Suspect in murder case challenges jurors' decision

A 62-year-old man yesterday appealed a decision where jurors found he was of sound mind when he allegedly fatally stabbed his estranged wife in her hospital bed in September 2005.

Lawyers Anglu Farrugia and Edward Gatt, on behalf of Anthony Schembri, argued that the "surprising" verdict of the jurors had unjustifiably ignored the conclusion reached by three psychiatrists who certified that Mr Schembri was not of sound mind when he allegedly stabbed Doris Schembri at St Luke's Hospital.

While pointing out that jurors had "hurriedly" handed down the verdict after 45 minutes of deliberation, the lawyers also criticised decisions by the judge.

Mr Schembri stands charged with the voluntary homicide of Mrs Schembri on September 29, 2005.

The compilation proceedings in the case had been interrupted by defence submissions that their client was insane. A team of three psychiatrists was appointed to draw up a report. But the Attorney General did not agree with the report's conclusion, that Mr Schembri was not of sound mind when he stabbed his wife, so a panel of jurors was appointed to decide the matter.

After hearing the various witnesses in the case, the jurors on Monday concluded that Mr Schembri was of sound mind at the time of the incident. The following day, Mr Justice Giannino Caruana Demajo, sitting in the Criminal Court, declared him of sound mind and ordered the continuation of the compilation of evidence against him.

Mr Schembri has now appealed, raising three main points.

First, he said the jurors' verdict was wrong. They were to reach a verdict based on the evidence they heard during the trial. In this case, the evidence consisted of two main versions.

On one hand, there was the report drawn up by the three psychiatrists who concluded that Mr Schembri was not of sound mind at the time. On the other, there was the statement released by Mr Schembri to the police. The Attorney General was contesting that the statement showed he was in his senses the day he stabbed Mrs Schembri.

The defence noted that the psychiatrists had also concluded that Mr Schembri was in a state of insanity as defined by law. In their testimony, the three experts had stated that it was not advisable to rely on the police statement because, when taking a statement, the police - who were not trained in psychiatry - did not address the individual's mental health situation.

Although jurors had the right to disregard the conclusions of the experts, there was no reason for them to do so at law when the experts where the only witnesses with an understanding of mental health. Besides, no evidence was brought to prove that Mr Schembri was of sound mind.

Secondly, the jurors had not reached their verdict according to the level of proof requested by law. According to law, the defence - that was claiming insanity - had to proof its case to a level of probability. The Attorney General, who was contesting the defence, was legally obliged to prove that Mr Schembri was of sound mind to a level beyond reasonable doubt.

Given the evidence of the psychiatrists, who even invoked insanity with certainty, it was difficult for the jurors to be convinced beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Schembri was sane at the time of the incident.

In the final point, the defence argued that the judge had prejudiced Mr Schembri's case with decisions he took. The defence had requested that no reference be made to a case in which Mr Schembri, in 1991, was charged with violence against his wife. The judge turned down the request allowing reference to be made to his past conduct and this was of prejudice to him.

The defence then asked that, if the jurors were to be informed about the 1991 incident, they should also be informed that Mr Schembri had been declared to have been in a state of insanity at the time.

Such a declaration was made in 1992 and with the approval of the Attorney General. However, the judge, while allowing reference to be made to the 1991 case, did not allow reference to the declaration of insanity. This was prejudicial to Mr Schembri's case.

The defence, therefore, called on the Court of Criminal Appeal to declare the judgment null and declare that the accused was not of sound mind at the time of the alleged incident.