Caucasian dominoes

One should think twice about domino theories of international relations. They tend to be woefully wrong.

During the Cold War, some thought that certain Latin American countries might turn communist like falling dominoes. In recent years, some argued that a democratic Iraq or Afghanistan would spread democracy throughout the Middle East, again like dominoes. In both cases, the domino theory led to unfortunate mistakes being made.

It may still be useful to consider a domino theory of the Caucasus, however. It would help us see the recent war between Russia and Georgia in a wide regional framework, rather than a simple conflict between two counties.

Russia has few friends in the trans-Caucasian region. It is facing the prospect of having, in a few years, either EU members or Nato members as its immediate neighbours.

Whether out of pride or out of strategic need strengthened by its energy supplies, Russia is likely to resist this.

The EU may find that the attitude Russia has shown towards South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two would-be breakaway states from Georgia, will be repeated elsewhere. The consequences for the EU may be huge.

Today, I would like to focus on Armenia, perhaps Russia's only dependable friend in the trans-Caucasus.

Even a brief visit to Armenia, as mine was in the summer of 2005, would quickly impress upon one some of the salient aspects of Armenia's regional politics.

Its material heritage includes Greco-Roman ruins - temple, baths, mosaics. There is the Christian heritage in a country where the religion was adopted as early as the third century.

Convents clinging out of caves, churches hewn out of mountains, the country is adorned with monasteries. But one cannot view these sites without learning of Armenia's troubled relationship with Turkey: disputed territory, the historic Armenian diaspora (and churches) in Turkey, the Armenian genocide at the hands of the Ottoman army in 1915.

All these, especially the last, continue to create tension between the two countries. As the border between them remains closed, Armenia depends for much of its trade on its other huge neighbour, Russia.

In the recent conflict with Georgia, Armenian popular opinion was heavily biased in favour of Russia, even if the latter is viewed with ambivalence.

However, whatever doubts Armenians may have about their excessive dependence on Russia, two factors will ensure that Armenia's ties with Russia remain close.

One is Turkey. If relations with Turkey remain tense, then Armenia will depend on Russia for guaranteed protection. The second is a dispute over territory that Armenia has with another former Soviet state, Azerbaijan.

This territory is called Nagorno Karabakh. If the EU demands onerous concessions from Armenia in this conflict, the latter may well prefer to stick with Russia. Currently, trade between the two is growing exponentially.

Such ties could be significant for Europe. Armenia's trade and exchanges with Russia are increasing to a significant extent because of the growing importance of energy security. There are important pipelines passing through Armenia, apart from mineral mines.

There are signs that Turkey's relationship with Armenia may be on the mend. My old Council of Europe friend, Abdullah Gul, now President of Turkey, recently visited on the pretext of watching a Turkey-Armenia football match. It was the first visit by a Turkish head of state.

Repairing relations with Armenia is important for Turkey's EU membership bid. But if membership is denied, something very interesting may still come out of the new friendship with Armenia.

Although Turkey is a Nato member, this has never really bothered Russia. Indeed, the war with Georgia may have actually served to strengthen Russia-Turkey ties, according to some observers.

It should be remembered that Turkey, with its Kurdish problem, is very sensitive about the problems that have been created for it, in this respect, by the US invasion of Iraq. Since the war with Georgia is believed, in the region, to have partly been triggered by misguided support from the US, Russia and Turkey have a grudge in common.

They have more than that. They both have energy supplies and important pipelines. A friendly alliance between Russia and Turkey, with no tension over Armenia, would make them a formidable duo to cross.

This has implications not just for the respect and intelligence with which the EU should treat Russia. It also implies that if Turkey is rebuffed by Europe, its Plan B would not necessarily be some alliance on Islamic lines, as certain Europeans imagine. It would, in a way, be far more menacing. For it would be a hostile alliance based on energy supply.

In such a regional scenario, a country like Armenia would be an important domino. As would other countries, like Azerbaijan and Moldova. But those two countries deserve consideration in their own right.

Dr Attard Montalto is a Labour member of the European Parliament.