The issue on divorce legislation

In this tight little island, wonders never cease. The way the divorce issue, once again, finds itself in the forefront of the political agenda has all the qualities of an artificial concoction made in Malta.

It is worth pointing out at the outset, that the debate has been carefully designed to sidetrack religious and moral considerations, concentrating instead on the civil law aspect of the debate. It is also worth pointing out that divorce, as an issue, had for long been avoided like the plague by the major political parties, no doubt for electoral reasons.

Now that the issue has been raised, no political party has outlined any clear plans to deal with the matter, which involves legislation that must, in any event, be discussed in Parliament. After all, they never asked for and have no electoral mandate to take the initiative one way or the other.

Divorce legislation involves the family and social institutions. It is about the stability of marriage, about the rights of children of divorced families, about the disposition of property. It raises moral and religious issues as well.

I am neither qualified nor competent to deal with the religious and moral aspects that are bound to be brought up at the proper stage. There are however, paramount considerations relating to citizens' rights that go to the very core of democratic thought that deserve public attention.

For the past 46 years or so, the people of these islands have been masters in their own home. Their Constitution gives them inalienable rights. They have advanced to the foreground of social life to occupy the places and to use the instruments that confer power to the politicians they elect to administer their affairs.

It has taken centuries for the people of Malta to emancipate themselves, first from feudal rulers and, subsequently, from colonial masters, be they benevolent or otherwise.

During those long years, Maltese democracy grew from a sapling into a tree, under the shelter of liberal principles and the rule of law. It learned to absorb pluralism and to make space for political dissent. It now rests on a Constitution which is the expression of the people's will and which presumes the consent of the governed. The consent of the government, in turn, implies consensus based on tolerance and respect for the rights of minorities.

This puts a brake on the exercise of power. The Constitution, which expresses the people's will, provides for safeguards against arbitrary impositions by the state as well as other forces - faceless, hidden or otherwise - that may see to impose their own imperatives.

This means that the people have advanced to the footlights. They can be mobilised by political parties and they can be led. But they cannot be forced to accept anything against their collective will. And they could not be bamboozled indefinitely. They know that they have the right to have their say on fundamental issues.

If the issue of divorce is to be brought up, it should not arise from notions that spring from the café or the discotheque or from student extra-mural activity in the warmth of the mid-day sun. It should be advanced by the political parties that want the matter discussed with relevance, on behalf of interested citizens, prior to asking for a mandate and in anticipation of proposing the necessary legislation in Parliament.

The mandate should come from a general election or a referendum and the rest will follow in the light of the popular will. On issues that impinge on the sensitive side of the social framework, the sentiments of the whole social corpus come into play, not just a minority claiming its perceived "rights".

Any new legal dispositions and related arrangements have to be made formally on authority. That authority has to come from the people and not from faceless persons or from hidden interests and, much less, from a government without the semblance of a mandate. Without that authority, the future could be positively ominous. It leads to crisis.

At this stage, I have no wish to enter into the merits or demerits of the civil law aspect of the divorce issue. But I would like to break a lance against proponents who are trying to force the issue by speaking of the "new morality". It will not do to dignify a crisis situation by presenting it as a conflict between moralities, two civilisations, one in decay and the other in its dawn.

Democracy needs its ethos, its ethical side as it were. If one is unwilling to submit to any norm, it amounts to denying all morality and this is not amoral but immoral.

I have written the above in the belief that the Maltese people are sovereign. The meaning of this proclamation is no other than to uplift human souls from their interior servitude and to implant within the conviction of their dignity.