Clarification over police probe into alleged fraud on Manwel Dimech Bridge

The services related to the inspection, design, supervision and certification of works on the Manwel Dimech Bridge were entrusted by the Malta Transport Authority (ADT) in June 2005 to a consortium formed between Design & Technical Resources Limited (DTR) and Konig, Heunisch und Partner (KHP) with the former company being the leading partner.

This consortium was engaged on these works following a public call for tenders.

The ADT had separately engaged a consortium of contractors, entrusted with the civil works, at a later date. DTR + KHP were, at no stage of the works, engaged in any manner by the consortium of contractors, who had engaged their own engineers, both local and foreign, who were required to render the necessary professional services to the contractors, as per the contractors' contract conditions. Among the duties required from the contractors' engineers in terms of the contract, such engineers had to ensure that all works on the bridge were carried out according to the specifications and instructions of the supervisor, DTR + KHP.

One of the duties of the supervisor was to certify that the works were indeed carried out to specifications, on the basis of the technical information provided from time to time by the contractors' engineers as well as on personal direct supervision, with the ultimate scope of certifying that all the works were carried out according to the contracted specifications, terms and conditions, and that ultimately the structure would achieve its design life. DTR + KHP's terms of engagement established that a final certification had to be completed by the Supervisor following the completion of the works on the bridge.

This certification comprises an analysis of all the works carried out by, and technical data received from, the contractors.

The documentation required to enable the DTR + KHP to complete the certification exercise were submitted by the contractors on October 8, this year.

When this documentation was being analysed, the supervisor found, included in the documentation received, correspondence which evidenced that incorrect information and technical data had been submitted during the course of the works by the contractors' foreign engineer to the supervisor, with regard to the bridge's post-tension operations.

Reference is being made to the e-mail which the foreign engineer addressed to the contractors on March 22, this year, wherein he states that the supervisor had directed the contractors to tension a number of the bridge tendons to 105 per cent but that the foreign engineer would pretend to carry out such works during the Easter period (between Good Friday and Easter Sunday), when he was sure that the supervisor would not be present on site, and consequently doctor the values of the recorded elongation of the tendons on the relevant technical document to be submitted to the supervisor, thereby giving the impression that the post-tensioning of the tendons had been duly carried out in accordance with the instructions of the supervisor.

It is to be clarified that the instructions issued by the supervisor, as above explained, had followed a previous exercise, which was carried out under the constant supervision of DTR + KHP, whereby the bridge tendons in question had been stressed to approximately 100 per cent.

Following the discovery of this e-mail and the accompanying technical document, the supervisor established that the bridge tendons had effectively only been stressed to approximately 100 per cent.

DTR + KHP confirmed that the structural integrity of the bridge was not compromised by the missing additional post-tensioning requested, but that such an omission may have a minimal affect on the durability of the structure, which was intended to have a design life of 80 years and possibly increase the costs of maintenance of the bridge.

For purposes of clarity, it is to be specified that the post-tensioning (stretching) exercise is carried out by specialised equipment which the contractors were, in this case, contractually bound to supply.

Once the gauge records the established stress, the tendons are cut, anchored and grouted. Consequently, the supervisor has no technical means to verify the final value of the tension elongation, unless he is physically present during such an exercise.

After verifying that the structural integrity was not compromised, DTR + KHP requested an urgent appointment with the chairman of the Network Infrastructure Directorate (NID), which meeting was convened last Monday.

During the meeting the supervisor, in the presence of a senior architect who was also monitoring the works on behalf of the ADT, gave the chairman of NID an explicit account of the above information and conclusions, with supporting documentation.

In view of the above, DTR + KHP regret the erroneous impression emanating from the title given to the statement issued by the Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport and Communications and to subsequent newspaper reports, wherein it was stated that the suspicion of fraud was directly linked to the certification of the bridge, thereby implying some wrongdoing on the part of DTR + KHP as the consortium entrusted with such certification.