During Nato's recent 60th anniversary ceremony in Strasbourg, the Alliance welcomed two new members, Albania and Croatia, bringing its total membership to 28. This expansion is a good thing, for history has tormented these two countries.

Being welcomed within the great international family of the West will reassure them, stabilise them, and contribute to their political, cultural and economic development.

But, the good news was limited, because Nato addressed only a routine agenda. No core problem was really tackled.

The controversy that arose in France over the country's return to Nato's unified military command makes this abundantly clear.

Was France losing its autonomy, perhaps even its sovereignty? Was it capitulating to American hegemony? These are real questions, yet at the Nato summit people spoke of them more in terms of symbols than as realities.

But, what is the reality here? Nato is a military alliance composed of 28 countries. One of them, the US, has a military budget that is more than three times that of all the other members combined. Hence, the US runs most Nato civilian and military commands with the consent of the others. Of course, there is a collective consultation and deliberative process that enables any member to be heard. But in reality a member's actual power is what affects common decisions.

This structure harks back to the conditions of Nato's birth, when it was forged to thwart the Soviet threat to Western civilisation. At the time, no one ever doubted that American power - already endowed with nuclear weapons - was the only counterpart. For this reason, the US came to preside over the alliance.

During the 41 years of the Cold War, 14 of Nato's 16 members strictly obeyed and complied with American decisions and policies. French President Charles de Gaulle was the only one to question whether an American President would actually ever be ready to launch a nuclear attack on the USSR in order to protect one or several Alliance members if vital US interests were not directly at stake.

Based on that doubt, France - a nuclear power since 1960 - withdrew in 1966 from the Alliance's permanent centralised military command in order to assert its own deterrent capability.

This decision was mainly grounded on the American doctrine, adopted in 1962, of "flexible response," which said to the Soviets: "As long as you do not use nuclear weapons, we will not use them, either." This very doctrine left Europe exposed.

Indeed, while it is a much disputed question, General de Gaulle was probably right about America's lack of commitment to the nuclear defence of Europe. Both Henry Kissinger and Robert McNamara left office admitting that Mr de Gaulle had been correct. Nevertheless, Mr de Gaulle's insights left a legacy that still causes some mistrust and dissent within Nato. France was right on this key strategic point, but it was never able to explain its position to its allies.

This inability to discuss, clearly and forthrightly, this strategic doctrine continues to hamper the Alliance. At the Strasbourg summit, confidence in the future could have been strengthened if a couple of troubling issues had been discussed. Instead, once again, there was an extended focus on the past.

The key questions are whether Nato's doctrine of common defence is currently directed at one country in particular, and whether nuclear force remains the Alliance's major defensive tool.

In the current global situation, no predictable conflict will require the use of a nuclear weapon. At the moment, there is no global threat and the Alliance only intervenes in regional conflicts, so why not have Nato admit this?

But the most important matter that went unmentioned in Strasbourg is the relationship with Russia. Nato was founded to confront the threat that the USSR represented 60 years ago.

But the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union's "anti-Nato" alliance of socialist countries, was dissolved in 1991; communism imploded the same year, with Russia caught ever since in a struggle to build a market economy and define a new global position for itself.

At a time when Russia was taking a more pacific course, Nato - unlike the Warsaw Pact - was not dismantled. On the contrary, the Allies chose to maintain the pact and to extend it to numerous Russian neighbours.

Nato's members essentially said: "We Western nations do not trust you. Even if you become a democracy, we will always be suspicious."

George Kennan, one of the greatest American diplomats of the post-war years, once wrote that the Western world was committing its biggest mistake in 50 years' time by expanding Nato after Soviet communism collapsed.

The resulting humiliation and blatant mistrust that Russia's elite has felt ever since has led them to their current policy of rearmament. The only way to resolve this problem is for Nato to assert its pacific intentions before the world.

The most convincing way to do that is to moderate America's excessive taste for power, which it demonstrated in Iraq.

Nato needs to shift its focus from organising and administering a unified military command to building real confidence that every member's voice will be heard.

To that end, all members must stand on an equal footing. France's decision to return to full and equal Alliance membership was a good one, and France must now work from within to advance the principles in which it believes.

The author, former Prime Minister of France and leader of the Socialist Party, is a member of the European Parliament.

©Project Syndicate, 2009, www.project-syndicate.org.