The First Hall of the Civil Court, presided over by Mr Justice Mark Chetcuti, on July 18, 2012, in the case “Rita and John Spiteri and Carmen and Mario Spiteri vs Andrew Briffa and others”, held among other things that a person was entitled to compensation for services rendered (serviġi) even if granted to close family members, unless it was proven that such services were effected gratuitously.

The facts in this case were as follows:

Although they provided their support out of respect and duty to their parents, there was no doubt that they aspired to receive some form of compensation in their parents’ will

Two sisters, Rita and Carmen Spiteri, were aggrieved with their share of inheritance from the parents’ patrimony.

Faced with this situation, they proceeded to file a lawsuit against their other brothers and sisters, in their capacity as heirs, for compensation, for all the services which they rendered to their parents during their lifetime and in respect of which they had received no appreciation.

Their parents, Carmena and Karmenu Briffa, died on April 13, 1999 and January 23, 1996 respectively.

Carmen and Rita Spiteri claimed they were entitled to receive compensation and accordingly asked the court to liquidate the amount due to them and to condemn defendants to pay them compensation with interests.

They also filed a separate lawsuit where they claimed their legitim.

The defendants in reply, disputed their claims.

It was not true, they said, that Carmen and Rita Spiteri assisted their parents in the manner as claimed.

They also raised the plea of five years’ prescription, in terms of article 2156 (f) chapter 16, deals with “actions for the payment of any other debt arising from commercial transactions or other causes, unless such debt is, under this or any other law, barred by the lapse of a shorter period or unless it results from a public deed’’

The court considered the plea of prescription and expressed no doubt that the right of action to claim payment for services (serviġi) was time barred after the lapse of five years.

It was possible to raise the plea of prescription even if there was an uninterrupted continuation of services. Reference was made to “Caruana vs Scicluna et” (CA) dated June 4, 1948 (Vol XXX III – I-285).

The continuation of services did not suspend the commencement and the duration of prescription; nor did it bring about its interruption.

The acceptance of additional services was not an admission of debt, nor a renunciation of the plea of prescription in respect of any claim for payment for the additional services.

The court noted that the parents died in 1996 and 1999 respectively, and that it did not result that there was conclusive proof of any acceptance, renunciation or interruption of prescription. In this respect, the court accepted the defendants’ plea of prescription.

It established the relevant period where Carmen and Rita Spiteri’s rights of action for payment was not yet time-barred, considering the date of the lawsuit and the date of death of each parent.

The relevant period in the case of their father was seven months and for their mother approximately four years. For purpose of this case, the court refused to consider any services before June 5, 1995.

The court was of the opinion that both Carmen and Rita Spiteri rendered services regularly to their father for the few months before his death. Rita cleaned and washed his house, together with Concetta, between June 1995 until his death on January 23, 1996.

It said that Carmen gave less support than her sister Rita.

In connection with the right to compensation, reference was made to “Anthony Catania pro et noe vs Mario Agius” dated December 11, 2003, where it was held that in the past no compensation was awarded to services (serviġi) rendered to close family members and which were effected without any expectation for payment, insofar as no expenses were incurred.

In the light, however, of new case-law, the position has now changed. Unless it could be proven that no payment was ever intended, a person should be compensated for his services.

In the circumstances, it did not result that Rita and Carmen Spiteri agreed to provide their services ex gratia.

Although they provided their support out of respect and duty to their parents (values which, the court noted, were unfortunately lacking in this present generation) there was no doubt that they aspired to receive some form of compensation in their parents’ will.

The court was of the opinion that both Carmen and Rita Spiteri were entitled to compensation for services rendered to their parents, though it felt that Rita Spiteri deserved a greater reward.

In “Vassallo vs Aquilina” dated June 29, 1982, the courts considered a number of factors: such as the frequency and type of services, the means of defendants, benefiting from the services, and the relations between the parties.

In this case, the court considered that their father was ill and their mother, though old, was not unwell nor disabled.

Their services were granted to their parents for a limited duration.

In “Catania noe vs Agius” dated December 11, 2003, the amount of compensation for services bestowed upon a close family member, was not high and did not necessarily reflect the economic value of the service.

For these reasons, on July 18, 2012, the First Hall of the Civil Court accepted the plea of prescription.

It declared that Rita and Carmen Spiteri were entitled to compensation: Rita Spiteri was awarded €1,200 and Carmen Spiteri €750. The defendants were condemned to pay them compensation with interests from the date of their decision, on a joint and several basis.

Dr Grech Orr is a partner at Ganado & Associates.