Much has been made of the decision in a libel case delivered by the Appeals Court that overturned a judgment of first-instance court. In its ruling the Appeals Court upheld the point that serious and prudent investigative journalism requires protection.
The right to freedom of expression and the right to disent are basic and vital elements of democracy. Abusing libel laws with the aim of curtailing these rights is not on. Unfortunately this has been happening in Malta since time immemorial- Michael Falzon
The case refers to a press release which Joe Mifsud had issued in April 1997, in which Mifsud referred to journalistic work he had carried out in connection with his book Id-Djarju ta’ Ciro del Negro (The diary of Ciro del Negro) that mentioned drug trafficking and also implicated people connected to politicians.
Louis Galea, then a Cabinet minister, deemed the contents of the press release libellous and sued Mifsud, with the first court finding in favour of Galea and ordering Mifsud to pay €5,000 in damages.
Having read the judgment thoroughly, I do not share the enthusiasm shown by some journalists who have opted to consider this as some milestone in Maltese jurisprudence when viewed in the context of the history of libel cases.
The particular circumstances of this case are hardly run-of-the-mill and I do not think many parallels with this case will be found in future.
While I sympathise with Galea, as Mifsud’s press release contained innuendos that reflected badly on him, it is a fact therewas no allegation that Galea was personally involved in drugtrafficking.
What is interesting is the court’s affirmation that as people in public life, politicians, are expected to put up with far more criticism than a private person – something that is not always kept in mind by magistrates or judges making decisions on libels.
Indeed, I have known lawyers who have even argued the opposite: since the person suing for libel is a politician the harm to his career is bigger and the damages should therefore be greater.
It is perhaps just a coincidence, but the judgment was delivered at about the same time that Tourism and Culture Minister Mario de Marco announced he is positively considering the reintroduction of political satire in Carnival.
We are now in the situation where one comes across political satire every day in the media and on the internet and even on billboards, while it is not allowed in carnival floats!
The ban imposed in the 1930s has long passed its justification emanating from the circumstances of the turbulent pre-war years and, in my view, today it cannot but be considered asa patent breach of the rights of freedom of expression.
That this retrograde banhas never been legally challenged goes a long way towardsshowing how much our society does not give the right tofreedom of expression its due importance.
Back to libel cases: at the end of the day, libel cases are a clash between the basic human right of freedom of expression of the writer and other basic rights that are enjoyed by all citizens.
Otherwise, both rights areconsidered absolute.
Of course, anyone suing for libel believes his rights have been breached while the court has to decide, according to the circumstances of each case, which way the balance tips. Admittedly this could be a difficult exercise.
I believe the right to freedom of expression and the right to dissent are basic and vital elements of democracy if human liberty is to flourish in society.
Abusing libel laws with the aim of curtailing these rights is not on. Unfortunately, this has been happening in Malta since time immemorial.
The problem, in my view, is that historically, Maltese courts have tended to give the issue of the right to freedom of expression less weight and significance than the right of public people to defend themselves from slanderous attacks.
The notion expressed in our Press Law that “exposing a person to public ridicule” is libellous cannot be interpreted in the widest of manners as Maltese courts have often been doing for so many years – to the extent that a newspaper was once found guilty of libel after a report on a football match said that a linesman “waved an imaginary off-side”.
Believe it or not, the linesman sued and won.
Moreover the law, as it is interpreted, does not distinguish between the deliberate malicious lie and the inadvertent untruth resulting from some casual misleading information – although this might influence the amount of damages awarded.
With such jurisprudence, is it any surprise that the libel clauses in the press law were for quite a long time a legitimate means of political repression with the continual (ab)use of this law to smother political dissent?
A number of judgments impinging on respecting basic human rights being delivered by our courts are now being scrutinised in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
Several decisions of this court show that it gives much more importance and ‘weighting’ to the notion of freedom of expression.
One would therefore have expected that the interpretation of our courts of what constitutes libel should have changed to be one more attuned with the norm in Europe.
micfal@maltanet.net