Prime Minister Lawrence Gonzi appeared jubilant last week at the EU Council meeting in Brussels. "The fact that Malta could keep a permanent commissioner is very positive," he told the press.
Yes, but no thanks to him. For did he voice any concerns when the constitutional treaty was re-negotiated into the Lisbon Treaty? Indeed not. To the contrary, just as he had ratified the already-rejected constitutional treaty without a national debate, he made sure that Malta was one of the first to ratify the Lisbon Treaty - even before anyone could read it, since a consolidated version was not yet available.
Had Malta held a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty we would have debated its contents and discovered, like the Irish, that certain provisions could be of concern.
I will not venture into how the Lisbon Treaty transfers more power from national parliaments to the EU civil service or how it paves the way towards increasing EU competences. I will instead limit myself to what the Irish voters found distasteful in the Lisbon Treaty after debating its contents.
The loss of the permanent commissioner was high on the Irish list of concerns. Although commissioners do not represent their countries, but in fact pledge allegiance to the Union, it is desirable for every country to have one of its nationals occupying a "Cabinet" post in the Commission.
And that is what we gained through the Irish no. But should the Irish vote yes in the second referendum next year, only Ireland will benefit from the other three concessions: on abortion, taxation and neutrality.
In the case of abortion, the implications are not immediately noticeable in the Lisbon Treaty. But, although there is no explicit mention of abortion, the connection is traceable, as I will explain.
Annexed to the Lisbon Treaty we find the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which replaces the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). There is not much difference between the Charter and the ECHR, except for the adjudicating court. Whereas the ECHR falls under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, which has no connection with the European Union, the Charter falls under the jurisdiction of the EU Court of Justice in Luxembourg (ECJ). So while the Lisbon Treaty establishes EU citizenship as being "additional" to national citizenship, the ECJ, through the Charter, acquires jurisdiction over the rights of all EU citizens.
With the Lisbon Treaty, the ECJ would have the authority, once presented with a case, to establish case law that harmonises abortion-related legislation across the EU.
The ECJ has long been accused by critics of empowering the EU with competences outside the framework of the treaties. In other words, more power is transferred not through ratification by national parliaments but through the rulings of the ECJ. Ultimately, the ECJ has primacy over national laws and constitutions; with Lisbon, it would technically have the authority to rule that abortion rights are universal.
The issue of taxation largely deals with the harmonisation of corporate tax rates, which would jeopardise Ireland's low rates. In brief, whereas now taxes can be harmonised only when it is necessary for the functioning of the EU internal market, the Lisbon Treaty widens this scope to include "distortion of competition". This allows for unlimited interpretation of which tax rates could distort competition.
Moreover, the annexed Protocol 27 redefines the internal market as "a system ensuring that competition is not distorted". This means that at any given opportunity the ECJ could rule on whether specific tax rates distort competition, ultimately leading towards complete harmonisation of all tax rates across the EU.
Neutrality is another thorny issue for the Irish. The Lisbon Treaty establishes a "common security and defence policy" and explicitly encourages militarisation to police the world ("peacekeeping" by the barrel of the gun). It also provides for the creation of a "permanent structured cooperation" where a number of member states voluntarily form a military alliance that acts in the name of the Union, including neutral states and others outside the military alliance that might disagree with a particular military action. Critics maintain that this "permanent structured cooperation" is just another name for a European army.
In Malta, the question of neutrality has long been abandoned by our leaders. And, yet, Malta officially remains a constitutionally neutral republic that actively works towards peaceful goals. Does Malta qualify for the same guarantees given to Ireland? Would Dr Gonzi dare bring this constitutional question to the EU agenda?
On these three issues, Ireland received assurances, concessions and guarantees - probably in some non-binding declarations that would be tested by the passage of time. But whatever the outcome, the stance of the majority of the people of Ireland was tough on the EU. They were critical of the treaty, which they saw as unclear in some aspects and too clear in others. And for being critical they were rewarded.
For this, however, the Irish are asked to vote again by the end of next year. Another no should, of course, reopen Pandora's Box and that is when we need our government to wake up and act decisively.
But, to conclude on a different note, it was nice to hear Dr Gonzi say that Malta's sixth seat could eventually be confirmed through the Croatia Accession Treaty. You see, last February, on Xarabank, he had dismissed my claim that the Lisbon Treaty was only a vehicle for the ratification of the agreed new composition of the European Parliament. It turns out I was right in saying that the implementation of the seats agreement should not necessarily depend on the Lisbon Treaty.
It seems to me that Dr Gonzi's government is sailing through the EU dream with their rudder stuck to the bow.
The author has been working as an EU affairs consultant in the European Parliament since 2004.