Three events have been reported in the international press that have aroused moral controversy; the bombing of Muammar Gaddafi’s residence in Tripoli, the killing of Osama bin Laden when he was unarmed, the arrest of Dominique Strauss-Kahn for attempted rape when it could be that there was partial consent. How interesting for us is the ethical debate on each of these cases?

To begin with Libya. The debate has arisen because the military intervention was not justified as one might have expected on the ground that when flagrant violations of human rights were taking place, then the international community had the right to intervene in spite of the doctrine of the sovereignty of a state within its territory.

In this connection it might be recalled that when climate was declared by the United Nations to be a common concern of humankind, rather than a common heritage as Malta had suggested, people like me whose immediate reaction was to consider this declaration as empty were told that it had great significance in international law.

Declaring something to be common concern of humankind implied the right of the international community to intervene even in breach of a state’s sovereignty to safeguard what was of universal concern.

Unfortunately, since the worst offenders on the issue of climate change were the US and China, understandably neither the United Nations nor any single nation took any forceful action against them.

So the declaration has not so far proved to be of much consequence. Instead, another principle has been invoked, namely the protection of the civilian population of a state that is proving incapable of providing such protection which is a primary reason for the very existence of statehood.

The principle is seen as even more applicable when the state is itself causing the threat, as was the case in Libya.

Some members of the United Nations felt happier not to present the intervention in this case as a justified violation of Libya’s sovereignty, but as merely supplementing the failure of the Libyan government to ensure the security of part of its citizenry who were protesting against it.

This principle is not a recent invention. It was applied in 1860 to save the Christians of Lebanon from destruction. It was scandalously not applied in the case of the Ruanda genocide and on other occasions.

In Libya’s case, it is clear that the states that had only consented to the application of the principle of protection of civilian populations would find the bombing of places like Gaddafi’s residence, even if it could also be considered to be a military installation, as unauthorised.

The counter argument is that the alternative would be acceptance of a stalemate with unbearable costs for all concerned over the long-term.

The conclusion I derive from this experience is that it would be morally cleaner to declare the true justification of the intervention by those states who agreed to carry it out than to camouflage it under a cover that obtains consensus, even if a different response were to be given in an analogous case (for instance, Syria).

What about the killing of bin Laden?

The clearest condemnation came from the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, who also criticised the way in which the Obama administration has appeared to change its account of the raid.

He said: “I think the killing of an unarmed man is always going to leave a very uncomfortable feeling because it does not look as if justice is seen to be done. I don’t know the full details, anymore than anyone else does. But I do believe that in such circumstances, when we are faced with someone who was manifestly a war criminal as you might say in terms of the atrocities inflicted, it is important that justice is seen to be observed.”

I agree with Williams that the worst aspect in this episode is the lack of transparency which is an essential dimension of justice. The result has been the uncertainties which have been aroused in many minds even more hauntingly than those aroused in relation to the Twin Towers’ collapse.

Many are convinced that bin Laden was in fact dead a long time ago. I myself certainly did not find Obama’s own blunt justification of extrajudicial killing morally acceptable.

How about the Strauss-Khan case?

The details of it have so far been kept as hidden as those of the bin Laden raid. However, it seems likely that the story will turn out to be similar to that of Julian Assange of Wikileaks.

His accuser said that women tend to say “no” to a seducer’s advances but then let him do as he pleases, because they are flattered, timid, grateful, passionate, a bit tipsy or too tired to resist.

Similar problems arise when an employee has to deal with her boss at work. There are other forms of pressure than the physical. Moral responsibility is difficult to assess when there are factors which affect the freedom of the will.

This difficult problem was already discussed by Aristotle in connection with what he called “weakness of the will”. It is still being discussed in the light of more recent psychological and philosophical considerations as in the thesis by Mark Sultana.

Unfortunately, in current jurisprudence the view of Hobbs and Hume that the last motivational push determines the nature of the act seems to have become increasingly popular, despite the general tendency to give more weight to social factors rather than to individual in the constriction of freedom.

In fact it is only because of the loss of the sense of an objective morality that half-willing yielding to the charm of a seducer removes his guilt.

Fr Peter Serracino Inglott was talking to Miriam Vincenti.