The apparent narrow victory of Viktor Yanukovich in Ukraine's presidential election last Sunday - five years after trying to steal the presidency - represents a remarkable comeback for the pro-Russian politician.
Mr Yanukovich's attempt to cheat his way to victory in the November 2004 election led to him being swept aside in the Orange Revolution headed by outgoing President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, his defeated opponent in this year's contest.
Tymoshenko has so far refused to concede defeat in this election, claiming that fraud took place, and has also declined to step down as Prime Minister.
The official electoral result was indeed close with Yanukovich getting 48.8 per cent of the vote compared to 45.7 per cent for Tymoshenko. Four per cent of voters (one million Ukrainians) rejected both candidates, which is a higher margin than Yanukovich's victory.
International observers, including those from the OSCE and the Council of Europe have judged the poll to be free and fair. Matyas Eörsi, head of the delegation of the Council of Europe's parliamentary assembly, remarked after the election: "Some say the Orange Revolution has failed. I say no. Thanks to the Orange Revolution democratic elections in Ukraine are now a reality."
What explains Yanukovich's victory? Divisions in the Orange camp were rife, corruption is still a major problem, the economic situation is dismal - the Ukrainian economy contracted by 15 per cent last year - and IMF aid was halted because of Parliament's failure to adhere to hard but necessary economic measures. In short, there was widespread disillusion with the Orange government.
The biggest single cause of Yanukovich's victory, I believe, was the intense bickering, over the much of the last five years, between the two leading lights of the Orange camp - President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko - which almost paralysed the government and prevented it from getting to grips with the country's intense economic crisis.
The two also fiercely criticised each other in the first round of voting - in which Yushchenko received a humiliating 5.5 per cent of the vote. Yushchenko even continued his feud against his supposed Orange colleague before the second round of voting by signing an amendment to the electoral law that was clearly advantageous to her rival, Viktor Yanukovich.
Despite the Orange government's unpopularity, however, Ukraine has changed for the better over the past five years. Its elections are now free and fair, its media is free from state control, it has better relations with Europe and the outside world, and its sense of identity as an independent state has grown. So Yanukovich will take office - should Tymoshenko concede - in a different country in terms of democracy.
Tymoshenko's refusal to accept the result, at least for now, could be a way of forcing Yanukovich to accept some sort of compromise such as keeping her as Prime Minister. However, international observers believe Tymoshenko's fragile parliamentary coalition will soon collapse and Yanukovich's Party of the Regions is likely to entice MPs from Yushchenko's Our Ukraine bloc - currently in coalition with Tymoshenko - as well as other minority factions to form a new coalition which will then choose a new Prime Minister. If a new majority cannot be formed, then a parliamentary election will have to be held.
Yanukovich's greatest challenge, if he does manage to confirm his victory, secure a new parliamentary majority and form a new government, is to restore Ukraine's economy and to set out a new vision for relations with the EU and Russia.
He will also have to restart negotiations with the IMF, which last year suspended its €12 billion aid package to Ukraine. The IMF, on the other hand, will want guarantees on cuts on spending, pensions and household gas subsidies in return for help, something Yanukovich promised not to do in the campaign.
Yanukovich, whose support in the country is based in the Russian-speaking east and south, is clearly more at home in Moscow than in Brussels, and this is bound to affect both his economic and foreign policies. His record in managing the economy is not good. As Prime Minister between 2003 and 2004 and again from 2006 to 2007 his policies were hardly reformist and he was often associated with shadowy privatisation deals. If he wants closer ties with the European Union, as he says he does, he will have to bring about EU-oriented reform, but many observers believe he - and the oligarchs who back him - will feel uncomfortable with this.
Yanakovich will definitely not pursue Ukraine's Nato or EU membership bids, is bound to forge closer ties with Moscow and is in favour of a customs union with Russia. Furthermore, he will have to deliver on a promise to extract cheaper gas from Russia. He has also pledged to recognise the breakaway territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which could cause problems with the west.
If Yanakovich really wants to get Ukraine out of its economic mess he will have to adopt a new market friendly approach and introduce genuine reforms. Whether he is up to the challenge, considering his past record in office, is another matter.