Where are the directors?
Literature points to the importance of a mix of personalities as collective experience can add more value to the board’s overall work.
One of the main functions of the board of directors of corporations is to monitor and advise the executive management team. One can only wonder whether the directors of Air Malta, Bank of Valletta, Wasteserv, to name a few recent cases, were really effectively fulfilling those roles.
This is not problem restricted to our shores as evidenced by the recent Libor fixing scandal and the Standard Chartered affair. I do not expect such problems to end as corporations are run by human beings, prone to making mistakes. This does not mean that we should remain complacent. If we really want to improve future performance then we must first acknowledge our errors and face the consequences, and second, be willing to objectively present the facts and draw lessons for future practice.
However, what has transpired from these cases is that the management and the board either continued to justify that their actions and decisions were right – in spite of evidence to the contrary – or they were focused on trying to pass the buck. The executive management blames the board which, in turn, blames the regulator who, in turn, blames the enforcement if it is conducted by another entity which finally brings us back to executive management. Another popular approach usually consists of the present management or board of directors blaming the previous team under a different political administration for current problems.
What can we do? We could start by learning the lessons from the vast academic research on corporate governance. This literature tries to identify which corporate governance factors corporations should follow by looking at which factors tend to enhance performance and increase stock returns.
These factors mainly focus on the features and composition of the board of directors since this is the entity that has to oversee and advise the executive management team. I will first outline and then explain the features that research has shown to enhance corporate governance. These are chief executive-chair duality, presence of outside directors, ratio of outside or related directors, number of directorships, staggered boards, and institutional holding.
It is important to have a separation between the roles of chairperson and chief executive officer. The latter has to focus on day-to-day management while the former, free from overseeing the daily issues, can focus on long-term strategy and overseeing what the chief executive and the executive management team are doing. The board of directors’ main role is there to control management and should not be there to rubberstamp whatever the chief executive has decided.
To avoid this, it is best to appoint outside directors who are seen to be more independent. They will find it easier to challenge the opinions of the CEO and ask the tough questions.
If there is a higher ratio of outside directors compared to insiders, then the outsider directors will find support whenever they need to bring up issues with which the chief executive is not comfortable. While it is recognised that being director on more than one company can be valuable, the advantage quickly disappears if directors have too many directorships.
Indeed, there are only 24 hours in a day and the work of directors has become more complicated requiring more hours per directorship. In the case of complex institutions like banks, directors must also have specialised skills to be effective.
Another feature that enhances corporate governance is the use of staggered boards. This means that directors are not all renewed at the same time, providing for continuity and stability to the operations of the board. The presence of institutional investors on the board of directors is seen as positive: sophisticated investors can enhance the monitoring function.
Directors are usually chosen among a pool of people who have well ascertained expertise in operating businesses or having worked in the same sector in which the firm is operating. Here again, literature points to the importance of a mix of personalities since collective experience can add more value to the board’s overall work.
For these considerations to be taken in our corporate life, the pool of potential directorship candidates will have to widen. We will have to revise the way we appoint directors.
Robert Suban is a full-time academic within the Department of Banking and Finance at the University of Malta.
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Paul Azzopardi
Sep 27th 2012, 16:55
Directors are usually chosen by that group in the company with the greatest power, usually the CEO and the Chairman, or a major shareholder. Since these groups already have control, what they're looking for are primarily people who would support their decisions. It would be ideal if these supporters (some call them "yes men") can contribute in some way - knowledge, connections, strategic advice, etc. but the main thing is they have to be supportive.
Having supporters of the main group in the board is not necessarily a bad thing because when things are going well they make for a strong team. But when things are going badly, you cannot then suddenly change a "yes man" into an independent thinker of character - the company is stuck with whoever was chosen.
A major shareholder can save this situation by injecting new blood, but sometimes this is easier said than done since the incumbents find ways to retain control. Where shares are widely held by the public, management has the upper hand and they usually stay put for as long as they can, even if the company goes down the drain. Where shares are held by institutional investors such as investment funds and insurance companies, these tend to vote with the board since there are often cross-holdings, business relationships, and the possibility of cross appointments.
Corporate governance is currently one of the big issues because in large public companies it is often obvious that managements are running companies to their own benefit, not their stakeholders' including shareholders. We see this in excessive pay packages based on peer benchmarking where many CEOs and top managers made fortunes at the same time as they ruined their companies. So far, this is not a big problem in Malta but it certainly is in the US and Europe.
Solutions vary across countries but often include fairer proxy voting, more shareholder democracy, facilitating activist shareholders, appointing directors with relevant skills, independent directors, fully independent board committees, staggered appointments, more transparency of board business (while protecting sensitive business areas), and regular special board meetings sans management,
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