Lebanon is poised to hold a presidential election that none of its contending factions - indeed, none of the rival factions in the region - can afford to lose.
Let's start with Syria. In 2005, President Bashar Assad's regime was forced to withdraw its army from Lebanon, following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Syria is widely believed to have been responsible for the crime, and domestic Lebanese and international pressure helped force Syria's pullout. In a speech soon thereafter, Mr Assad warned that nothing could sever the Syrian-Lebanese relationship.
Mr Assad knows that the election of a president who bolsters Lebanon's sovereignty and independence would make Syria's return difficult - and Mr Assad, as even his allies privately admit, wants nothing less. Moreover, Mr Assad is worried about the creation of a mixed Lebanese-international court to try suspects in the Hariri assassination. The court was approved under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and will be situated in Holland. Once the trial begins, Syria may find itself in the dock.
Closely allied with Syria is Hizbollah, whose armed militia is far more effective than Lebanon's national army, and which has openly rejected UN Security Council resolutions to surrender its weapons.
Hizbollah's priority is to maintain the military capacity to fight Israel, and also to play a pivotal role in the broader regional rivalry between Iran, Syria, Hizbollah, and Hamas on one side, and the US, the Sunni-led mainstream Arab states, the Mahmoud Abbas-led Palestinian Authority, and Syria's Lebanese foes on the other.
But there are constraints on Hizbollah. The party's leaders, like their patrons in Iran, know that any crisis in Lebanon could provoke a Sunni-Shiite conflict, with disastrous consequences. Iran would find itself the bogeyman of the Arab world's Sunnis, while Hizbollah could be swallowed up by another debilitating Lebanese civil war. Hizbollah will have to calculate at several levels. If Mr Assad decides to scuttle the presidential election in order to strengthen Syria's hold in Beirut, Hizbollah will go along. But a political vacuum in Lebanon only makes violence more likely, which Hizbollah doesn't want.
On the other side, Syria's Lebanese enemies know that the election's outcome will determine their fate. Given that several prominent critics of Syria have been killed since 2005, there is little room for compromise. The problem is that the anti-Syrian coalition, known as "March 14," is not yet united around a single presidential candidate.
The US has made it clear that it will not accept a president close to Hizbollah or Syria. While America will not bargain with Syria over the election, it would probably accept a candidate with whom Syria feels comfortable, provided he is acceptable across the political spectrum.
The US must also calculate what the Europeans will accept. France, Italy, and Spain all have large contingents in the UN force in south Lebanon that was expanded after the summer 2006 war. No election, they fear, would endanger their soldiers. This makes them vulnerable to Syrian leverage, and hence more amenable to dealing with Syria on the presidency.
Another key actor is Saudi Arabia, whose relations with Syria are at an all-time low. The Saudis, deeply disturbed by the Syrian-Iranian alliance, worry that re-imposition of Syrian supremacy in Lebanon, and with it the strengthening of Iranian and Shi'ite power there, would threaten the Kingdom itself. But, as the Saudis also want Syria to be included in King Abdullah's regional peace plan, they are not looking for an open-ended confrontation with Mr Assad.
These clashing interests will be played out after September 25, when the two-month period during which Lebanon's parliament must elect a president begins. No side has a yearning for war, which is why compromise solutions are possible.
But what would such a compromise look like?
One idea - to elect a candidate with whom everyone can live - would likely produce a weak president. So would an agreement by all sides to elect an interim president for two years, buying time until the regional balance of power changes or solidifies.
Whatever the outcome, the choice of Lebanon's next president will emerge from a political maelstrom - one that he will almost certainly be powerless to allay.
The author is opinion editor of the Daily Star newspaper in Lebanon.
© Project Syndicate, 2007
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