Be or not to be

In Kenneth Wain's article on bioethics (January 15), it transpires to be interesting how I was the one originally basing arguments on factual scientific material regarding the human being, before certain other individuals brought in the personality argument, and I end up being berated for basing arguments for the defence of human life, on the philosophical concepts of personhood! My original contention was in fact that there are different definitions of what person means and that, although one could argue till Kingdom come about which was the right definition, there was no easy objective way to settle the matter from the definition of personhood. One however has his opinion which one is entitled to hold.

Where does that leave us with respect to a human being in embryonic form in a womb or laboratory dish, considering that there is now the presence of a third human being in the discussion, although without the capacity to regale us with its opinion? I have always argued from objective scientific fact that one cannot debate the existence of the biologically defined human being (there have been weak efforts to do this on the basis of twinning and individuality, but these arguments are now superseded by scientific developments).

Prof. Wain will probably object to this on the basis of the naturalistic fallacy that an "is" does not automatically imply an "ought". The product of Hume and Moore's thinking. The language of analytical philosophy may be itself used to counter this assertion (vide John Searle and James McGlynn). I have no intention of boring readers with this philosophical debate that we have entertained them to in the past. Using an objective rather than a subjective morality, I have no doubt that the presence of a human "is" rationally implies an "ought". Since a biologically defined human being exists, one ought to respect him or her!

Where does that leave me as a doctor, who might want to make decisions which effect the life of a human being whose personhood is being quibbled about as per quiddity? Once a human organismic fact is present, then I really have no alternative but to protect that human life, even if, which is not the case, I might have doubts as to its personhood.

If his claims damage the rights and life of a third human being, then I have no personal qualms legally imposing my morality on anyone, him included, for the sake of the third human being. I do so, of course, through the proper democratic channels on the premise that there are others who think as I do.

There is such a thing as a moral object in ethics. The correct underlying objective morality in this case would be that if the third being is human then that being is in possession of rights and, consequently, those rights demand an obligation from our part. The morality of the US Supreme Court's Decision in Roe vs Wade to rule abortion within the sphere of private action, and, therefore, a constitutional right, forced the pro-choice morality on the whole American nation, with abortions ending up being paid for through public funding.

Prof. Wain seems intent on labelling me as a fundamentalist. I do not like labelling people as I might then be tempted to call him a consequentialist liberal but, then again, the human psyche is too complex to allow this. If, however, protecting human life at its weakest renders one a fundamentalist, then so be it! What's in a name?

His other effort to draw faith as opposed to reason has been answered too many times in the past to go into it again here.

In many democracies and democratically composed committees, one of the practical ways to solve issues on bioethics, although not the only one, is through the vote. Notwithstanding, certain basic rights, if there is a large enough consensus, are often enshrined rights which require a much larger qualified majority than a simple one to change.

As for his query as to what are my own particular contributions to the make up of the Bioethics Consultative Committee, the answer is none as this is fully composed on the initiative of the minister concerned. If he would like to know how much my remuneration is, the answer is also none. All Bioethics Consultative Committee members work for the love of God or country but not money. They also have their own vote, which I have no way of determining except, maybe, by persuasion.

Prof. Wain seems to berate me further for referring to the literature of Bernard Lonergan of the Society of Jesus. I do not know why it bothers him because I quoted a Jesuit intellectual. He should be arguing about the essence of what Lonergan says not on who he is or what he believes.

Lonergan is a philosopher who had a very dynamic view of human form and function. But I could quote process philosophers like Alfred Whitehead, with his ideas of a social nexus splendidly defined and applicable to a human being from conception till death. Samuel Alexander, with his view of a plan of life with a repeated memory to execute this plan. Both Whitehead and Alexander were not Catholics. The former a Protestant, the latter a Jew.

What about Pierre Teilhard de Chardin with his concepts of union, his definition of complexity/consciousness and the integration of the concept of freedom in the biological workings of man?

All these peoples' work on process points to conception as the point where individual human life has its beginning. But I suppose that Chardin, being a Catholic, has to be excluded from the philosophical discourse.

How does Prof. Wain think that the human brain stores memory if not by electrical and chemical impulses? How does he think the electrical impulses are generated if not by active depolarisation of the neuron membranes by chemicals? DNA is no less a chemical with the active potency of memory ingrained in its very constitution.

Could it be that he is making the mistake that many philosophers (Parfitt, Singer, Harris) make when attributing personhood to functional empirical development at the same time considering time and space to be static dimensions rather than dynamic concepts of a very relative nature? All concepts of personhood based on static concepts of time and space relative to other individual observers are based on false premises. Time and space are relative to the observer and any description of the actualisation of personhood based on the measurement of the time interval between two human observers does not necessarily hold for the measurement of the time interval between two other human observers. Therefore, a description of personhood based on time intervals of observed development is also inconstant depending on the observer and other circumstantial factors and, therefore, useless as an absolute definition. We have Albert Einstein to thank for that (also a Jew).

That leaves only one reliable definition of personhood. That of ontological development from the existence of the combined human DNA in the cellular organism at conception. But this is all beside the point.

Human life is life and should be protected from the beginning of the human organism, which comes about at conception!