Out in 18 months or 100 years?

Winston Churchill once said that, in wartime, truth was so precious that it needed to be surrounded by a "bodyguard of lies." In America's Presidential campaign - and, sadly, within Iraq itself nowadays - the Iraq War may not be surrounded by a bodyguard of lies, but it has certainly picked up a vast entourage of partisan half-truths, cynical indifference, and uninformed stubbornness.

America's Democrats continue to argue for complete withdrawal of US forces from Iraq within 18 months, despite the fact that no rational observer believes that Iraqi forces will, by then, be able to secure Iraq's borders and face down the country's numerous militias, which remain armed to the teeth.

Indeed, the Democratic plan (if it can be called one) ignores Iran's ongoing subversion of Iraq's state institutions, which will continue unless and until they become strong enough to resist such machinations. Moreover, Barack Obama's insistence that Iraq has never constituted a central front in the war on terror insults the memory of tens of thousands - perhaps hundreds of thousands - of Iraqi civilians and US troops murdered by al-Qaeda's suicide bombers since 2003. Indeed, by 2004, the terrorists themselves regarded Iraq as the central front of their campaign.

Nor can one be buoyed by Joseph Biden's repeated calls for a "soft partition" of Iraq, even though the entire Iraqi political class has rejected the notion.

As for the Republicans, setting aside Sarah Palin's talk of America's divine mission in the war on terror, it is inconceivable that John McCain truly believes that a US presence is sustainable in Iraq into the indefinite future.

To be fair, Mr McCain never suggested that US troops will wage 100 years of war, as some of his critics claim. What Mr McCain was referring to was a peaceable presence of US forces in the country for a long period, rather like their continued presence in Japan since 1945.

Still, even assuming that the American public would tolerate such a presence, the Iraqi public would not. America has made too many policy mistakes, US forces are too closely associated with an unpopular and incompetent occupation, and, until recently, their tactics have been too thuggish to permit talk of a permanent presence.

While most Iraqis understand the need for US forces to be in their country for the short term, they will not abide a permanent deployment. Mr McCain's advisors would do well to consider a historical precedent: The failed British attempt at World War One's close to maintain a long-term military presence in Iraq.

Iraqi politicians have not been exempt from posturing for political gain. The government committed a number of blunders in its negotiations on the continued presence of US troops. Indeed, this summer it injected itself into the US elections by seeming to endorse Mr Obama's plan for early withdrawal.

Then again, for three consecutive years, Iraq's national security advisor - a physician with no credentials for the job when appointed by the US occupation authority, except that he spoke tolerable English - insisted that the next year would be the last in which American troops were needed.

Iraq's government is demanding a withdrawal timetable from the US, not because it believes that Iraqi forces will be ready to take over soon, but to burnish its nationalist credentials ahead of next year's parliamentary elections.

Thus, it hopes to divert public attention from still non-existent basic services, continuing sectarianism, weak oil production, scant infrastructure investment, and rampant corruption and cronyism. Whether this strategy will succeed in obscuring the government's record of failure in the minds of voters, remains to be seen.

The problem now for Iraqi and US politicians is that, to act rationally, they will need to face down elements within their own constituencies.

They must recognise that a long-term presence by US troops is out of the question, but that US combat forces will be needed in Iraq - albeit with a diminishing role - for the next five years.

Only such a presence can consolidate the palpable, but still reversible, gains made over the past year.

Such a force is needed to continue pursuing al-Qaeda, and to counteract pro-Iranian activities. Ending US involvement before the Iraqis can achieve these goals on their own would be disastrous for both US and Iraqi interests. In the meantime, US forces must support Iraqi efforts to strengthen the country's own military and security forces, while simultaneously disbanding all militias.

Iraq's militias will not go quietly, yet their dissolution is essential for long-term stability, itself a sine qua non for stability in the region. When these missions are accomplished - but not sooner - US forces should withdraw from Iraq.

The author served as Iraq's Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN from 2004 to 2007. He is currently a visiting professor of law at Indiana University.

©Project Syndicate, 2008. www.project-syndicate.org