Editorial

A red blip on the radar screen

It took well over a year for the powers-that-be to publish the findings of an investigation into an air-miss close to Malta International Airport on April 21, 2007. Alas, the report, dated June 17 this year, gives rise to questions that the sooner they are answered, the better for the peace of mind of air passengers.

On June 15, The Sunday Times carried a news item saying that a report by the Bureau of Air Accident Investigation (BAAI) had just been submitted to the government, giving details of the main findings. The chief inspector of accidents did not seem to like this, complaining that somebody had leaked the information to The Sunday Times, which, after all, was only fulfilling its duty of informing the public about a matter of grave public concern on which the authorities took their time to give an account.

The findings are perturbing.

The Italian registered Storm ultra-light aircraft that almost collided with an Air Malta airliner "entered Maltese controlled airspace undetected". Having an aircraft "invading" a country's airspace undetected is already bad in itself but the report goes even further. "Notwithstanding that I-6293 entered the Terminal Area undetected, the radar traces subsequently recovered from Mats recording facility clearly show the radar plot indicating the lateral trajectory of I-6293 commencing approximately 35 nautical miles NNW from the airport. Since I-6293 was not ATC transponder-equipped, the traces were from primary radar only," the BAAI noted. It then added: "During the unauthorised incursion of I-6293, a controller shift change was in progress at all Area, Approach and Tower stations".

The BAAI examined the radar recordings and could see that the airliner and the "unidentified radar return could be noted as being on converging tracks". The bureau felt it should point out that the short-term conflict alert warnings on the radar system in use are only visual and do not emit any sound.

Radar software engineers who inspected the equipment after the air-miss confirmed that "the radar was functioning properly at the time".

However, there "is a substantial difference between what was noted during the radar playback and what all the air traffic controllers said that they observed during the actual incident". All the controllers insisted they did not see any unidentified aircraft return on their radar screens. Intercom recordings did not indicate the presence of any unidentified aircraft being observed on radar and the tone of the voice of the two controllers handling the airliner were "also quite calm".

The BAAI concluded thus: "The fact that a radar return can be seen on the radar recordings and (cannot) be seen on the radar display at the time of the incident cannot be explained". Likewise, the bureau was unable to determine whether any of the controllers on duty saw a primary radar return of the small aircraft. Yet, it found no evidence that the radar system was not functioning properly.

The BAAI made five safety recommendations. Two stand out: An evaluation of work practices and standard operating procedures at air traffic services and the possibility of introducing aural warnings on the radar system.

Whether it is a matter of radar equipment that needs improving/updating, a more efficient shift system or whatever, the matter begs urgent attention... and a clear explanation to the public, preferably immediately.

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