The article by Prof. John Baldacchino of Columbia University (The Sunday Times, September 28) calls for a number of clarifications.

The very first sentence: "To argue for or against divorce has nothing to do with morality" surely needs an intelligible explanation. Morality is concerned with all human acts - of commission or omission - and deeming such acts as being either good or bad. Now divorce is surely a human act, and therefore is to be judged as being either good or bad according to whatever code of morality one acknowledges. To write that divorce has nothing to do with morality means that the writer has to explain what he means by morality.

I need hardly point out that this does not mean that divorce is good or bad, but simply that divorce, like all human acts falls within the sphere of morality.

Of course, the writer contradicts his opening statement because the rest of his writing tends to prove that divorce is a good thing, and that judgment is a moral judgment.

The second, unintelligible, statement read: "To moralise against divorce is to say that those whose marriage breaks down are weak and must suffer the consequences." This statement shows in the first place that 'moralising' about divorce means that to moralise, according to the writer, is to condemn as bad or evil, but does not include that moralising which proclaims divorce as good is not also an exercise in moralising.

The third unintelligible statement is: "The State has no role in judging couples whose relationship has ended." Presumably the writer excludes the authority or jurisdiction of all courts from deciding any claim for divorce by one of the parties against the other party. This appears to be an anarchical position and the writer perhaps should explain what he means.

A fourth strange position taken by the writer is: "Free and responsible individuals are not passive beings who require laws to conduct their lives" but later on Prof. Baldacchino contradicts that statement by saying "which is why the law must be there to preserve one's choice and one's right, and at the same time make sure that legality and morality prevails."

The writer seems to be in two minds about the roles of the State and of the law and this permeates the whole article.

He wants to put out of court, as it were, the State and the law from judging on the relationship between men and women, but then calls upon the two to assist him to bring about the state of affairs he advocates. Among the many parts of the article where this emerges are: "Subsequent 'second' or 'third' families are no less real; just as single parents and same-sex families cannot be ignored. All these are real families and the State cannot force anyone to follow one model. The State must mirror the fact that relationships are plural and that children grow in a variety of contexts. The State must protect its citizens and Parliament must hear and consider everyone's rights."

So it is the State which is burdened with the task of considering "everyone's rights". And, of course 'rights' do have a moral component which the word itself implies.

Lastly, comes the showdown on what the writer really thinks about the human condition: "Although the scenario of women and man, falling in love, getting married and having children seems like the natural thing to do, marriage has nothing to do with natural law."

It would be preposterous of me to think the writer does not know that natural law is concerned with right reason and human basic values, but he should be a bit more attentive about the way he peppers around with the use of common, but intelligible, expressions like morality, the State, the law, and finally natural law, and see to it that their use does not bring about not only contrasts and conflicts in what one writes but outright contradictions.

When these are quite a number and are repeated, it becomes quite tedious to reply.