No amendment is hence required regarding such hypothetical situations.

Nor is neutrality rendered obsolete by the fact that current wars are supposedly wars on terrorism rather than against states. First of all, wars on terror (Afghanistan, Iraq) were conducted against states. Secondly, the most effective way of combating terrorism is by eliminating its breeding ground –injustice, fanaticism, intolerance and double-standards with regard to rights and obligations. A neutral Malta may help the region achieve this goal more than any military alliance could.

Another argument that is frequently made regarding the neutrality clauses not being any longer valid is that there are no longer two superpowers. Admittedly, these clauses do refer to two superpowers.

Yet, this does not logically entail that what is stipulated by them ceases to apply if one superpower no longer is. To draw an analogy, it is as if I stipulate that neither of my parents ought to pay my coin-phone.

The stipulation does not cease to apply if one of the parents deceases. It only applies to one janitor rather than two. Moreover, the end of one superpower did not spell the end of war or tension, particularly in the Mediterranean. The reasons that made neutrality pertinent 30 years ago still hold today.

There are hence no reasons why the neutrality clauses in the Constitution should be amended. Hopefully the ideal of neutrality will not be betrayed by the same party which enshrined it.