Ministerial accountability

Are we paying lip service when we boast that our system of popular democracy, based on an adult franchise, is the only tolerable form of government for a freedom-loving people?

This question is legitimate because, on the one hand, we hear so many voices pleading for the defence and enlargement of personal freedom and for a participative democracy based on the consent of the governed and, on the other, we see big government getting bigger and more intrusive in the affairs of the citizen. What is worse, there is a threat to our liberty to call authority to account if, for any reason, it is found wanting or unreasonable.

One of the prime objectives of a popular democracy will always be equality. The other is freedom. But there are democrats who claim it is only by direct and continuous state intervention that the strong and persistent trend towards social and economic equality can be maintained. Simultaneously, as government gets bigger and more pervasive, the bureaucracy is coming increasingly to the fore and is delegated with greater authority to use the paraphernalia of state power.

There is, therefore, the constant danger of the state arrogating too much power, thereby encroaching on the turf both of Parliament and of the courts. The real danger is that the real power of the Executive (the government) passes more and more from the hands of ministers, who can be called to account by the representatives of the people, into the hands of faceless individuals out of reach of parliamentary scrutiny.

Parliamentarians with a lively appreciation of their prerogatives could stand up to the despotism of the Executive when this is in evidence. But faceless nominees on quangos and autonomous authorities, the likes of which have mushroomed at an alarming rate, are out of reach and out of range of parliamentarians and could, conceivably, establish a despotism on the ruins of the two leading features of the Constitution: the sovereignty of Parliament and the rule of law.

There is no doubt that good civil servants and consultants advise ministers about the powers a department ought to have if a task, entrusted to it by Parliament, is to be efficiently performed. It is Parliament that confers such powers and, if it is so minded, it can take them back.

The question that arises is how far Parliament should delegate its powers. Should the devolution of power by Parliament run to the extent that ministers cease to be accountable?

Responsible government presupposes that the Executive must, when called upon to do so, account for its actions to those to whom it is answerable, that is, ultimately, the electorate.

A system where decisions are decreed by autonomous authorities beyond popular scrutiny offends the principle of parliamentary democracy. It amounts to absolutism.

Evidence seems to be accumulating that such a system is taking shape in these islands, as more "autonomous" authorities are being set up outside the umbrella of parliamentary scrutiny. They are manned by hand-picked nominees of the government and sustained by public funds.

Some of them are being dressed up as "regulators" with their own brief. In a number of areas, there are overlaps of responsibility and clashes of authority. The "money no problem" mode comes back and public expenditure runs at a gallop.

The question that arises is not about the proper division of the functions of government between Parliament, the Executive and the courts. It is whether the functions assigned to the Executive are effectively discharged by ministers and how far they could be properly delegated.

In examining this question, it may be useful to divide a minister's duties into three categories: the determination of policy, the retention of parliamentary support and the supervision of the administrative work involved.

True enough, decisions could not be taken wisely without data that only experts can provide or the accumulated experience that permanence can give. But the decision ought to be the minister's alone.

If one were to turn to the second category of the minister's duties - those in Parliament itself - it is the minister who must occupy the stage. The role of officials is that of a prompter in the wings; or so it should be.

Like the prompter, an official should not be heard. Much less should he be authorised to take decisions off his own bat. It is the minister who should be on top of civil servants and the bureaucratic cohorts and not the other way round.

When it comes to the third category of ministerial duties - that of day-to-day administration - the size of the bureaucratic machine is such that countless decisions have to be taken every day by officials on their own responsibility, exercising delegated powers under the law.

This has to be within the limits assigned to them by their superiors. This is bureaucracy - democracy cannot get rid of it and must make the best of circumstances.

But no democratic parliamentary system is worthy of its name if ministers are dethroned and if parliamentary authority could not be effectively exercised under scrutiny in the name of the electorate.

One main protection against deviations from the high purposes of parliamentary democracy must continue to be the enforcement of the principle of ministerial responsibility and accountability.

Many years ago, it was Lord Bryce who pointed out that "neglect to fix responsibility became one of the most fertile sources of trouble in popular government".

Politicians with a thirst for power are not likely to honour this golden rule if they can get away with suiting their partisan interests.

A maturing electorate, intent on building up resistance to arbitrary power, would think otherwise and act accordingly.